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Azim Premji University’s charter includes Knowledge 
creation and establishing domain knowledge, in various areas 
to help engage in issues related to theoretical and practical 
concerns in education and development. This means both 
intensive work (deeper in relevant disciplines) and extensive 
work (covering multiple disciplines). This naturally also 
implies taking up work in important and popular as well 
as important yet ignored/unattended areas of knowledge – 
towards generating interest and initiating a discourse in a 
particular discipline. 
The series of annual conferences in Philosophy of Education, 
from 2013 to 2018 were part of this initiative to generate 
interest and contribute to the philosophical discourse on 
education in India. This annual event sought to involve 
educationists, practitioners, philosophers, and students of 
education to engage with these issues philosophically. The 
response to these conferences and related events organized 
have been both overwhelming and gratifying. We believe that 
the nature of responses we have received is indicative of the 
need for forums where philosophers and practitioners can 
come together and engage in a dialogue with one another, and 
increasing consensus about how fundamental and urgent the 
task of addressing and engaging with philosophical issues 
and ideas concerning education is. 
We are extremely grateful to several philosophers and 
practitioners of education working on a wide variety of 
issues, who have took keen interest in this event. This volume 
has select papers from the first five conferences which are 
related to issues faced in conceptualizing education (and 
related concepts like teaching, training, intelligence etc. 




The Philosophy of Education conferences organized by 
Azim Premji University from 2013 to 2018 were part of the 
University’s effort to contribute to and develop philosophical 
discourse in education. In this series of annual conferences, 
over 100 presentations were made, by accomplished 
philosophers of education and relatively new entrants into 
the domain of study. Most of the video recordings from 
each conference are available online, but we realize that is 
not enough. It is equally important to bring these important 
papers in print form and initiate a written dialogue among 
educationists and educators. 
This is the first in a series of 3 editions, and comprises a 
selection of papers that engage with some foundational 
conceptual questions related to education. Section I starts 
with two articles that argue for the need of philosophy of 
education (henceforth PoE) and then other papers that 
engage with issues related to the idea of aims, education, 
teaching, learning, curriculum and assessment.
In the first article – which serves as a proper introduction 
to this volume - Dhankar elaborates on the need for PoE, 
rather philosophizing about educational theory and 
practice. Through three examples – a pedagogical practice, 
a policy decision, and a conversation that represents 
how educationists think of philosophy of education – he 
demonstrates and brings to fore the limits of the public 
discourse in relation to educational practice, and the need 
for PoE. He further demonstrates how employing PoE in 
such situations would immensely benefit the domain of 
education; and that philosophising is a necessary condition 
for educational practice to be meaningful and useful. He then 
demonstrates the methodology that PoE adopts, criteria to 
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mark the domain of educational issues and concepts that can 
be addressed by PoE, and moral and intellectual dispositions 
required to do so.
Pring further argues on the same issue: educational thinking, 
both in theory and practice, involves raising and responding 
to questions that are in the “province of philosophy”. Failure 
to see this is bound to lead to “defective policy and research”. 
He analyzes and derives responses to issues related to the 
concept of education, conflicting approaches to education 
like academic versus child-centered education, standards 
in the assessment of educational practice and teachers 
as researchers. Through these arguments he argues that 
reflection is not a distraction from practising education, 
and that adequate thought on these issues and deriving 
good acceptable responses are a necessary condition for any 
research in education. 
Elgin raises the questions: “What constitutes good education? 
What makes an education good?” and traces some responses 
to these questions provided by philosophers over time and 
argues that democratic societies ought to function the way 
Dewey describes in “Democracy and Education”. She centres 
the ends of education around the notion of deliberative 
democracy that Dewey describes, which she says redacts 
the dichotomy between individualism and collectivism, by 
pointing that rather than clashing with each other, they in 
fact reinforce each other.
White’s paper takes the notion of aims of education further 
to describe the problems with a subject based curriculum 
and argues that curriculum should be aims-based; which 
involves logically breaking down larger aims of education 
into more specific smaller aims that lead us to blocks of 
curriculum.
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White describes fundamental flaws in the rucksack view 
of the curriculum - a collection of many subjects - that is 
currently vogue in most schools across the world, including 
Indian schools. 
Stojanov raises the issue that the concepts of education and 
teaching are conflated in most of the work in philosophy 
of education. Stojanov describes the various contrarian 
meanings of education as proposed by Dewey, Peters and 
Scheffler, and the relationship they establish between an 
individual’s growth as a human being and the criteria that 
determine growth. He argues that the concept of Bildung, 
described and advocated by Humboldt and Hegel, provides a 
comprehensive idea of education that cleaves apart education 
from schooling and teaching.
Hinchliffe analyses the idea of knowing (or having learnt) 
using Plato’s metaphor of the cave. He elaborates the 
epistemic and psychological state of people living their life 
in the cave of vicarious or second-hand knowledge in the 
form of shadows, and habitual interpretations of meaning 
from the shadows. He further compares people experiencing 
the real world temporarily and returning to the cave finding 
the interpretive life rather unengaging. He juxtaposes the 
idea of knowledge in Plato’s metaphorical cave with Hirst’s 
forms of knowledge. He argues that theoretical knowledge 
of disciplines is not enough to explain or change our life 
experiences in any manner. Rather we need to develop the 
ability to make judgments to comprehend our experiences 
through the lens of concepts learnt in formal education.
In Section II, Schapira, Stojanov, Phillips, Pring and Siddharth 
take up specific educational issues that influence the way we 
think about aims, policy, university, school, and curriculum. 
Schapira argues that many discussions of the university are 
trapped in the “ideas discourse,” which focuses on the history 
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of ideas as opposed to the variegated history of the institution 
itself. He examines various ways in which higher education 
has moved from a public to a private good, focusing not only 
on ideas, but also the historical conditions which gave rise 
to the post-war university, and this informs the challenges 
it faces today. He argues that universities should describe 
their relationship with the state and private sector with a 
historical inflection that will provide an expansive view of 
the contemporary university. 
Stojanov criticizes the “learnification” of education which 
results in treating education only in its functionalist and 
instrumentalist sense which makes it impossible to grasp 
the ethical character of aims and process of education. He 
elaborates on the notion of learning and aims of education 
and learning from the Humboldtian concept of Bildung 
which treats aims and processes as normative concepts with 
ethical underpinnings. 
Phillips describes the most common misunderstandings 
about epistemology, and discusses the criticisms of 
mainsteam epistemology raised by academics who believe 
that it is a tool used by the majority to dominate minority 
groups. He argues that “these educational scholars have 
made the mistake of trying to express these concerns in 
the language of epistemology when they themselves are not 
trained in epistemology nor are the basic concerns essentially 
epistemological!”
Siddharth examines the relationship of intelligence with 
agency and consciousness. Since intelligence is classified as 
a conscious and intentional achievement, it implies a direct 
relation between intelligence and agency. To establish the 
relationship between intelligence and consciousness, he 
first separates decision (which is the result of an algorithm) 
from judgment (which is an act done by an agent). He 
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further argues that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary 
condition for judgment. 
The papers in section III deal with specific issues in the 
practice of teaching and learning like the effect of technology 
on learning, the necessity of scepticism in the practice of 
learning, authenticity and teaching, the relationship between 
knowledge and emotions, and assessment in education. 
Lewin navigates through techo-optimism and techno-
pessimism to find ways in which technology can be made 
useful, particularly by finding ways of retaining the attention 
span of users of online mechanisms for learning. He says 
pessimists are worried that online education combined with 
learnification and constructivism, veers our focus to the 
process of learning rather than the purpose(s) of learning. 
He argues that we need to be ambivalent in our view to 
technology because the issues we perceive with technology, 
attention for instance, exist as much in us outside of 
technology too.
Iyer’s paper first establishes specific purposes of learning 
to philosophize and its value for practitioners of education. 
Subsequently, dissatisfaction with our beliefs is identified as 
the source of the impulse to examine and possible revise or 
reaffirm our beliefs. Using Kant’s definition of practice, Iyer 
identifies learning as a practice and analyzes three normative 
aspects of learning – the end of learning, the procedure of 
learning and a necessary attitude towards learning. He 
argues that these normative demands lead to the conclusion 
that experiencing a sceptical moment, defined as suspension 
of judgment, is a necessary condition for learning philosophy 
of education.
Sarukkai and Siddiqui express the concern that knowledge 
and knowing has been the center of a learning environment 
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because of the perceived importance of objectivity and the 
seeming unavailability of the “process of learning” to the 
teacher. Their argument is that “there is a primordial and 
essential experience of learning that accompanies learning 
of different kinds”. Using the Heideggerian idea that teachers 
“confront our finitude”, when she comes to the limit of 
her teaching, they say we need to pay attention to how we 
continue teaching even when we see that it is not achieving 
results. Based on an empirical study and interviews with 
teachers of dance and music, they analyze the conception of 
truth in relation to the student experiencing her own version 
of performing the art form and acting it out themselves in 
the way their body (and mind) acts it out. They describe 
and critique the ways in which this situation is made 
ethically problematic when one teaches other disciplines like 
mathematics or social science.
Ams’s paper seeks to address the role of emotionality in 
processes of learning. Based on Maslow’s notion of self-
actualization, Ams traces an alternate epistemology of 
learning that focuses on the question of what it means to be 
a human being in general and a human being in particular. 
The attempt to explicate such a form of emotional knowledge 
is pursued by considering learning as that which occurs 
beyond the ambit of formal language practices and in the 
domain of day to day experience.
Bajantri attempts to discern the most inseparable part 
and practice of school curriculum and that is assessment. 
The kind of assessment being inquired into is the one 
whose purpose is to understand learning in a context, 
largely that of the classroom with multiple learners and 
the kind which serves certain pedagogic purposes and not 
those of judging an individual for his or her potential or 
ability to do something in future (famously the entrance 
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examinations etc.). The following discussion attempts to 
abstract theory of assessment and its alleged connection 
with learning, through various philosophical perspectives 
and reasoning by thinkers and educationists.
This book engages with a wide range of educational issues and 
the chapters would seem disparate and even divergent. What 
connects them together are two things: a demonstration of 
the need for philosophy of education, and the emphasis on 
the need to analyze some fundamental concepts that inhabit 
educational theory and practice which keep evolving and 
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A Practitioner’s take on Philosophy  
of Education
Rohit Dhankar
Professor of Philosophy of Education in Azim Premji 
University, Bangalore. He has been part of many 
NCERT initiatives in developing material and 
curriculum through various committees.
The general attitue of educationists in India to philosophy of 
education is that it is of limited use in deliberating on aims of 
education, and has almost nothing to offer in curricular and 
pedagogical decisions. The aims themselves are considered 
either almost irrelevant to actual task of educating children 
as they are too remote from the immediate concern of, 
say, teaching a school entrant reading and counting. 
Alternatively they are already determined by the goals of 
national development, which basically is a political economic 
decision. Therefore, even in deliberating on aims, the role 
of philosophy of Education (PoE) is limited to working out 
implications and possibly some conceptual clarification. 
Another view is that in the Indian tradition, philosophy of 
education is woven into the overall analysis of education 
from sociological, political and economic perspectives. 
Working out a territory and method of PoE on it’s own is a 
western idea of recent origin, and the Indian approach of an 
overall analysis is more robust and fruitful in our context. 
Without immediately challenging any of these contentions 
we will identify three issues which may throw up unavoidable 
philosophical issues, and then try to see how PoE might help 
there. 
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Recently a short video of a math teacher went viral first on 
social media because a business tycoon tweeted it. Then a 
very famous Bollywood star was floored by its simplicity and 
effectiveness, and sent it to the largest online tuition group in 
India, then TV channels picked it up. In the video a teacher is 
explaining a very interesting and simple way of multiplying 
9 by any number less than 10, in other words working out 
multiplication table of 9. To multiply 9 by 4, she asks one 
child to raise her hand and show ten fingers of both hands. 
She writes “4” on the black board. Then holds the 4th finger 
on the child’s hand and asks: how many fingers are to the left 
of this finger? Children reply “3”, and she writes “3”. Then 
she asks how many fingers are to the right of this finger and 
children say “6”. She writes 6 after 3, and the number on the 
board becomes “36”. She declares “Multiplication is done”, 
implying 4x9=36. 
We have to be a little careful in understanding the issue 
with this method of teaching. First, the teacher is doing a 
good job of teaching children a “math trick”, which could be 
very useful, if certain other conditions are fulfilled. We will 
come to those conditions presently. Second, goodnatured 
and socially concerned business tycoon and Bollywood star 
are appreciating the teacher’s work, and promoting it, which 
is very kind of them. The TV channels are going berserk in 
declaring that this can happen only in India. All this raises 
a suspicion (hopefully for some) that this is going to be used 
by a large number of mathematics teachers in the country. 
The hope or suspicion is not unfounded, there are scores of 
videos propagated by foundations, NGOs and teachers with 
such tricks and teaching methods. 
One can ask, “What is the issue here? This sounds so good.” 
To understand the problem first let’s note that mathematics 
classroom activities should be necessarily directed to achieve 
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aims of teaching mathematics. Our National Curriculum 
Framework 2005 states that “[D]eveloping children’s abilities 
for mathematisation is the main goal of mathematics 
education”1. It further states “[T]he higher aim is to develop 
the child’s resources to think and reason mathematically, 
to pursue assumptions to logical conclusions and to handle 
abstraction. It includes a way of doing things, and the ability 
and the attitude, to formulate and solve problems.” Methods 
such as shown in video, unless followed with discussions and 
explanations concerning the clarification of concepts and logic 
involved, are very unlikely to achieve these aims. It requires 
understanding the nature of mathematical knowledge, logic 
behind mathematical procedures or algorithms to create a 
dialogue which can ground mathematics in reason. How 
many teachers might be doing that? My guess is less than 
one percent. 
The problem in this example is not the teachers using this 
trick to simplify multiplication table of 9. The problem is that 
philosophical considerations of nature of math, mathematical 
logic behind procedures and epistemic grounds for accepting 
math conclusions are absent. And these are philosophical 
considerations. Proliferation of math videos like this one 
seems to be a direct result of neglecting philosophical issues 
involved in math teaching in teacher development and 
generally in the country. 
Let’s take a second example to understand the roots of 
problems in classroom teaching. Presently the Indian 
public education system is seriously infested with so-called 
improvement programmes initiated by foundations created 
by large corporates to channel their own CSR funds. One 
would have considered it a very welcome development 
and avoided the word “infested” had these corporations 
1. NCERT, National Curriculum Framework 2005, New Delhi, page 40. 
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been careful about their theories of change and theories of 
education. But the only strength they have is their money. 
Most (there are some exceptions as well) of them are running 
on half understood ideas borrowed from the west. Therefore, 
it is important to understand and analyse their thinking on 
education. 
The head of an organisation running a few thousand 
schools for poor children very seriously put a question to an 
educationist: “How essentially should pragmatic goals of (i) 
acquiring knowledge, (ii) acquiring skill-capabilities, (iii) 
acquiring-reinforcing attitudes-values, and (iv) acquiring the 
capability to learn, be facilitated by philosophical discussion 
of issues involved.” The educationist very confidently replied: 
“In my opinion not worth the effort”. At present this is the way 
most of the people in India who are influencing education at 
a large scale think. 
The question itself can make any meaning only when one has 
reasonably clear answers to a host of sub-questions: What is 
Knowledge? What is a Skill? What is the difference between 
a Skill and Capability? What are Values? What are Attitudes? 
How is an Attitude different from a Value? Where do they 
come from? What is the ‘capability to learn’? How do the 
‘capability to learn’ and ‘learning itself ’ differ? How do I 
know that X has it? What is the relative worth of knowledge, 
skill, attitudes and values in achieving educational aims? 
Obviously, all these are philosophical questions requiring 
conceptual analysis. If someone is making decisions 
regarding curriculum and teaching-learning without having 
coherent and reasonably clear answers to these questions 
then she is groping in the dark. 
Both the questioner and the respondent here are assuming 
that sufficient clarity to weave these capabilities, concepts 
and values into curriculum and pedagogy is available in 
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common sense understanding. But actual observation of 
Indian curricula, textbooks and classroom practices all 
militate against this assumption. Another very influential 
assumption in India is that if a group of teachers, curriculum 
framers or textbook writers get together to work on practical 
problems of their respective domains and share ideas and 
experiences, such clarity will naturally emerge. Whether 
the assumptions hold or not requires a rigorous empirical 
study. Philosophy cannot really say anything about this 
assumption. However, in India wherever it has happened, 
for there are such examples, these groups necessarily had 
one or more members who could think philosophically and 
were good at conceptual analysis. On the other hand, there 
are a large number of such groups working for years and 
producing no clarity .
Let’s take a third example from policy level. Recently there 
was a national debate on something called “no-detention 
policy”. In brief, no-detention policy emerged from Section 
16 of the RTE Act 2009 which states “[N]o child admitted 
in a school shall be held back in any class”2. In other words, 
promotion to next class is independent of satisfactory 
learning achieved in the year, it is the right of the child to be 
promoted to the next class, irrespective of whether she can 
cope with the curriculum or not. 
There was a nationwide debate and controversy on the issue. 
Majority of teachers demanded that this policy be done away 
with, because the only motivation for learning for school 
students is “passing an examination”. Politicians supported 
the teachers and finally the no-detention policy was made 
optional for states to decide by an amendment passed in 
the parliament. Most of the states repealed it. Progressive 
educationists’ (all Indian educationists are progressive by 
2. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Act 2009.
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definition) assertion that no-detention is a progressive policy 
and its removal or limitation would be a retrograde step in 
our education reforms, was completely ignored. 
In this entire debate no one noticed that the RTE 2009 has 
messed up the very definition of Elementary Education. 
Under present provisions, a common sense (nothing 
particularly philosophical) analysis of the interrelated 
stipulations of RTE will reveal that elementary education has 
no necessary relationship with learning achievements of the 
children. All it requires is spending one year in the school 
at 8th class, being admitted in “age appropriate class” at the 
age of 14 years. The point I am making is not particularly 
philosophical, it is rather a common sense observation. But 
the issue of definition of any defined stage of education and 
standards of learning achievement is important, and requires 
serious philosophical deliberations together with help from 
sociology and psychology of education. Can education be 
defined purely in terms of time spent in the school? This is a 
conceptual issue having bearing on definition of education. 
A whole society and particularly its educationists ignoring it 
in order to make psychological and sociological arguments 
in favour of no-detention reveals an attitude of unconcern 
for conceptual clarity and coherence. It is unimaginable that 
the educationists did not know about this messing up of 
definition of elementary education, they did not pay attention 
to it because it weakened their psychological and sociological 
arguments against detention in the same class for non-
achievement of required learning standards. This unconcern 
for conceptual clarity and coherence is a philosophical issue 
with much wider ramifications than just the detention-no-
detention controversy. 
We have deliberately taken three examples starting from 
the actual classroom practice to curricular decision making 
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to policy level confusion which require philosophical 
deliberations; concerned with either epistemic or ethical 
perspectives. This involves conceptual analysis and 
responding to normative questions. 
The range of issues
The issues indicated in connection with the video are one 
extreme of the spectrum of issues PoE has to deal with. 
To get a rough idea of the complete spectrum lets have a 
cursory look at the other extreme of the spectrum. Often 
people claim that the most abstract extreme of the issues 
PoE has to deal with is aims of education. This may be true 
if considered together with justification of aims, but is false 
if interpreted only at the level of understanding and working 
out implications of the educational aims. Educational aims 
reflect our views on human nature, our imagination of good 
human life and desirable society; among other things. Thus, 
the most abstract end of the spectrum that PoE considers is 
human nature and human capabilities. Aurobindo states that 
“there are three things which have to be taken into account 
in a true and living education, the man, the individual in 
his commonness and in his uniqueness, the nation or people 
and universal humanity”3. This puts in the centre the notion 
of human being, the nation or the society and a vision of 
humanity. 
Tagore articulates his notion of human being and humanity 
thus: “It is an insult to his humanity, if man fails to invoke 
in his mind a definite image of his own ideal self, of his ideal 
environment, which it is his mission to reproduce externally. 
It is the highest privilege of man to be able to live in his own 
creation. … And what is more, man is not truly himself if 
his personality has not been fashioned by him according to 
3. Sri Aurobindo, A Preface to National Education, in Early Cultural 
Writings, Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust, Pondicherry, 2003, page 425.
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some mental picture of perfection, which he has within. … It 
is for him inwardly to see himself as an idea, and outwardly 
to show himself as a person according to that idea. … He is 
an artist, whose medium of expression is his own psychology. 
Like all other artists, he has perpetually to struggle hard with 
his materials, to overcome obstructions, inner and outer, in 
order to make definite his manifestation.”4
The nature of human being, her capabilities, good life for her 
and a desirable society necessarily demand philosophical 
deliberations, as they involve values and normative 
considerations. A rational scheme of education is not possible 
without considering these aspects of humanity. The first 
quote above indicates a necessity to keep human nature at 
the root of educational thinking, and the second indicts the 
complexity and abstractness one has to deal with in forming 
any notion of human nature. 
Between these two extremes are situated aims of education 
which connect the ideals of humanity and human life on 
one side, with the practical task at hand in the classroom on 
the other. There can be umpteen ways of articulating aims 
which may serve to workout a connection between these 
two extremes. One good example (just as an example, not 
necessarily recommended) could be found in Basic National 
Education5 which is approved by Gandhi: “the new scheme 
which we are advocating will aim at giving the citizens of the 
future a keen sense of personal worth, dignity and efficiency, 
and will strengthen in them the desire for self-improvement 
and social service in a co-operative community”.
4. Rabindranath Tagore, Man the artist, 
https://www.parabaas.com/rabindranath/articles/pRabindranath_
MantheArtist.html, downloaded on 18th May 2020.
5. Basic National Education (Report of Zakir Hussain Committee), 
Hindustani Talim Sangh, Waradha, (1938). Page 16.
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Since everywhere in this spectrum there are multiple 
perspectives and views, the connections worked out look very 
tentative and speculative. In addition, there have to be a large 
repertoire of tools, one can call them as content literature, 
which themselves sound very abstract and unconnected to 
the classroom practices but are necessary to connect the 
vision, the aims and the actual teaching practices. As the 
necessity of developing all this conceptual material is not 
immediately clear to the pragmatic man, and the connections 
worked out are neither as firm nor as clear as in Science; he 
gets frustrated and suspicious of the whole activity called 
PoE; and reaches the conclusion that it is not worthwhile 
to spend resources and time on this. However, as we have 
seen above, the necessity of dealing with philosophical issues 
can not be dismissed without losing our way in the long 
and complicated path from classroom to aims; and then to 
politics. 
The important issue here, then, is: how do we conceptualise 
and fashion work in philosophy of education that may do its 
job properly, and can also convince the teacher and those who 
control education either through policy and administration 
or through their financial resources? One cannot answer this 
question from within PoE. Therefore, what I will do below 
will only be a tentative suggestion which may work..
Philosophy of education
On Dewey’s advice we can begin with accepting that 
philosophy of education “is not an external application of 
ready-made ideas to a system of practice having a radically 
different origin and purpose: it is only an explicit formulation 
of the problems of the formation of right mental and moral 
habitudes in respect of the difficulties of contemporary 
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social life”6. Since our focus is on PoE we can restrict present 
considerations to the difficulties of contemporary education. 
A relatively more recent expression of a similar view is 
articulated by Barrow and Woods when they say: “[O]ne 
of our main objects will have been achieved if we can help 
readers to become more skilful at philosophical debate, able 
to think about and discuss in a philosophic manner issues 
which they have not met before and on which they have not 
read what other philosophers have to say”7. 
Accepting PoE as a way of identifying philosophical issues 
in education and thinking about them, we need to think 
of it as an area of knowledge as well. An area of knowledge 
to become a reasonably well defined discipline for such a 
purpose will necessarily require 
(i) a methodology, at the least for initial stages in studying 
it and to finally fall back upon even in the advanced stages 
when nothing else is at hand,
(ii) a more or less clear set of criteria to mark the boundaries 
of the domain of issues and concepts it is likely to deal with, 
and
(iii) moral and intellectual dispositions expected from its 
study, as well as the requirement to practice it properly.
We will try to outline a brief sketch of PoE in the Indian 
context in three aspects mentioned above. 
Before that, however, two preliminaries are in order. One, 
it is not a rigorous definition and delimitation of PoE for 
philosophers. It is a somewhat simple outline of PoE as a 
6. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, Aakar Books, Delhi, (2004) 
(First published 1915), page 356.
7. Robin Barrow and Ronald Woods, An Introduction to Philosophy of 
Education (4th Edition), Routledge, London, (2006). Page 1.
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discipline for educational practitioners. Two, there is nothing 
particularly Indian about what I am saying below except 
keeping in mind interest and concerns of Indian audience as 
stated in the first part of this article.
Philosophical enquiry and its method
For the sake of simplicity, taking cue from Hamm8, we can 
start with examining the kind of questions philosophers 
ask, rather than the issues or particular areas of human 
knowledge they take up for reflection. According to Hamm 
“they ask, and try in various ways to answer, three sorts of 
questions: 
(1) What do you mean? (Or, what does it—the word, the 
concept—mean?)
(2) How do you know? (Or, what, in general constitute 
the grounds or kinds of grounds for claiming to know 
something?)
(3) What is being presupposed? (Or, what assumptions or 
presuppositions are you now making or must you make for 
the proposition you are now asserting?)”.
And further he rightly states that “[It] is when one acquires the 
habit of asking these questions about one’s own and others’ 
speech and writings that one begins to be a philosopher.” 
These questions and hope of developing the habits indicate a 
tentative methodology and expected dispositions. 
The first question (What does it mean?) encompasses the 
entire range of conceptual analysis. Conceptual clarity in 
philosophical investigation is of paramount importance, 
8. Hamm, C.M. (1989) Philosophical Issues in Education: An Introduction, 
RoutledgeFalmer, London and New York. P5.
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as concepts are the basic building blocks of human 
understanding. This insistence on clarity of concepts does 
not demand flattening notions people may have (say of 
education or any other x under consideration) by imposing 
an uncompromising uniformity; all it demands is being 
conscious of the overt and covert differences in meanings of 
the same word people could be using in a discourse. In other 
words, it demands that one knows what one is talking about. 
Since language is a rule-governed system of symbols, and 
it offers endless scope of formulating grammatically well-
formed sentences, the possibility of meaninglessness may 
creep in. That may very quickly lead to building of a tower 
of Babel, if the question “What do you mean” is not seriously 
asked. Thus, if one is not clear about what one is saying s/he 
is not doing any good philosophy; at most a sloppy one. This 
also indicates and emphasizes a thought through response 
to any issue being discussed. One of the biggest problems 
in a dialogue, be that educational or political, is responding 
without fully understanding the meaning and import of 
the speaker/writer. Thus, conceptual analysis indicated 
in this question demands clarity from the speaker/writer 
and responsibility of effort to understand from the reader/
listener before reacting to any idea. It should also strengthen 
the disposition of patience in doing philosophy. 
The second question (How do you know?) demands grounds 
for accepting or rejecting a proposition. Philosophy does not 
deal with assertions or received knowledge; it has to be squarely 
a rational activity if it is to have any worth at all. Therefore, 
the understanding of grounds on which one proposes 
something and their consistent employment in discourse 
can hardly be dispensed with. Again, the question does not 
preclude or prescribe any particular criteria for assessing the 
epistemic worth of grounds proposed; all that is demanded 
is banishment of arbitrariness and unjustified assertions. 
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Asking for reasons to accept something demands epistemic 
responsibility from the one who advances a proposition; and 
at the same time asserts dignity and independence of the 
one who is supposed to accept that proposition. This gives 
the discourse a meaningful seriousness and dignity. Thus 
again, asking for grounds emphasises making an attempt 
to be correct in the theoretical sense; as well as emphasising 
independence of mind as a disposition. 
The third question (What is presupposed?) is to bring into 
open unexamined or, at any rate, not yet articulated, beliefs 
and assumptions. In most of the arguments what we say and 
hear is just the tip of the proverbial ice-berg of fondly held 
beliefs replete with unexamined assumptions. The discourse 
or argument that does not look under the visible tip is likely 
to be misunderstood and misjudged. Asking for articulation 
of assumptions is not the same thing as their rejection, it is 
just a serious attempt to render them visible, and open them 
up for examination. It will bring to the surface all the buried 
metaphysics (as well as more common assumptions) without 
which no discipline or discourse can take off. Looking 
for presuppositions hints at what Dewey describes as a 
“disposition to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning—to go 
below the surface and find out the connections of any event 
or object, and to keep at it”.9
Thus, these three questions seem to be of undeniable 
importance in doing philosophy. To quote Dewey again: 
“It is of assistance to connect philosophy with thinking 
in its distinction from knowledge. Knowledge, grounded 
knowledge, is science; it represents objects which have 
been settled, ordered, disposed of rationally. Thinking, on 
the other hand, is prospective on reference. … Philosophy 
9. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, Aakar Books, Delhi, (2004) 
(First published 1915). Page 351.
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might almost be described as thinking which has become 
conscious of itself—which has generalized its place, function, 
and value in experience”10. These three questions taken as a 
method help a novice practitioner of philosophy to develop 
required dispositions and make her thinking “conscious of 
itself”. Additionally it seems to me, they are equally useful to 
a more advanced philosopher when she is stuck for want of a 
proper method to deal with complex situations. 
However, philosophical deliberations on education are not 
armchair reflections of a spectator. They are concerned 
explorations directed at finding solutions to practical 
problems of education and to give direction to possible action. 
Therefore, whatever judgment one forms on theoretical 
issues has implications for further development of thought 
as well as practice. PoE can not stop at arriving at a well-
considered theoretical judgment and leave implications for 
practice to be worked out by someone else. Philosophers of 
education are mostly reticent to spell out the implications for 
practice, as it is largely an empirical domain. The relationship 
between ideas can be understood purely through speculative 
methods; but the relationship between action and its effect, 
whether one assumes it to be correlational or causal, requires 
empirical observation and analysis of data gathered from 
that observation, which is beyond PoE. Still, to realise its full 
potential PoE has to venture into the world of the practical. 
All three examples given in the beginning are illustrations of 
PoE indicating problems and hinting, however tentatively, to 
possible practical remedy through informed action. 
Philosophical analysis can help in this in two ways. One, 
showing contradictions as in the case of RtE, that what is 
self-contradictory cannot be implemented in its true spirit; 
simply because it has no true-spirit or has a conflicting 
10. Ibid, page 351
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spirit. As a general principle it can adopt the idea that what 
cannot pass a rigorous theoretical examination cannot 
bear significant fruit if implemented practically; however, 
the reverse, that that which passes theoretical examination 
necessarily produces good results, is not always true. Second, 
it can help in identifying limited number of possibilities and 
direction for action which are likely to bear fruit; which 
otherwise using a trial and error approach would be endless 
possibilities. Thus, action does not remain blind trial and 
error but acquires a reflective character. In other words, it 
helps turn random activity into guided practice and/or 
enquiry. 
Therefore, we have to add a fourth question to Hamm’s 
three we have considered above: What are the implications? 
If a proposition is accepted it would have its own logical 
implications for all that is connected with it and may have 
been already accepted in the discourse (or argument). 
Rational enquiry cannot afford to contain contradictions; 
and therefore, implications of accepting a new proposition 
may induce unforeseen changes in the entire belief system. 
To reiterate, we can say that irrespective of the content, 
philosophy of education organises its enquiry around four 
key questions:
1. What does it mean?
2. How is it known?
3. What is presupposed? And 
4. What are the implications of its acceptance?
Now we can round up our discussion on the method 
of PoE. One aspect of the method is already outlined 
above in characterising philosophical enquiry, namely: 
investigation around the four key questions. The second 
aspect can be tentatively captured in articulation of the way 
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philosophy approaches these questions. One suggestion 
worth considering is that philosophy tries to build a rational 
discourse through argumentation. Argument is important in 
order to encompass all possible aspects and interpretations 
of an issue. The philosophical argument is characterised 
by its emphasis on coherence or at least attempts to avoid 
contradiction. Since philosophical investigation is primarily 
speculative and is aimed at coherent organisation of human 
thought, it has very little to fall back upon for its justification 
other than consistency of the thought itself. This coherent 
system of thought is built on the ground (however shaky) of: 
agreement in intuitions, agreement in use of language, the 
principle of non-contradiction, logic, and open-mindedness 
to examine accepted positions. Adherence to these principles 
builds rational rigour, as the ultimate method in philosophy. 
The above discussion takes care of the core of the general 
method of PoE. The method also hints at the dispositions 
required: 
An attitude of careful examination from all possible 
directions before proposing or accepting any idea, principle, 
fact, and so on. 
Recognition of epistemic responsibility and cherishing the 
value of cognitive clarity. 
Epistemic independence in accepting or rejecting any idea. 
Equal respect to reasons advanced by others irrespective of 
one’s own position; or impartiality in theoretical deliberation. 
Courage to accept inadequacies and mistakes, and open 
mindedness to revise one’s position,and 
Willingness to put in hard work to examine grounds for 
and against any ideas before arriving at any judgement. That 
brings us to the domain of PoE.
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Domain of PoE
Making a list of issues that can be dealt with in PoE or 
demarketing its domain as clearly as that of sciences or 
mathematics does not seem to be possible. However, leaving 
the question of domain relatively open does not mean that 
philosophy has equal interest in all issues or it is equally 
capable of contributing to all issues. For example, the issues 
which can be settled on the basis of available empirical 
evidence, though are not out of bounds for philosophy, but 
at the same time are also not of great interest. In order to 
convert an empirical issue into philosophically interesting, 
one has either to investigate the epistemic veracity of the 
available empirical evidence, or the use of that evidence in 
argument building; which also includes normative aspects of 
epistemic criteria involved. Another aspect of an empirical 
issue that can be of interest to philosophy is working out its 
implications for human understanding and human conduct. 
Thus, the preferred terrain of philosophy is fundamental 
questions of human situation, understanding and conduct, 
that involve normative considerations.
Any philosophical enquiry arises from the present conflict in 
meaning making and ideals in the society. But since it tries to 
find general unifying principles, it has a tendency to become 
technical and abstract very quickly. The issues philosophers 
get interested in may seem to be completely abstract and 
arcane, with no relation to the practice of education. If all 
that PoE becomes interested in is of this nature, it loses its 
relevance. Thus, connection with the pragmatic issues of 
education ranging from classroom to research is a necessity 
for PoE. But we should also remember that often finding 
solutions to practical problems requires theoretical resources, 
without which it would be impossible to imagine new ways 
of tackling a problem. Such theoretical resources can not be 
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built on demand immediately when a problem arises. One 
can not dig a well each time one is thirsty. Mathematics has 
proved amply that in the world of abstract ideas, useless but 
rigorously developed concepts and results (theorems) may 
become useful after decades or even centuries of their first 
formulation. Philosophical explorations do have a similar 
propensity. The abstract and seemingly unrelated but 
meaningful in the discourse and rigorously worked our ideas 
and studies may become useful in future problem solving 
and development of knowledge. For example, a comparative 
study of Nyaya and Inca logic may sound very esoteric and 
useless to a practical minded person. Moreover in actuality, 
it may not give any results that are immediately useful in 
curriculum and pedagogy. But it may be an interesting topic 
to a philosopher of education, and the conclusions drawn 
may become very useful someday. One should not scoff at 
this hope of becoming useful someday.
Actually, it is building a repertoire of intellectual tools. 
Larger the repertoire of intellectual tools to understand the 
world one has, better chance one stands of finding a suitable 
tool when the need arises. This also helps in developing 
knowledge. In mathematics there are plenty of theorems 
which are of no direct use themselves, but very useful and 
important theorems can not be proved unless one first proves 
the ‘useless’ ones.
Therefore, the domain of PoE necessarily has to include 
very abstract ideas related with human understanding and 
human situations. However, to repeat, unless the larger 
part of the discipline deals with conceptual and normative 
issues which can throw immediate light on the practice, it 
can not hope to gain support from the society; and runs the 
danger of becoming completely useless. Therefore, a balance 
is certainly needed in the domain; a balance tilted towards 
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that which helps solve current problems of the practice and 
theory. 
Conclusion
The above discussion provides hints on how to approach 
educational issues and what methods to use. The entire 
educational endeavour could be seen as an integrated 
whole comprising educational practice, system and theory. 
Philosophy of education in this sense, as Dewey noted, is 
not an application of content of philosophy to education; 
but should be seen as spotting and approaching the issues 
in educational practice and theory in philosophical manner.
Philosophy of education then will have a double task to 
perform in education. One, as a component of educational 
theory contributing assumptions and insights regarding 
educational practice; for example, analysis of aims of 
education, possible curricula, pedagogy, human nature, 
knowledge, etc. And second, constructing an umbrella 
framework in which all aspects of educational theory can be 
understood in relationship with each other and in relationship 
with educational practice and critiquing educational theory. 
It would be gross misunderstanding to take the second aspect 
as an attempt to establish any kind of disciplinary hegemony; 
in its more appropriate and justifiable form it is labour of love 
undertaken and responsibility accepted to ensure coherence 
and interconnectedness within educational theory and 
between educational theory, between practice and system. 
This task is philosophical by nature as the most fundamental 
principles used here would necessarily be normative; the 
analysis of their nature, range and application being one of 
the primary tasks of philosophy in any case.
Prima facie, this operational understanding of philosophy of 
education seems to be capable of encompassing all aspects 
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usually considered within this discipline; from analysis of 
aims, curricula, pedagogy etc. to epistemology, ethics, socio-
political philosophy and issues of special interest in education 
like critical thinking, creativity, environment, et al. I am 
unaware of other countries, but Indian education for the last 
at the very least fifty years has been an arena of irresponsible 
play of unexamined and half understood ideas. This happens 
in the name of improvement and keeping abreast with 
current developments. The remedy is not to stifle new ideas 
through any kind of systemic restrictions, that would be a 
disaster as it will kill all new initiative. The solution lies in 
rigorous philosophical examination of all such attempts and 
ideas, and a proliferation of philosophical writing which is 
closely connected with the practice at the ground one hand 
and most generalised and abstract but rigorous theory on the 
other. 
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Why philosophy of education?
The place of philosophy of education in educational discourse 
and thinking is never secure. It needs to justify its place 
and relevance. Sometimes it succeeds and sometimes it does 
not. 
Richard Peters, a mainstream philosopher at London 
University, was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy of 
Education at the Institute of Education, London, in 1962. He 
famously said that the job of philosophy in such an Institute 
was to remove the mush from educational theory. And he 
strenuously worked at bringing what then was mainstream 
analytic philosophy to bear upon educational questions. 
He and his team were very successful. This coincided with 
the establishment of a Bachelor of Education degree, taken 
by most teachers in training, because the politicians and 
others who ran the educational system believed that teachers 
would be better in their jobs if they were able to reflect more 
deeply and critically on what they were doing – the aims and 
rationale of education, the nature of the knowledge being 
taught, the values implicit in their activities. 
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Therefore, philosophy became a component in the training 
of all teachers. It became popular in the further professional 
development of teachers through various Masters prog-
rammes. Many books were written, sold and read on the 
philosophical critiques of government reports and policies. 
One thinks, for example, of the critical examination of the 
Plowden Committee Report on primary education – the 
philosophical critique of the otherwise uncritical advocacy 
of child-centred approaches, of the failure to distinguish 
‘needs’ from ‘wants’, and of the ill-defined notion of 
‘creativity’. And the influence of this philosophy team 
spread widely, establishing close links with philosophers 
abroad – for example, Scheffler and Schwab in the United 
States.
But such widespread success did not last for ever, and 
philosophy of education is ever in need of justification if it 
is to survive. Indeed, it can be seen by those in charge of 
education as distinctly dangerous. It gets in the way of political 
initiatives which set forth the targets which teachers have to 
attain if standards are to be ‘driven up’ (a mode of expression 
often used). Philosophers have the unfortunate habit, for 
example, of questioning those targets and the underlying 
concept of ‘standards’. In a system which is target-driven 
and in which teachers are seen as ‘deliverers’ of those targets, 
philosophical reflection and criticism are seen as a dangerous 
distraction. Hence, the massive decline in the support for 
philosophy of education at every level and of those teaching 
the subject.
We should not be surprised. That great teacher, Socrates, 
was made to take the hemlock because his philosophical 
questioning was seen to corrupt the youth of Athens. The 
American philosopher, John Dewey, whose Democracy and 
Education has inspired generations of teachers across the 
world, was called ‘worse than Hitler by some who felt that 
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he infected schools with epistemological relativism and 
substituted socialisation for true education’ (Noddings 2005).
However, philosophical problems are embedded in 
educational thinking, planning and practice, and it is 
important to acknowledge this and to face the problems. 
First, however, it is important to explain what I mean by 
‘doing philosophy’.
Doing philosophy: ‘what do you mean?’
Take the following statement from England’s Secretary of 
State for Education:
Our society has not always valued academic achievement 
as it should … the poor suffered because of the left-wing 
doctrine that pursuit of academic excellence was somehow 
narrowly elitist. The argument for uncompromising emphasis 
on academic excellence has been won … tomorrow’s A Level 
results will show we’ve buried the nonsense about child-
centred learning (Times, 15.08.2012)
But this statement depends on the meaning of two key words 
– ‘academic’ and ‘child-centred’. What do they mean? One 
aim of philosophy has been to analyse what is meant by 
central but contestable concepts – to undo what Wittgenstein 
referred to as ‘the bewitchment of the intelligence by the use 
of language’. By contestable is meant that how words are 
used has a history which reflects different assumptions about 
values to be held, ways of understanding the social and moral 
worlds we inhabit, the nature of the mind, and so on. Hence, 
in asking ‘What do you mean?’ one is often taken into those 
traditional fields of philosophical argument such as ethics, 
epistemology and philosophy of mind. And this is certainly 
the case in educational discourse, as the following examples, 
I hope, illustrate.
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Academic
The longer Oxford English Dictionary provides one amongst 
several definitions of ‘academic’, namely, ‘boring’? Is 
Mr. Gove recommending very boring education – possibly 
as an excellent preparation for a boring life after formal 
education? The point is that as soon as you begin to ask 
what you mean by academic, you get into trouble. In 
much educational and political discourse, it is contrasted 
with the practical and vocational. But, then, are the study 
of Engineering, and Design and Technology thereby not 
academic, even though they are intellectually demanding? 
And for art to be academically respectable, must it become the 
History of Art – thinking theoretically about Art rather than 
doing or being engaged practically with it? The unresolved 
conceptual difficulties here are resulting, in England, in a 
new English Baccalaureate which excludes the Arts and also 
Design and Technology.
Child-centred
Or, again, with regard-to ‘child-centred’, this word has a 
history, reflecting different understandings and attitudes 
towards children. Surely, teaching children requires some 
attention to how children are thinking and to what is 
motivating them. Can education be anything other than 
child-centred? On the other hand, there have been advocates 
of education arising solely or mainly out of the interests of 
the child – ‘realising the potential’ is the phrase. But the 
slightest glance at the newspapers shows that we have as 
much potential for evil as we do for good. Child-centred in 
that sense is unacceptable, but was such a notion ever held by 
the left-wingers whom Mr Gove wants to overcome? There 
is, of course, an emotive meaning attached to the use of 
words (which, for some philosophers such as A.J.Ayer, was 
the central meaning of moral words - see Ayer, 1963). And 
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no doubt Gove was trading on that emotive meaning. There 
is no obvious logical connection between academic and non-
child-centred which his ‘argument’ seemed to assume. It all 
depends on what you mean. 
Standards
A second and connected example concerns the appeal to 
standards and the need to ‘drive them up’. Much is made of the 
need to raise standards, especially as a result of the OECD’s 
PISA four-year survey of educational performance of 15 year 
olds in reading, mathematics and science across 65 countries. 
These surveys demonstrate, so it is claimed, comparative 
standards between countries, as well as declining or rising 
standards over time within the respective countries. They 
are taken very seriously by the countries concerned. Thus, 
for example, the UK came 27th in reading competency, 28th 
in mathematics and 21st in science, indicating both a decline 
in league table position and poor education in comparison 
with our man competitors. 
But what do we mean by ‘standards’ – and what could be 
meant by such standards going up or down? Take for example, 
language and reading capacity. The reading measures in 
the 2009 survey, but not in the previous ones, included 
understanding and navigating around electronic texts. 
Quite possibly many who scored high in the 2006 survey 
would have done badly on the 2009 survey, including the 
writer of this paper. Standards change as education tries to 
keep up with the changing social and economic challenges. 
Standards cannot go up or down – if they were to, it would 
be by reference to a higher standard by which standards are 
judged to go up or down – and thus into an infinite regress. 
Rather is it performance according to agreed standards 
which go up or down. Standards are the benchmarks against 
which performance is judged to be good or bad, elegant or 
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crude, intelligent or stupid. But the standards themselves 
change, not rise or decline, and that change in standards 
relates to changes in what you think to be important. They 
logically relate to the purpose of the activit. The meaning of 
educational standards, which underpin much educational 
research, depends on the aims of education, and thus on the 
values which are embodied in such aims. You cannot decide 
on what are the standards by which to judge performance 
without first making explicit what the aims of education are 
– standards logically relate to the aims of an activity, and to 
what one means by being educated.
Interim conclusion
Therefore, philosophy, as Socrates demonstrated, often 
begins with the question ‘What do you mean?’ It is the job of 
philosophy to scratch beneath the surface of what are thought 
to be ‘agreed meanings’ and to show that our accounts of 
the world are much more complicated than is often assumed 
– that our intelligence is often bewitched by the misuse of 
language. As Wittgenstein explained. ‘My aim is to teach to 
pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is 
patent nonsense’. (1958: 1.464) 
Education: its meaning and its aim
Much follows, therefore, from the particular use of language, 
especially when the purpose of education (on the basis of 
which learners are judged successful or failures) lies in hitting 
targets defined by politicians and their civil servants. The 
targets become the standards. Thereby, teachers’ activities 
are directed to hitting the targets, rather than developing 
understanding – to teaching to the test. (see Mansell, 2007, 
for evidence).
In recent decades in Britain and the USA, the language 
of performance management has permeated educational 
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discourse and thereby the language of educational research. 
The importance attached to ‘raising of standards’ has led to 
interest by policy makers, and therefore by researchers, into 
the ‘effective school’ – the school which, if it follows well-
researched procedures, will attain the desired results. This in 
turn has created the ‘science of educational deliverology’ (a 
centre for which has been established in Washington by Sir 
Michael Barber, once ‘Director of Delivery’ for the former 
Prime Minister). The science of deliverology has the tools 
whereby teachers might ‘deliver the results’, that is, ‘hit 
the targets’ which politicians have declared to be the mark 
of the successful school. As a result a new language has 
arisen which shapes political discourse about educational 
standards, teacher discourse about educational practice, and 
thereby the discourse about educational research. Thus, there 
needs to be specification of measurable targets, performance 
indicators by which the attainment of targets is judged, 
effective delivery of curriculum by teachers so as to hit the 
targets. The teachers, as deliverers of targets, are regularly 
audited by inspectors to ensure that the targets have been 
hit and that the clients or consumers (i.e. the parents and 
students) have the results they desire. The assumption is that 
by making public the targets, which have been hit and then 
translated into school league tables, teachers will strive all 
the harder so as to compete in the market created by free 
schools for parents who can now exercise choice. Standards 
are thereby driven up.
This new language of education is beguiling. But we need 
to ask whether it has anything to do with what we mean by 
‘education’.
If one changes the metaphor from that of performance 
management to one which more accurately reflects what it 
means for people to think, to deliberate or to engage with 
other people, then teaching, and thereby educating, are 
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seen very differently – affecting the nature of educational 
research. Ends and means are not contingently related. The 
means embody the ends. The teacher of literature introduces 
a book or a play because it embodies the educational values 
(the feelings, the understandings, the sentiments) which are 
to be internalised and which transform the person. The book 
or play is part of the educational conversation between the 
teacher and the learner, and thereby between the learner and 
the culture we have inherited.
Michael Oakeshott (1962) spoke of man [sic] as ‘what he 
learns to become: this is the human condition’. It is through 
learning what is worthwhile (knowledge and practices of 
many different kinds) that one learns to live a distinctively 
human life. Schools, ideally, give access to deeper and wider 
reflection on the human condition. Education, therefore, 
for Oakeshott is a ‘conversation between the generations of 
mankind’ in which the young learner comes to appreciate 
and participate in what he refers to as the ‘voices’ of science, of 
poetry, of literature, of history, of philosophy. The metaphor 
of ‘conversation’ creates different expectations from that 
of hitting targets. One criterion of a good conversation is 
that you cannot anticipate the outcome. To do so would not 
be the nature of serious interactions taking place between 
two interested people – for example, the teacher and the 
learner.
There are, therefore, two aspects of this language of education 
which I wish to emphasise. 
First, as Peters (1965, p.25) argued, the logical characteristic 
of ‘to educate’ is like that of ‘to reform’. If I talk of reforming 
someone, then I am assuming that I am changing that 
person for the better in some respect (for example, no longer 
a criminal). Similarly, to educate someone (as opposed to 
mere training or instructing) is to imply that the learner is 
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in some way transformed for the better by what he or she 
has learnt. He or she has, in Oakeshott’s sense, come to live 
a more distinctively human life. At the centre of educational 
thinking by policy makers or by teachers, therefore, there 
must be deliberations over what it means to live a more 
human life. What is it to be and to become more fully a 
person?
The paradox of ‘educated’ in the descriptive sense of having a 
lot of learning and ‘educated’ in the evaluative sense of living 
a more distinctively human life is finely expressed in this 
letter which the principal of an American High School sent 
to her new teachers.
Dear Teacher
I am the survivor of a concentration camp. 
My eyes saw what no man should witness:
Gas chambers built by learned engineers
Children poisoned by educated physicians
Infants killed by trained nurses
Women & children shot and burned by high school 
and college graduates
So, I am suspicious of education.
My request is: Help your students become human.
Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, 
skilled psychopaths, educated ichmans.
Reading, writing, arithmetic are important but only if 
they serve to make our children more human.
Second, one aspect of what this means to be educated – to 
become ‘more human’ - is that learners are enabled to enter 
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into that ‘conversation between the generations’ and thereby 
to understand better the social, physical and moral worlds 
they have inherited. And the educational engagement is a 
constant interaction through which those understandings 
evolve and improve. What one person understands or values 
may not be exactly what another understands or values. But 
through that engagement with others and with the wisdom 
of the past, so are the learners enabled to see things more 
critically, to engage in the conversations more fully and to 
advance in understanding. Oakeshott refers to education 
therefore as an engagement – between learner and teacher, 
and between learner and what others have written, said and 
illustrated. And, like all good conversations, there is no way 
of predicting the conclusions. Standards lie in the quality 
of the engagement, not in the preconceived and measurable 
targets to be hit.
To educate, therefore, is essentially evaluative, concerning 
how people are enabled to realise their humanity, to 
understand better the physical, social and moral worlds they 
have inherited, to enter into the conversations between the 
generations - to become more fully persons. It is a process 
of constant becoming through contact with what others 
have done or said over the generations. It is to be enabled 
to exercise judgment on the life worth living and to have 
nurtured the dispositions to live accordingly. 
The concept of person therefore must shape educational policy 
and practice, and therefore what is distinctively educational 
research.
Educating persons
We train dogs and horses. We educate persons. To recognise 
someone as a person is to recognise them, not as objects to be 
used for others’ purposes, but as ends in themselves, worthy 
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of respect. In that sense, the concept of ‘person’ is more than 
a descriptive term for a physical object; it is a moral concept 
expressing the recognition of their own distinctive rights, 
worthiness for respect, and capacity to have views of their 
own. They are ends in themselves, not to be treated as means 
to an end. 
This distinction between people as physical objects and 
people as persons is crucial to our understanding of 
education and to our criticism of research which, in 
collapsing the distinction, reduces people to mere objects. 
That depersonalisation of people is seen in so many ways in 
current policy backed up by research. Successful learning is 
equated with what is easily measurable, teaching is reduced 
to producing the behaviours which will gain the required 
gradges in national tests, priority is given to learners who are 
borderline between success and failure so that schools can 
rise in the league table. As a result, lost is the focus on the 
different ways in which children struggle to learn. Little time 
is given to the personal exploration of value and meaning 
through poetry and the arts since such personal exploration 
does not enter into the specifications for grades. It is as 
though the learners are seen as objects to be changed for 
purposes other than what is personally significant or valuable. 
So easily do the learners become, not ends in themselves, but 
means to some end other than what is of value to the learner 
– for example, the place in the schools’ league table, the 
successful attainment of targets laid down by Government, 
the supply of skilled workers. Hence, the ‘logic of action’ 
which equates educational research to being a branch of the 
social sciences. 
By contrast, education describes not a neutral process that 
is instrumental to something extrinsic to that process (for 
example, improved employment opportunities). It is an 
initiation into a way of life which is judged to be intrinsically 
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worthwhile. It is so judged because that way of life is part 
and parcel of what is meant to be a person and to become 
one more fully. That is why at the heart of education 
are the essentially moral questions about what it means 
to be and to grow as a person. That in turn entails that 
ethical considerations and judgements are at the centre 
of educational discourse, determining what counts as 
educational. Fundamental, therefore, to the Nuffield Review 
of 14-19 education and training for England and Wales was 
the question: What counts as an educated 19 year old in this 
day and age? 
As with all moral questions, one cannot expect unanimity. 
Different people and societies will reach different conclusions. 
But such differences should not preclude critical examination 
of the often unexamined value assumptions underpinning 
educational policy, practice, and research. That critical 
examination requires reflection on what it means to be and 
to grow as a person: for example, having the knowledge in its 
different forms for what Dewey referred to as ‘the intelligent 
management of life’, the capabilities to flourish practically, 
the virtues and moral seriousness for living a distinctively 
human life, and the sense of community whereby one 
recognises the interdependence of one for the other.
Explaining human activity: linking the social science to 
educational thinking
If, then, educational thinking is essentially moral (concerned 
with what counts as development as a person), then is it 
quite separate from the concerns and interests of the social 
sciences? 
Educational policy and professional practice are ultimately 
about getting people to learn what is deemed to be of value. 
To educate is to develop the capacity to think, to value, to 
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reason, to appreciate. These are states of mind, mental 
capacities, distinctively human qualities. 
Such a mental form of life is logically different from a 
purely physical form of life which is the object of the 
physical sciences and subject to causal explanations. In many 
respects the social sciences from Auguste Comte onwards 
followed the example of the physical sciences, and sought 
to provide causal understandings of persons’ behaviour and 
of societies. Obvious example of the former was the work 
of behaviourists such as B.F.Skinner. More recently one 
has seen the importance attached to the large scale and 
carefully matched experimental and control groups, in 
which a particular intervention within the experimental 
group (all else being held equal) would demonstrate its 
causal significance – a key to educational improvement. 
And there are excellent examples of the success engendered 
by such interventions – the effectiveness of ‘Reading 
Recovery’ and the phonological training of children with 
reading problems. However, such explanations have their 
limitations, because of the limitations of such a narrow 
concept of causality where human situation are concerned. 
Let me explain
Can there be a ‘science of man’ – the question raised by the 
once prominent logical positivist, A.J. Ayer (1969)?
Explaining a person’s behaviour requires reference to 
intentions, motives, prior understandings through which 
interventions are interpreted. I can observe the hand raised 
in the same way that I can observe tables and chairs. But 
I cannot observe the intentions that would explain whether 
this is a signal, a bit of stretching, or a request to speak. 
And even if I knew the meaning as that is explained by 
the intention, I would not necessarily know the motive – 
whether to be polite, or to create disruption, or to indicate 
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disapproval. Explaining human action requires reference to 
intention and motivations, not to causes.
Furthermore, these intentions can be understood only 
within the context of social rules, often implicit, through 
which that particular hand movement is to be understood. 
Raising the hand, say, is a socially understood way of seeking 
attention. One needs to know the social rules through which 
social intercourse is enabled to happen. And these social 
rules will change from social group to social group, from 
society to society. To explain human action (and to engage 
therefore educationally with the learners) requires not only 
insight into their intentions and motives but also into the 
social rules through which they interpret others’ words and 
gestures. 
Education – the pursuit of what is seen to be valuable in terms 
of understanding, practising, appreciating, moralising and 
socialising – is necessarily an engagement between minds, 
not a set of interventions to cause preconceived behavioural 
outcomes.
But caution is required. In one sense, each individual is 
unique. My thoughts and intentions are mine, not yours, 
unique to me, the product of different backgrounds and 
interactions over time, through which I see the world and 
interpret what others say and do. That is why policy makers 
wrongly assume that their detailed interventions will produce 
the results which they envisaged and hoped for. What is clear 
to them, the policy makers, is not necessarily clear to the 
teachers or interpreted in the way intended.
On the other hand one must be careful of the ‘uniqueness 
fallacy’. Each person and each society is unique in some 
respect but not in others. I am unique in terms of my exact 
history, but not unique in terms of my having shared that 
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history to some extent with other people in my social group. 
And that social group shares basic human needs with other 
social groups – the need for food, affection, community. 
As Winch (1958) argued in The Idea of a Social Science, we 
can come to understand from the inside how other societies 
work and how other people within those societies interpret 
(generally speaking) the interactions with others. No two 
languages translate exactly. But there is sufficient proximation 
to exactness, given the human form of life that we share, 
for the outsider to enter into the way of thinking of the other.
Hence, generalisations can be made but they are inevitably 
tentative, provisional, open to interpretation, not necessarily 
applicable to all individuals, some of whom might come from 
very different backgrounds with very different ways of seeing 
the social and moral worlds. That is why there can be no 
direct transmission of the conclusions of general statements 
to the particular case. The teacher always needs to exercise 
judgement as to whether the general conclusion applies to 
this particular learner. 
None the less, that deliberation recognises indirectly the 
validity of generalised conclusions drawn from social 
science research. The contrast between uniqueness of each 
individual, on the one hand, and the large-scale explanations 
of individual or society behaviour, on the other hand, is a 
false dualism. The reconciliation lies in the deliberations of 
the decision-maker, whether that be policy maker or teacher. 
Moreover, entering into such deliberations or praxis, though 
not necessarily explicitly, are the educational aims and values 
argued for above. 
Teachers as educational researchers
Many of the great philosophers have had something 
interesting to say about teaching and teachers – Aristotle, 
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Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Rousseau, Dewey, Wittgenstein 
and Oakeshott. Each offers insight into the ways in which 
‘teaching’ has been (and could be) conceived, given quite 
different philosophical presuppositions about the nature 
of knowledge, about what is worth learning, about the 
centrality of experience, and, above all, about what it means 
to be human – and to become more so. They see a moral 
dimension to what it means to be a teacher. 
From different social and philosophical perspectives, what it 
means to teach partakes in a wider understanding of what it 
means to help young people to flourish as human beings, to 
provide access to cultures which shape that humanity, and to 
engage in what is judged to be worth learning, 
To understand teaching within this broader ethical and 
social context provides the basis for challenging how 
policy makers often conceive of teachers – as did such 
‘radical reformers’ as Ivan Illich, Carl Rogers and John 
Dewey. Teaching for Dewey lay in the transformation of 
the experiences which the young learners brought from 
their families and communities, in the provision of further 
enriching experiences and in critical reflection upon 
them. So understood, the educational journey is helped 
by, for example, the ‘teacher’ introducing at appropriate 
moments those aspects of the inherited ‘wisdom of the race’ 
(Oakeshott’s ‘voices in the conversation of mankind’) which 
may help transform those experiences. 
This is most important in thinking about what is distinctively 
educational research. We have seen, on the one hand, how 
engaging thoughtfully in education requires addressing the 
aims of education (What counts as an educated person in 
this day and age?) - essentially moral considerations. We 
have seen, too, how policy makers and teachers need to take 
into account what social scientists may say through the 
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various forms of empirical research which bear upon the 
attempts to answer that question in this context and with 
these learners. 
But reconciling and integrating these different considerations 
requires systematic and critical deliberation. Such critical 
and systematic deliberation is at the heart of educational 
research, and for that reason the teacher has to be seen as a 
researcher in the following sense.
The teacher is trying to realize in practice certain educational 
goals. Those goals embody the educational values he or she 
is committed to. The reflective teacher will constantly try to 
articulate those goals in the context of his or her practice. 
And, no doubt in the light of what others say, what the 
teachers see to be of educational value for the learners in his 
or her care will evolve through criticism. Furthermore, in 
implementing those educational aims, the deliberations of 
the reflective teacher will take into account what researchers 
(especially the social scientists) have said – not slavishly 
because, as I argued above, what is generally applicable may 
not be so for these children in this situation. For example, 
generalisations about the benefits of the phonic approach 
to the teaching of reading would not apply to children with 
glue-ear!
All that applies to the ‘reflective teacher’. That is not quite 
the same as the teacher as researcher – but a pre-cursor to it. 
What turns reflection into research is
  clarifying as precisely as possible the aims of educating 
these learners – the knowledge and practical capabilities 
that are valued, the issues of social concern that impact 
on them, the sense of personal worth which each is 
striving to acquire;
  gathering evidence which would support the claim that 
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such aims have been implemented – or not, in which case 
new approaches have to be found, tested and refined in the 
light of further experience. Part of that ‘refining’ would 
lie in openness to criticism of others – other teachers and 
the feedback from the learners. 
The essence of the research, therefore, is the clarity of the 
thesis (the claim being made), the evidence which is relevant 
to challenging that claim, and the openness to critical 
scrutiny of the thesis and of the evidence provided. 
For this to happen, teachers within or across schools need to 
become supportive communities of researchers. Knowledge 
grows through criticism and so one needs to create the sort 
of communities where criticism can flourish – where the 
‘thesis’ can be tested, hopefully survive, or (where that is not 
the case) be refined. This is so important because the natural 
human instinct is to avoid criticism and to avoid exposure to 
any evidence which makes one question what one believes 
to work
Conclusion
Educational thinking, whether that be in policy or in 
practice, raises questions which traditionally have been 
within the province of philosophy – ethical questions 
about the aims of education and what is worth learning, 
about the nature of the knowledge to be acquired, about the 
relation of private to public good. Failure to address these 
question leads to defective policy, practice and research. That 
philosophical questioning often begins with the puzzlement 
over what is meant when policies and practices are advocated 
– with the realisation that there is ambiguity in what is said 
and that at the centre of such ambiguity are assumptions 
about values or about what it means to know or about what 
counts as an educated person. Furthermore, key to such 
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educational questioning should be the teachers, who, far 
from being ‘the deliverers’ of the curriculum, must be the 
curriculum thinkers. Furthermore, philosophically aware 
and questioning, the teachers need to engage in the research 
which will enable them teach better.
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Many animals learn from experience. They learn where to 
forage, whom to flee, where to find mates. Some, such as 
wolves and lions, learn to work collectively to pursue their 
prey. Some, evidently, are taught. Lions apparently teach 
their cubs how to hunt. Humans do more. We learn not 
just from those nearby, but from people remote from us in 
time and space. We can do so because we have developed 
languages and other symbol systems that enable us to 
communicate our ideas, express our feelings, engage in 
cooperative enterprises, and rationally evaluate our own and 
one another’s actions and ideas. Moreover, we need to do all 
these things. Individual members of our species are poorly 
equipped to fend for themselves. Unlike zebras, who are ready 
to run and fend for themselves shortly after birth, we have an 
extended period of dependency. One might even argue that 
our dependency is lifelong. We live in communities and rely 
on one another to provide goods and services that we cannot 
provide for ourselves. Unlike the other animals, we have and 
need a heritage – a constellation of evolving understandings, 
practices, institutions and techniques that we learn from past 
generations, then modify and transmit to future generations.
This means that education, broadly conceived, is as 
distinctively human as any activity. And it is vital. Without 
59The ends of education
a suitable education, a human being probably could not 
survive. Obviously it does not follow that a human being 
could not survive without schools, or homework, or final 
exams. But we have to learn much of what we need to know. 
And we have to learn how to learn much of what we need to 
know. To a considerable extent, this requires being taught. 
Whether schools, homework and final exams figure in the 
best way to teach such things remains to be seen.
Our reliance on education raises important questions. What 
can we know? To answer this requires investigation into 
the nature and scope of knowledge. What can we learn? 
We need to investigate the physical, psychological and/or 
social factors that facilitate or inhibit learning. We need also 
to investigate whether different methods are effective for 
different populations or at different stages of development. 
How does a person learn? To answer this requires devising 
methods that would enable us to investigate learning. Do 
we need to develop a science of education to discover what 
methods are effective? Or is it sufficient to draw on other 
sciences – psychology, neuroscience, sociology? (See Dewey 
1929). Then we must consider what is worth learning. It is 
surely not the case that every opinion, institution, practice, 
or approach is worth accepting, acting on, passing on to 
our descendants. Among the things that could be learned, 
which ones should be learned? What criteria should we use 
to decide? Do they vary with circumstances?
It might seem that we need not worry about such questions. 
Inasmuch as educational institutions and practices are in 
place, our predecessors have already implicitly answered 
them. Such complacency is problematic. To say that we have 
educational institutions and practices is not to say that they 
serve our ends. Perhaps they are ineffective, or outdated, or 
unjust. Perhaps they overlook opportunities we could benefit 
from. To say that we are doing something is not to say that 
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we are doing what we ought to do. To develop and sustain an 
acceptable educational regime, we need to ask fundamental 
philosophical questions: What constitutes a good education? 
What makes an education good?
These questions are as old as philosophy. Plato asks in the 
Republic: What sort of life is worth living? And he recognizes 
that this question cannot be answered independently of 
determining what sort of education equips citizens with 
the abilities, desires, and motivation needed to live a good 
life. Abilities alone are not enough. If people are to live a 
good life and a good life requires reading, then they need 
not only to be able to read, they also have to want to read 
and to be inclined to read. So desire and motivation are 
crucial. If a good life requires contributing to the well-being 
of the community, then people need not only to know that 
they should contribute to the community’s well-being, they 
should be motivated to do so. Moreover, the various skills, 
desires, and motivations need to be integrated. They must 
be suitably woven together so that they support rather than 
undermine one another.
Education, whether formal or informal, is an essentially 
reflective enterprise. Unlike indoctrination, which might 
proceed smoothly without any consideration of what is being 
indoctrinated, education involves critical reflection on its 
own ends and means. What are we trying to convey? Why 
are we trying to convey just this? What benefits accrue 
from having conveyed this? What means are effective and 
appropriate for conveying this sort of thing? What are the 
criteria for being effective and appropriate? Philosophy of 
education provides resources for investigating such matters. 
It grows out of and feeds into all aspects of educational theory 
and practice. And it grows out of and feeds into all branches 
of philosophy.
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It asks basic questions in an attempt to identify and 
investigate assumptions that ordinarily go without saying. 
What is knowledge? How does it differ from understanding? 
What is learning? How does learning something differ from 
merely developing an opinion about it or changing one’s 
mind about it? What is teaching? How does teaching differ 
from indoctrinating, from coaching, from inculcating? These 
might seem to be psychological questions. There is clearly a 
psychological component to them. They all have something 
to do with how people think. But psychology alone will 
not provide us with the answers we seek. For knowledge, 
understanding, learning, and teaching are success concepts. 
They involve a commitment to the idea that something has 
been mastered, or done well, or done correctly. So the questions 
arise: what is the appropriate standard of assessment, and 
what justifies the choice of that standard? For Jan to have 
learned the causes of malaria or the consequences of the 
Opium Wars, it is not enough that she has acquired some 
opinions on the subject. She must have acquired a sufficient 
number and range of at least roughly correct opinions on 
the subject. She must have done so in a way that involves 
cognitive activity (rather than, for example, as a result of 
a kick in the head or an implant in her prefrontal cortex). 
Perhaps, in addition, the way she came to have her opinions 
or can now support them must afford some reason to think 
that they are correct. Then she can give a credible answer 
to the question ‘How do you know?’ Obviously, a lot more 
analysis is required to explicate exactly what it takes to have 
learned something. To understand what it takes requires 
knowing what kind of accomplishment learning such a thing 
is. That is a normative question.
Certain ways of inculcating beliefs for moral reasons 
evidently do not count as teaching. Although coercion or 
operant conditioning or surgical implants might bring it 
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about that a person believes something, it is not obvious that 
someone who has undergone such procedures has actually 
learned or been taught anything. An appeal to a student’s 
capacity to think and a respect for a student’s intellectual 
autonomy seem required for bringing a change of mind to 
qualify as teaching her. Advertising and propaganda attempt, 
in Plato’s terms, to ‘influence us unawares’ – that is, to get us 
to adopt certain beliefs without being aware of what leads us 
to adopt them. In effect, such methods intentionally bypass 
our critical faculties. This is disrespectful of us as intellectual 
(and moral) agents, even if the content conveyed is correct 
and the beliefs are valuable ones to impart. Education 
demands responsiveness to reasons. It should equip students 
to ask for reasons, to recognize reasons, to provide reasons 
for their beliefs and actions, and to be skeptical of claims 
when no adequate reasons are available.
At the heart of the philosophy of education is the question: 
What is the goal of education? What is the point? What 
exactly are we trying to do? There may be multiple answers. 
Perhaps education as a whole serves many ends. Or perhaps 
different spheres of education serve different ends. But if we 
do not seriously examine this cluster of questions, we will 
be at a loss to know how to design our educational practices, 
policies and institutions. For different designs serve different 
ends.
John Dewey (1916) argued that universal public education 
is necessary for a democracy. Having the right to vote will 
not do citizens much good if they do not have the resources 
to decide for themselves who and what is worth voting for. 
They are vulnerable to rogues and charlatans if they lack 
the ability or the incentive to assess issues and candidates 
for themselves. So in a liberal democratic society, there is a 
political justification for universal public education. Is this 
justification sufficient? Apparently not. First, it apparently 
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applies only to democracies. Nothing seems to follow 
about whether there is any justification for universal public 
education that applies to societies that are not and do not 
aspire to be democracies. Second, it is not clear that citizens 
in a democracy are entitled to only the level of education 
that they need to function well as citizens. Suppose, for 
example, that to function effectively as a citizen required no 
more than a 10th grade education. Would that mean that a 
society’s obligation to educate its people would stop at grade 
10? Or should society provide its young with more? I will 
below suggest that Dewey is more concerned with what it 
takes to be a participating member of a community than what 
it takes to be an active citizen of a country with a particular 
form of government. But the issue here is that there seems 
to be something unduly narrow about assuming the full 
justification for education derives from enabling someone to 
function as a citizen.
Throughout the world it has recently been claimed the 
goal of education is to prepare students for the work force. 
If so, the skills and abilities that education should impart 
are those that will turn students into good workers. These 
may be contextually circumscribed. At different points in 
history, workers need different abilities. No doubt equipping 
students with marketable skills is worthwhile. But is 
imparting such skills the only thing education should do? 
Should it prepare future workers at the expense of other 
educational objectives?
People are more than just workers. They are members of 
families, of circles of friends, of communities, of cultures. 
They have interests and aspirations above and beyond those 
that figure in their jobs. If education is concerned exclusively 
or primarily with preparing people for the work force, it is apt 
to be narrow and skewed. It is likely to skirt the development 
of skills, orientations and capacities whose value lies in other 
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aspects of their lives. It will thus fail to equip them with 
the resources needed to be good parents, friends, citizens, 
amateur artists, athletes, and appreciators of the diverse 
ways humans can excel.
Moreover, if preparing the populace for the work force is 
education’s overarching objective. we face a daunting task. 
Once it was reasonable for educators to think that they knew 
how to do this. In the fourteenth century, if a man was a 
farmer, he could take it for granted that his sons would be 
farmers and that they would farm the land in much the way 
that he did. So he could teach his sons to farm, imparting 
his skills and know-how, thereby equipping them for their 
place in the world of work. But today the world is changing 
rapidly. We have very little idea what specific skills and 
abilities the work force will need in 20 or 30 years, when 
our current students will be workers in their prime. Thus 
insofar as we are preparing our students to be workers, 
we are preparing them to work at something we know not 
what. This involves identifying and imparting a quite 
different set of skills from those needed to farm or cook or 
fix cars or program computers as we do today. It requires 
that we equip our students with higher order skills that 
enable them and motivate them to learn how to learn, and 
to recognize when established ways of doing things are 
becoming outdated.
Aristotle contends that human beings are essentially rational 
(Richard McKeon, 1941). If rationality is the human essence, 
then the end of education should be to enable each human 
being to function as a rational agent. Then each would realize 
his essence and be able to perform his proper function. This 
might require more or different skills, propensities and 
orientations than those that are required to enable each of 
us to function as a citizen or as a member of the work force.
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To see whether the Aristotelian position figures in a viable 
philosophy of education, we need to explicate and justify 
a conception of human flourishing, where to flourish is 
to function well as a rational animal. Rawls suggests that 
flourishing involves satisfying what he calls the Aristotelian 
Principle: ‘Other things equal, human beings enjoy the 
exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained 
abilities) and that this enjoyment increases the more the 
capacity is realized or the greater its complexity. A person 
takes pleasure in doing something as he becomes more 
proficient at it, and of two activities which he performs 
equally well, he prefers the one that calls upon the greater 
number of more subtle and intricate discriminations.’ 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 414) He goes on to say, ‘Presumably complex 
activities are more enjoyable because they satisfy the desire 
for variety and novelty of experience, and leave room for 
feats of ingenuity and invention.’ (Rawls, ibid. p. 427). 
Rawls does not, of course, think that flourishing requires 
relentless self-improvement in all aspects of life. He notes 
that it would be ridiculous if someone were to invoke the 
Aristotelian Principle as a reason to continually devise more 
complicated ways to tie his shoes. Nevertheless, Rawls thinks 
that flourishing involves realizing the Aristotelian Principle 
in some important aspects of one’s life. If this is right, and 
if enabling people to flourish is an aim of education, then 
we need to equip and motivate students to continually 
improve their performance in some significant areas of their 
lives, and refine their abilities to make subtle and intricate 
discriminations.
We might wonder whether there is such a thing as human 
flourishing. I do not mean by this that we should wonder 
whether human beings flourish. Plainly some do. The 
question is whether flourishing is a single property that all 
those who flourish share. If so, all those who flourish are in 
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an important respect alike. The ancient Greeks thought that 
the answer was ‘yes’. Flourishing had to be characterized 
at a level of abstraction, so that the relevant features could 
plausibly be general. But there was a single good – the good 
for man – that all aim for, and that all who were successful 
achieved.
The conviction that there is such a single good waned 
with the Enlightenment. Different people, it seems, quite 
reasonably value different things. They consider their lives to 
go well when they achieve different objectives. They do not 
all flourish in the same way. So if the Aristotelian Principle 
holds, it must be interpreted in a way that recognizes that 
different people seek to satisfy it in different domains.
This marks an important change that is highly consequential 
for education. For if there is value in people’s living lives 
that they consider good, then rather than thinking that the 
educational establishment – society, or the ministry, or the 
family – should set the goals from the outside, education 
should enable and equip students to set their own goals. In 
Rawls’s terms, education should enable people to determine 
their own conception of the good and equip them to pursue 
that good, their pursuit being limited by the rights of others 
not to be harmed and to have the same liberty to pursue 
their own conceptions of the good. A person’s conception of 
the good is a scheme of ultimate ends that she reflectively 
endorses, whose achievement is likely, barring disaster, to 
result in a life that she would consider well lived.
Formulating and pursuing a conception of the good requires 
a variety of abilities that children, and some adults, lack 
– information, foresight, the capacity to rationally assess 
alternatives, and so forth. Rawls is sometimes criticized for 
overlooking this fact. I do not think this criticism is sound, 
given that he was attempting to characterize the moral 
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features that fully functioning members of a well ordered 
society need. Children are not yet fully functioning members 
of society, and some people never will be. Still, the criticism 
points to an incompleteness in Rawls’ account, and one that 
is significant for the philosophy of education. What more is 
needed?
Here it pays to turn to Amartya Sen (Sen, 1995). He maintains 
that to be able to form what Rawls calls a conception of the 
good, people need a range of capabilities. Some are inborn, 
others are acquired. Among those that are are acquired are 
the capability to recognize opportunities, frame alternatives 
for oneself, and imaginatively entertain the possibility of 
adopting different goods as one’s own. The opportunities 
must be live options, not just pipe dreams. Because the 
opportunities in question must be, and be recognized as, 
genuinely available, exactly what capabilities students need to 
develop is keyed to circumstances. Nevertheless, if a person’s 
purview is too restricted, her ability to form a conception of 
the good will be stunted. She will be unaware of the range 
of opportunities actually open to her or of the reasons she 
might have to consider them desirable. If, although she 
can form a viable conception of the good, her resources are 
unduly limited, she is not equipped to pursue her conception 
of the good. As Sen makes clear, it is not enough that she is 
equipped to lead a life that she considers good simply because 
she is easily satisfied. Nor is it enough if, simply because her 
purview is restricted, she identifies as a good life what is 
merely the best of a bad lot, when there are real options that, 
had she been aware of them, she would have preferred. She 
must be capable of surveying and entertaining a fairly wide 
range of genuinely available options.
To be sure, some limitations are inevitable. Regardless of 
our aspirations, we human beings cannot fly by flapping 
our arms. Others are inevitable for some people, but not for 
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others. Unless their sight is restored, blind people cannot 
pilot commercial aircraft. That option is foreclosed to them. 
Yet others can be remedied by supplying absent resources. A 
young woman, living at a distance, becomes able to attend 
school when she gets a bicycle; a member of a group barred 
from a trade gains the opportunity to pursue that trade when 
the laws are changed. Yet others – the ones that concern 
us – can be removed or ameliorated by education. Literacy 
and numeracy enable people to both entertain and pursue 
careers, hobbies and activities that would otherwise be closed 
to them. The capacity for critical thinking enables people to 
judiciously entertain and assess alternative conceptions of the 
good. Expansion of one’s imaginative range, by broadening 
one’s perspective, enables one to recognize and appreciate the 
pros and cons of various options, as though from the inside. 
Through imagination, a person can ask herself, not just what 
is good or bad about this way of life simpliciter, but what 
would be good or bad about this way of life for me. There is, 
and should be no suggestion that the capabilities education 
fosters will lead all students to form the same conception of 
the good. Rather, they will enable them to survey and assess 
the options, and decide for themselves what goods they value 
most. Education should recognize that there is a diversity of 
lives that reasonable people consider good, and should equip 
students to formulate and pursue a life that they personally 
would consider well lived.
It is likely that without some measure of civic engagement, 
some personally and financially rewarding career, and some 
sort of family life most people would not consider their lives 
well lived. So the familiar ends of education are apt to be 
interwoven into an individual’s conception of the good. But 
because the weight they are given is apt to vary from person 
to person, for education to overemphasize any of them would 
be an error.
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It might seem that, like preparing students for citizenship 
or for the work force, this sets education a distal objective.1 
Looking back in old age, each person can assess whether her 
education provided her with the capabilities she needed for 
a life she considers well lived. This is so, and it may be that 
only by surveying one’s complete life that it is possible to tell 
whether that life as a whole has been well lived. Nevertheless, 
this is only part of the story. 
Still, this may sound very individualistic, perhaps 
objectionably so. I do not think it is. For, as I said at the 
outset, human beings are social animals. We form societies 
and create the institutions, practices, and norms that shape 
our collective life. To see how this modulates the Rawlsian/
Senian conception, let us look back to Dewey.
Standardly, I suppose, we think of democracy as a form of 
government, one where the government rules by the consent 
of the governed, where the will of the majority settles (most) 
issues, where voting is the mechanism for making political 
decisions.1 Dewey does not deny that political democracy has 
these features. But he considers democracy not just – and 
not mainly – a form of government. For Dewey, democracy 
is primarily a way of life. It is a form of association, an 
orientation toward joint enterprises, common and sometimes 
divergent aims, collective social life.
The model for Deweyan democracy is not the United States 
Senate, but a New England town meeting. A town meeting 
is a direct democracy. It is a form of government that was 
common in 19th century rural New England towns like the 
one where Dewey grew up, and still occasionally exists in 
vestigial form. Under such a government, the residents of a 
town meet together to decide what the town should do. All 
residents are eligible to participate, and have both a right and 
1. I thank Morwenna Griffiths for raising this worry
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a duty to take part. All are, from a political point of view, 
free and equal. They are free to advocate for any course of 
action they favor, entitled to be heard, and have an equal say 
in what is done and how things are done. What Dewey calls 
‘democratic deliberation’ is a form of mutually respectful 
collective deliberation. The background assumptions 
are, first: that there are problems that the group needs 
collectively to solve. Deliberations in the town meeting are 
practical; they concern what to do – perhaps about schools, 
taxes, roads, law enforcement or public health. Second: not 
everyone agrees about what to do. Different people have 
different opinions about the desirability of different ends, 
their relative importance, the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different means to achieve various ends, and so on. To get 
the deliberators to adopt the policy a person favors, he must 
convince his fellow citizens of its desirability. This is fairly 
obvious.
In order to prevail, an agent should understand his 
opponents’ points of view. If John knows why Mary objects 
to his favored course of action, he is in a better position to 
rebut or deflect Mary’s objections. If he knows what she 
wants, he is in a better position to insure that her desires do 
not conflict with or override with his. This is so even in purely 
adversarial proceedings. Any political operative would 
recommend coming to the table with such knowledge. But, 
Dewey believes, democratic deliberation is not adversarial. 
The goal of democratic deliberation is not to get others 
to do what one already wants. It is to reason together to 
achieve the common good. Although John and Mary have 
antecedently formulated ideas about the common good, the 
discussion is not a winner-take-all contest to see which of 
those ideas will prevail. Their ideas are common fodder for 
deliberation. They do not argue in order to realize their own 
antecedently fixed objectives and to discredit those of their 
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opponents. Their motive for informing themselves about 
each other’s points of view is not to block, rebut, or co-opt 
them. Rather, if they understand one another’s points of 
view, they learn what each other’s interests and objectives 
are, and why each thinks that those interests and objectives 
are worth pursuing. They thus enrich their understanding 
of the problem situation, the ends that might be realized, 
the courses of action open to them. This may lead them to 
modify their own position, to modulate it into something 
that accommodates, reflects, or respects the positions of 
those with whom they initially disagree. They argue from 
initially disparate points of view in order to arrive at a 
common, mutually satisfactory solution.
By accessing the opinions of others and the reasons for those 
opinions, we extend our data base. We gain more information 
about the available options and their desirability. So rather 
than seeing those who disagree with us as opponents, Dewey 
thinks, we should see them as allies who, by envisioning things 
differently, extend our epistemic range. Diversity of opinion 
on Dewey’s view thus is not an impediment to deliberation, 
but a resource for it. It follows that undue deference is a 
vice. If a deliberator, out of deference to a colleague, fails to 
voice her opinions where they diverge from his, she deprives 
him and the rest of the community of her insights. This is 
a form of disrespect. And it is epistemically costly. It may 
prevent the community from coming to the best available 
decision. What Dewey calls democratic deliberation is not 
restricted to the political realm. It is collective deliberation 
that affords access to insights and approaches that may prove 
beneficial, but that no one person, on his own, would ever 
have considered.
Dewey focuses on democratic deliberation in contexts 
where people seek to come to a consensus about their 
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common good. But its contribution to such contexts does 
not by any means exhaust its value. Because democratic 
deliberation extends an agent’s epistemic range, it is equally 
valuable in contexts where a person is concerned exclusively 
with her own good. For from the fact that she is, in such 
a context, self-interested, it does not follow that she knows 
where her interests really lie. Suppose, for example, she needs 
to decide whether to undergo a risky course of therapy. The 
decision is hers alone and her situation is such that she 
need only consider what is best for her. Still, she would do 
well to consult others – not just medical experts, but also 
people who know her well and perhaps patients who have 
undergone the therapy. Even though she gets to decide, and 
only her interests need be consulted in making the decision, 
she may not know what to decide or how best to decide. She 
may lack information or insight that others could provide. 
By deliberating with others, she gains access to alternative 
points of view. These may reveal important features of her 
current situation or currently espoused end which she has 
overlooked. Through such deliberation she gains access 
to information and experiences beyond her immediate 
purview. She may, as a result, modulate her ends or means. 
Whether or not she does so, she will be on more solid 
ground, since her decision will have been subject to greater 
scrutiny.
As I have characterized it, democratic deliberation is a way 
that people should work together to solve common problems 
and achieve collective goods. But it is considerably more 
than this. For Dewey’s democratic deliberation is essentially 
educative. It is a way – perhaps the best way – to learn from 
one another. By reasoning together in a context of mutual 
respect, deliberators draw on one another’s insights to figure 
out what to think. By reasoning collectively about how to 
figure out such things, they collectively devise and revise 
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methods of inquiry and standards of acceptability. So by 
participating in democratic deliberation, students learn from 
others. And by learning how to participate in such debates, 
they learn how best to learn from others. Since participation 
is required, learners are not passive. They contribute to 
ongoing debates. Their ideas are fodder for those debates – 
they are insights that might be endorsed, modified or rejected 
as impracticable, unfounded, or simply not as good as a rival 
proposal. Nor are the students mere proposers of ideas. They 
also function as critics of the ideas of others, and formulators 
of ideas that no one has yet entertained. So they learn how 
to take a critically reflective stance toward their own and 
other people’s ideas.
A person needs to have a particular set of skills to be able to 
contribute to and avail oneself of the resources democratic 
deliberation provides. Very roughly, deliberators need to 
be adept at both the giving and taking of reasons. This is 
something they need to learn to do.
In my description of the town meeting, I said nothing about 
rules or procedures. According to Dewey, these, as well as 
substantive decisions about policy, law, and practice, are not 
given a priori, but emerge in the course of deliberation. As 
people collectively deliberate about what to do (in enacting 
a law, formulating a policy, implementing or modifying a 
practice), I am grateful to John White for prompting me to 
make this point clear, they develop shared views about what 
sorts of considerations rightly bear on deciding this sort of 
thing and what sorts of practices foster effective deliberation. 
They develop second-order views about how such deliberation 
should be conducted. They come to recognize that certain 
rules or reasons or procedures strike them as unacceptable, 
so they collectively decide not to appeal to them, use them, 
or give them weight.
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Deliberators monitor the results of their procedures and 
modify their practice in light of those results. If, for example, 
they find that one approach leads to animosity, to endless 
debate, or to outcomes that on reflection they consider 
regrettable, they revise it in hopes of doing better. Gradually 
the standards of collective debate evolve, as they recognize 
that the reasons it makes sense to offer are the reasons 
their interlocutors should be expected to endorse, or at 
least seriously entertain, and these depend on the diversity 
of opinions among those they are deliberating with. The 
evolution of the practice of collective discourse, and the 
rules and constraints deliberators consider it subject to, are 
accepted for the nonce, as reflective of what they currently 
think are the best ways to deliberate about their collective 
lives. This holds not only in deliberations about a common 
good, but also in deliberations about an individual’s good. 
When a group of people are collectively deliberating about 
what one of them should do given her own conception of 
the good -- whether, for example, she should enroll in a 
dangerous but promising clinical trial -- they have learned 
to avoid ad hominem arguments, unjustifiable appeals 
to authority, adducing ad hoc considerations to avoid 
unpalatable consequences.
At the heart of Dewey’s conception of democratic deliberation 
is a deep-seated mutual respect. Deliberators respect one 
another in taking each other’s views seriously, and in taking 
responsibility for their own views, so that they are worthy of 
being taken seriously. Their deliberations display a critical 
reflectiveness about ends and means. The fact that a course 
of action accords with tradition is a point in its favor, since 
it is some evidence that that course of action has worked 
well in the past. But since deliberators need to look forward 
as well as back, they must consider whether circumstances 
have changed in such a way that what worked well in the past 
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will not work so well in the future. This is not to deny that 
deliberators can appeal to experts. But if they do, they need 
to accompany their appeal with intersubjectively acceptable 
reasons for thinking that the chosen expert is in this case 
trustworthy. Fallibilism is required as well. Deliberators 
must be willing to revisit previously accepted conclusions in 
light of their consequences, and to revise or reject them if 
things did not turn out as well as they hoped.
If democracy is a way of life, these virtues, which are at 
once cognitive and moral, should characterize our relations 
to one another, to our shared problems and our common 
world, generally. Whenever we are deliberating about 
matters of common concern, we should display the virtues of 
democratic deliberators: mutual respect, answerability to the 
evidence, foresight about social and material consequences, 
fallibilism, and so on. Since, according to Dewey, all 
deliberation is public deliberation, these virtues should 
infuse our lives.
If, as Aristotle said, our overarching objective is to flourish 
or to live a life we consider valuable, and as Enlightenment 
figures such as Rousseau, Wollstonecraft and Kant said, not 
everyone considers the same sort of life to be valuable, then 
as Rawls and Sen maintain, education must equip individuals 
with the resources to form their own conception of the 
good and the capabilities to pursue that good, constrained 
always by the provision that an individual’s pursuit cannot 
interfere with the equal liberty of others to pursue their own 
goods. The goal of education is not to enable people to realize 
some externally specified good, but rather to enable them, 
in a suitably unfettered and responsible way, to devise and 
pursue lives that they consider good. Since people are 
different, there will be a diversity of viable conceptions of 
the good.
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Education should foster the recognition of that diversity and 
the appreciation of its value. Since human beings are social 
animals who can flourish only in communities, we need 
to be able, as Dewey argued, to form, critique, and modify 
our ever evolving conceptions of the good by appealing 
to the insights of others. And we need to appreciate how 
tightly the realization of our individual conception of the 
good is tied to the good of our society, hence to the goods 
sought by other members of our society. Rather than 
individualism being at odds with collectivism, individualism 
and collectivism are mutually reinforcing. The capacity to 
appreciate these insights and the motivation to realize a 
community that fosters them is, I contend a fundamental 
goal of education.
I am grateful to John White for comments on an earlier 
version of this paper.
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In a longer version of this conference presentation, I have said 
a lot about the shortcomings of the traditional subject-based 
curriculum. More on this can be found in White (2011). But 
here I turn from critique to a positive alternative. This is an 
aims-based, rather than a subject-based, curriculum.
Curriculum statements in every country are usually prefaced 
by a statement of aims. Too often this remains something 
like a high-sounding mission statement that teachers and 
others who use the curriculum statement quickly skim over 
and forget in their desire to find what detailed syllabuses are 
required in geography or some other subject. 
In the new book that my Institute of Education colleague, 
Michael Reiss, and I are publishing in February 2013, called 
An Aims-based Curriculum, we argue for aims that are no 
longer curtain raisers to a pre-determined curriculum, but 
aims that go all the way down. Our vision is of schools whose 
every activity is a reflection of its fundamental aims and 
justifiable by reference to them. It is a vision that does not 
protect a special place for traditional subjects or for anything 
else. It starts from very general aims on which there is likely 
to be wide consensus in a liberal democratic society, and 
derives more specific aims from these.
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This is what the first, lengthier part of our book provides. 
The second part looks at how this scheme can be practically 
realised – at issues relating to political control, the division 
of curricular responsibility between state and school, 
and implications for assessment, inspection and teacher 
education.
Here I focus on the first part: the aims-based approach itself. 
The model we adopt is a kind of unfolding. We begin with 
very general aims, then show how these generate more specific 
aims and how from these in turn even more specific ones can 
be derived. We show that in this way one can derive aims 
just as detailed as those found in conventional curriculum 
planning, including many that overlap with these.
As an example, if we take it that if a major aim is to equip 
students to become responsible citizens, they will have, 
among other things, to know something about the society 
they live in. One aspect of this is having some understanding 
of its economy. This in turn requires some grasp of relevant 
aspects of the science, technology and mathematics 
underlying this economy. At the level of detail, there will be 
much overlap here with current requirements in these fields. 
The difference is that those teaching the specifics will be 
constantly referring back to the wider and wider frameworks 
within which these particulars are set: the economy, our 
society, citizenship, our personal and collective well-being. 
They will be less guided by the specialist requirements of a 
school subject.
We see our task in the book as mapping out the larger aims 
and relationships between them. At the most general level, 
this takes us into the realm of ethics and political philosophy. 
In the book we can do no more than touch on this, and so 
have to refer readers at many points to further discussions in 
the philosophical literature.
80 Conceptualizing education, and related issues
I’ll now briefly outline the major aims from which we start.
We begin from the suggestion that school education should 
equip every child 
  to lead a life that is personally flourishing, 
  to help others to do so, too. 
Then we show in more detail what each of these involves. 
There is now a large philosophical literature on what it is to 
lead a flourishing life. We draw on this to suggest that this 
life has much to do with being enjoyably, wholeheartedly 
and successfully immersed in worthwhile relationships 
and activities. Some people, not least in education, confine 
intrinsically worthwhile pursuits to intellectual and aesthetic 
ones, but the present account is much broader. It includes 
such things as intimate relationships, meaningful work, 
making music, scholarly research, gardening, eating good 
food, watching an excellent film. 
Nearly all of us in a modern society like our own assume it is 
ideally up to us largely to choose the mix of relationships and 
activities that best suits us. Unlike many of our ancestors, 
nearly all of us are deeply attached to personal autonomy as 
a value. 
A central aim of the school should be to prepare students 
for a life of autonomous, whole-hearted and successful 
engagement in worthwhile relationships, activities and 
experiences. 
In order to lead a flourishing life, certain basic needs must 
be met. We all need air, water, food, shelter, a certain level 
of health, a certain level of income. Psychologically, we need 
companionship, respect, recognition, security and freedom 
from attack, arbitrary arrest and other impositions. Schools 
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cannot provide all these things, but to some, like health and 
money management and recognition, they can make various 
kinds of contribution.
Working with parents, too, they can also help to develop the 
personal qualities that help us to live a fulfilling life – things 
like proper regulation of our emotions and our bodily desires 
for such things as food, drink, sex and novelty; a measure of 
confidence and self-esteem; independence of thought; moral 
courage.
The second, altruistic, aim about helping others to lead a 
flourishing life, has three dimensions. First, a moral one. We 
help others to flourish by possessing certain other-directed 
personal qualities: cooperativeness, kindness, tolerance, 
fairness, treating people with respect, helping them to meet 
their needs. 
Secondly, within this broad moral aim, we can place more 
specifically civic aims. We want children to become good 
citizens, concerned for the public interest as well as more 
private concerns, willing to collaborate with others in 
civic matters; disposed not to take at their face value the 
pronouncements of politicians and the pressure groups 
behind them, but subject them to critical scrutiny; standing 
up against corruption in public life. 
And thirdly, within this civic aim is the more specific aim 
of equipping young people to contribute to the common 
good through the work they do, both paid and unpaid. 
This is where education for employment comes into the 
picture.
None of these aims and sub-aims is discrete from the 
others. Importantly, those to do with the pupil’s own good 
are not discrete from the altruistic ones. Think of intimate 
friendships, of taking up teaching or nursing as a career, of 
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other collaborative pursuits of all sorts. What is good for one 
person can be good for others, too.
The two major aims mentioned would not make sense 
without bringing in a third aim that they presuppose. We 
call this the area of ‘background understanding’ – the 
understanding, in broad strokes, of human nature, of our 
social life and how it has developed as it is, and of the natural 
world in which we live.
You may ask: what is the justification for these particular 
aims? Don’t they simply reflect my own personal preferences? 
I hope they go deeper than that. Their justification goes back 
to the basic values of a liberal democracy. If you take as given 
that you want an education system in line with those values, 
these are kind of aims you will favour.
We explore these three major aims in more detail later in the 
book, deriving more determinate aims as we go. I gave an 
example just now that proceeds from 
  altruistic aims to
  education for citizenship to
  understanding society to
  understanding the economy to
  understanding the STEM areas that underpin this.
This is, of course, only one route into more detailed 
aims. There are further branchings at every point, here as 
elsewhere. Education for citizenship, for instance, is a matter 
of encouraging certain democratic dispositions as well as 
about various sorts of understanding. 
As the example of science and maths shows, an aims-based 
curriculum can generate much of the familiar content 
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found in a curriculum that starts from discrete subjects. 
Abandoning a traditional, subject-based curriculum does 
not mean demoting scientific, mathematical, historical, 
geographical, linguistic knowledge in education. What it 
means is that the knowledge selected is more obviously 
relevant to wider purposes. Take quadratic equations in 
algebra. In a subject-based approach, for a proper induction 
into mathematics as a specialism, you have to master them. 
No question. In an aims-based approach, we begin more 
agnostically. We have yet to see whether the aims point us 
in their direction. In my civic example just given, where the 
ordinary citizen needs some understanding of the economy 
and its scientific/mathematical underpinning, how essential 
is it for him or her to grasp quadratic equations? How would 
they rate against, say, elementary statistics?
Although an aims-based approach will put due weight 
on mathematical, scientific, historical and geographical 
knowledge, it does not follow that this will be acquired 
within the discrete school subjects of these names. This 
is a matter of what vehicles are selected in which to deliver 
these aims, not a matter of the aims themselves. While 
it will be a matter for the political realm to lay down a 
broad framework of aims in some detail, it will be the 
schools’ job to decide how best these aims can be pursued – 
whether by subjects as discrete entities, by projects, themes, 
interdisciplinary activities, whole school processes, or 
whatever. 
An aims-based approach does not put all the weight 
on knowledge acquisition. Far from it. Aims to do with 
possessing knowledge are always subordinate to wider 
aims about the kind of person one is, about the personal 
qualities one needs to lead a fulfilling life, act morally, be 
a good citizen and worker. Students can have as much 
knowledge as you like about what the world is like, about 
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human history, or about higher mathematics, but if they 
finish their education hopelessly inhibited about personal 
relationships, totally lacking in confidence, or, even worse, in 
a concern for other people, what avails them their academic 
learning?
The aims-based approach is a huge improvement on a subject-
based one. If we were not so attached to subjects as our one 
type of building block, or to the legacy from encyclopaedism 
that school education must be as comprehensive as possible, 
we could get so much further. Religious origins of the 
curriculum aside, there is an obvious reason why, until very 
recently, people felt that school education, topped for a few 
by university, should be packed tight with what was held to 
be essential intellectual provisioning for life’s journey. For 
most, that journey was likely to be short. If they did not get 
when young everything they might need for life, when would 
they get it? Today, with centenarians becoming two a penny, 
we have space to loosen up. 
We can shift the priority from a comprehensive grounding 
by 16 or 18 to something better fitting our age. Children 
will still need a good foundation, of course, but there is no 
need for this to try to cover all bases. More important is that 
the grounding spring from appropriate aims, rather than 
paying homage to tradition. Salient among these aims is 
that students enjoy learning and remain eager to continue 
learning once they have left school and throughout their 
lives. 
This is not a priority in a culture like our own in Britain, 
and perhaps in India, too, that leaves too many young 
people either switched off or glad to have exam cramming 
behind them. We need, badly, to rethink things from 
fundamentals.
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The English term “education” entails two very different 
meanings. On one hand this term denotes the formation 
of personality or human development in general. On the 
other hand “education” designates also the broad realm of 
pedagogical action including teaching. Of course, education 
in the first sense of that term does not preclude pedagogical 
efforts and interactions. On the contrary, the development 
of human individuals normally requires such efforts and 
interactions. However, human development is not limited 
to the pedagogical activities, for it also takes place outside 
pedagogical settings, outside practices of teaching and 
training. Besides, we should not exclude the probability that 
there could be certain pedagogical actions, certain methods 
of teaching and training that do not support education in 
the first sense of personality formation and human agency 
development. 
The exact question then is, how can we distinguish 
between pedagogical activities and arrangements that are 
educationally supportive, from those which are not. This 
requires a precise analytical clarification of the interrelation 
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between the terms “education” and “pedagogical action”. For 
it is obvious that we can only answer that question, if we first 
clarify what is education in itself and for itself. Only after 
that we can reasonably discuss the question how education 
can be supported by (certain kinds) of pedagogical action. 
In the following considerations I shall first show how 
“education” in the first and in the second sense of that term 
has been spelled out in the educational philosophy of John 
Dewey (1). While Dewey seems to assume a – indeed vague and 
somewhat self-contradictory – distinction between the both 
different meanings of “education”, those meanings became 
to some extent synthetized in the work of R. S. Peters which 
should be seen as a milestone in contemporary educational 
philosophy (2). In the next section of my paper I shall show 
why this synthesis is problematic, not only for logical but also 
for pedagogical reasons and why it is important to develop a 
clear analytic distinction between education as a particular 
kind of human development on one hand, and pedagogical 
action as a particular form of social relations on the other. In 
order to achieve this distinction I shall introduce the concept 
of Bildung as an understanding of “education” as a particular 
form of human development. This is an understanding that is 
clearly different from “education” in terms of teaching (3). On 
the ground of my explorations on the concept of education 
as Bildung, I shall finally be able to formulate some central 
norms of educative teaching, that is, to discriminate between 
educative and non-educative forms of teaching (4). 
1. Education as Growth and Education as Schooling in John 
Dewey’s Educational Theory
It is well known that John Dewey understands education 
mainly as a life-long process of growth. However, Dewey 
often uses “education” also as a synonym of “school 
education”, or of “schooling”, which, of course, terminates at 
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a certain age of the individual. The following quotation from 
“Democracy and Education” makes clear how he traces the 
relation between these two quite different meanings of the 
term in question:
...Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative 
save more growth, there is nothing to which education is 
subordinate save more education. It is common-place to 
say that education should not cease when one leaves school. 
The point of this commonplace is that the purpose of school 
education is to ensure the continuance of education by 
organizing the powers that insure growth.“ (Dewey 1916, 
p.51)
Now, one can put the question whether education in the 
first sense of life-long growth (which I shall call from now 
“education in itself”) and education in the second sense of 
school education really refer to the same class of things, 
and whether both the mentioned meanings of the word 
“education” do have any strong family resemblances. For 
while the “education in itself” that is “…all one with growing” 
(ibid, p. 53) does not have any purposes beyond itself, beyond 
the growth which it is, school education on the contrary does 
have an instrumental purpose to organize the powers that 
insure growth. That is to say that while the “education in 
itself” has an intrinsic value, the school education has merely 
an extrinsic one. 
Certainly, school education also entails the essential moment 
of personal growing. By learning different subjects, by being 
included in peer-groups and by interacting with teachers, 
by adapting to the institutional regulations of schools the 
students are widening up their life horizons and options 
for actions, they are making new social experiences, they 
are developing new attitudes and dispositions. However, 
“organizing the powers that insure growth”, which is 
89Education, Human Development and Teaching
according to Dewey the main task of school education, is 
quite different from “being growth”, which is the case of the 
“education in itself”. At schools, organizing the powers that 
enable growth is normally not an activity which is carried 
out by the growing children themselves, but by their teachers 
who have to create a desire for continued growth in their 
students and to supply the means to realize that desire (see 
ibid, p. 53.) Thus, this activity cannot be seen as an internal 
part of the “education in itself”. Rather, it is an external 
condition. 
This becomes very clear when we look at the “powers” 
which according to Dewey are crucial for enabling growth. 
These are social responsiveness and plasticity (see ibid, pp. 
42-46). It is obvious that children cannot “organize” these 
powers by themselves, even if they are capable of some kind 
of “self-organized learning”. Rather, plasticity and social 
responsiveness of the children should be kept alive and 
furthered by the adults who work with children, that is, by 
the teachers. The latter could do this, only if they respect 
the “sympathetic curiosity”, “unbiased responsiveness, and 
openness of mind” (ibid., p. 50, p. 52) of the children, instead 
of “…thinking of instruction as a method of supplying this 
lack [of desired traits – K.S.] by pouring knowledge into a 
mental and moral hole which awaits filling.” (ibid., p. 51). 
The respect for children’s curiosity, openness of mind, and 
responsiveness requires teachers to design and perform 
teaching and instruction in a way that gives broad space 
for the articulation of the actual questions and aims of the 
children, and to try to link this articulation to “objective” 
scientific knowledge, instead of just lecturing this knowledge 
by neglecting children’s own directions of thinking and 
growing. 
To sum up: According to Dewey “education in itself” is a 
process of personal growth while school education is to be 
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understood as a certain course of pedagogical action that 
enables the education-in-itself. Modes of pedagogical action 
that work against plasticity and social responsiveness as 
preconditions for growth are not educative. The common 
ground of “education in itself” and “school education” is that 
both terms has an inherent relation to growth – either in 
the sense that education is itself growth, or in the sense that 
(school) education is about enabling growth. 
Now, one can ask the further question whether the terms 
“human growth” and “education” are in fact fully equivalent. 
That is to ask, whether there might be some features and 
intrinsic goals of education, which cannot be subsumed 
under the growth of the human individual; features and 
goals that are not primarily linked to the individual and her 
development, but rather to collective values and interests of 
the society. So, for example, is the transmission of cultural 
objects like worldviews and values that traditionally have 
been seen as important ones within a given society, not an 
intrinsic goal of education – a goal that is quite independent 
of the one of individual growth?
On the other hand, we could ask ourselves whether 
“education” really covers all aspects of human growth, or 
whether this term does not rather specify some particular 
aspects of it. For “growth” appears to be a concept that is 
much too broad and too unspecific one – there are surely 
many aspects of human growth as for example biological 
maturation or as making “unplanned” experiences that are 
beyond the scope of education in the sense of teaching and 
pedagogical action in general. Thus, one may say that it is 
not the concept of human growth, or human development 
in general that can serve as a common ground for the two 
different meanings of education mentioned above, but rather 
some specific features of that concept.
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Indeed, in the historic development of the concept 
of education after Dewey there is such a tendency of 
differentiation between the terms “human development” 
and “education”. We can observe this tendency very 
clearly in the work of R.S. Peters who drew a twofold 
distinction between those terms: First, “education-in-itself” 
according to him also entails significances that go beyond 
the scope of “human development”, and second, “education” 
denotes only some particular dimensions of human 
development. 
2. Education as Transmission of worth-while Contents and 
Education as Development of Reason – R. S. Peters
In his programmatic book “Ethics and Education” R.S. 
Peters asserts three criteria for proper usage of the concept 
of education. According to him we should name only these 
processes and interactions “education” which
(1) imply the transmission of what is worth-while to those 
who become committed to it
(2) entail the development of a cognitive perspective at the 
learner
(3) respect the addressees of the transmission of educational 
contents by ruling out procedures of that transmission which 
lack voluntariness on the part of the addressees (see Peters 
1965, p 45). 
Now, it is not that difficult to see that these criteria represent 
a kind of “mixture” between the Deweyan “education-in-
itself” and “education as pedagogical action”. For it is clear 
that while the criterion (2) emphasizes a kind of individual 
development, the criteria (1) and (3) address “education” as 
“transmission”, that is, as a form of social relation. Should 
this “mixture” of apparently different meanings of education 
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be seen as a regress from the level of analytic elaboration of 
the concept of education reached by Dewey? 
I don’t think so. Rather, by proposing his criteria for education 
Peters seems to be trying to avoid a simple equalization of 
education to individual growth or individual development, 
and to assert the transmission of worth-while contents as an 
intrinsic goal of education; a goal that could not be easily 
reduced to the notion of individual growth. According to 
Peters’ first criterion, education is about transmission of 
contents that are worth-while not primarily with regard to 
individual’s self-realization, or with regard to “fixing the 
environment so that an individual “grows”” (ibid, p. 52), 
but with regard to “public traditions” (ibid, p. 53), or to a 
“heritage” that accumulates certain bodies of (collective) 
knowledge (ibid, p. 54). Turning the eyes outwards to what 
is essentially independent of persons is for Peters a crucial 
feature of education (ibid, P. 54). 
One might interpret the mentioned claims of Peters on the 
trans-personal and trans-individual dimension of education 
in a way that education is not only about the interest of the 
individual in growing, but also about the interest of society 
in cultural self-reproduction. These are two different interests 
that are often conflicting. 
Indeed, at a first glance, Peters seems to endorse this wide 
spread and trivial notion about a dichotomy and about 
a needed “balance” between an individual and a societal 
function of education, when he insists that at least in the 
later stages of secondary and adult education the emphasis 
should be more on disciplinary canons than on individual 
experiences and individual “avenues of initiation” into the 
public realm (see ibid, p. 56). One could understand that 
claim in a way that the academic disciplines should not be 
used only in an instrumental way as tools and as containers 
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of selective usable stuff for “fixing the environment so that 
the individual “grows”” (ibid, p. 52), but rather as cultural 
objects with rights on their own and with their own intrinsic 
value. 
However, a more careful look at Peters’ conception shows that 
it does not really entail a dichotomy between an individual 
and a societal function of education and that “cultural re-
production” of a given society does not appear as a task of 
education at all within that conception. That is to say, that 
according to Peters, educational institutions should not be 
understood as guardians of cultural canons or of national 
traditions that are meant to guarantee the cohesion of a 
national state, or of a given society. Rather, in Peters’ theory of 
education, transmission of disciplinary structured scientific 
domains should only function to enable the development of 
individual mind. 
Peters criticizes the empiricist notion of mind as an atomistic 
entity that develops itself by first receiving sensual data 
and then abstracting concepts from them . Rather, mind’s 
development is a genuine intersubjective process that is 
carried out by the initiation of the individual into “public 
traditions, enshrined in a public language” (Ibid, p. 49). So 
the point of teaching academic disciplines in educational 
institutions is to enable the development of an individual 
mind by initiating the student into activities of knowing and 
understanding (scientific) concepts that serve as grounds of 
public reasoning. This implies that not all new experiences, 
not all kinds of “growing” should be seen as “education”, but 
only those that link the developing individual to the sphere 
and the practice of public reason. 
We can find a similar (though not identical) line of thought 
in Dewey’s famous essay “The Child and the Curriculum”. 
Here Dewey claims that education requires establishing 
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a link between the personal experience of the child and 
the universal experience of the human race. And the later 
experience is organized, systematized and reflectively 
formulated in academic subjects which have been normally 
taught at schools (see Dewey 1964, p. 344-345). However, 
unlike Peters, Dewey does not think that the disciplinary 
canons should have priority over personal experiences and 
individual lifeworlds of the students. Quite in the contrary, he 
insists that academic disciplines should be “psychologized”, 
that is, they should be de-canonized and re-constructed in 
a way that these disciplines can be made compatible with 
the personal experiences of the students in order to serve as 
extensions, systematizations and universalizations of those 
experiences (see Ibid, p. 351). 
Also Israel Scheffler makes a strict distinction between 
growing of rationality that is for him the kernel of education, 
on one hand, and holding on disciplinary canons, on the 
other. According to Scheffler rationality is the ability to 
grasp principles, rules, and purposes and to evaluate all 
those “things” critically “in the light of reasons that might 
be put forward in public discussion”(Scheffler 1973, p. 
62). This notion of rationality comes very close to Peters’ 
understanding of education as development of a “cognitive 
perspective”, of an attitude of grasping conceptual schemes 
and principles of the facts and of asking for their reasons 
(see Peters 1966, p. 30-31; p. 45). But unlike Peters, Scheffler 
claims that rationality goes far beyond “academic mastery 
of factual subject matter” (Scheffler 1971, p. 62). For him 
cultivation of rationality is a matter of initiation into “open 
rational discussion” (Ibid, p. 62) – and not into academic 
disciplinary canons. Moreover, he sees a great merit in 
Dewey’s emphasizing of the “free judgment of the child as 
against fixed adult curricula imposed from above” (Ibid, p. 
63). 
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Peters’ equalisation of the initiation into public reason 
or public discourse with the initiation into the canons 
of academic disciplines is indeed not convincing. To be 
sure, dealing with concepts elaborated in the domains of 
academic disciplines like math, history, philosophy, art 
etc. does a great deal for the cultivation of one’s ability to 
participate in public reasoning. These concepts have a 
coherent structure being components of systematic chains 
of argumentation with explicit and justifiable premises, 
so that they can claim a trans-individual and inter-
perspectival validity. This makes them capable to serve 
as central tools of public reasoning, for public reasoning 
requires the participants to aim at mutual understanding 
that overlaps their particular perspectives, worldviews, or 
cultural values. 
However, the practice of public reasoning cannot (and should 
not) be understood as a sum of the disciplinary discourses 
of various sciences and arts like math, philosophy, history 
etc. Subjects of public reasoning are normally moral, 
political and societal issues (like for example: Is it just to 
have private schools?, which kind of art is a good one and 
should be subsided by the state? What is the relevance of my 
professional choice for society, and what rewards should I 
expect (and why) for the job which I am going to choose?) 
that crosscut disciplinary boundaries and that are rooted 
in the personal experience of the participants in discourses 
on these issues. Thus, in order to become fluent in public 
practical reasoning the student does not need to internalize 
the academic canons of various disciplines as they have 
been developed by generations of professional scientists and 
scholars in the particular fields of knowledge. Rather, she 
should become capable of conceptual and argumentative 
articulation of facts and experiences by dealing with 
examples from different ways of thinking and interpreting 
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the world (science, art, literature) and by applying those 
examples to the interests and worldviews of one’s own. 
I think that these differences between education and 
transmission of disciplinary canons are quite obvious 
and even trivial. So the question arises, why did such a 
brilliant philosopher of education like Peters neglect those 
differences by identifying education as becoming fluent in 
public reasoning with initiation into the canons of various 
academic disciplines? 
It seems to me that the answer to that question lies in 
Peters’ confusing education with teaching. His talk about 
education is almost always at the same time a talk about 
the transmission of the contents of knowledge in schools. 
The later talk is usually dedicated to a defence of personal-
independent bodies of knowledge that are structured in 
“objective ways” in the different academic domains against 
the progressivist notion of “child centred” teaching. Peters 
obviously interprets that notion as a threat for the cognitive 
dimension of education, understood as the ability to identify 
and understand contents that are objectively valuable, and to 
order these contents in conceptual schemes (see Peters 1966, 
p. 74-75). 
However, one can put the question whether teachers really 
have only the choice between a “child-centred” pedagogy, 
a teaching of academic disciplines for their own sake, or 
a “balance” between the both. Couldn’t it be the case that 
the greatest educational effect can be achieved by teaching 
a selection of themes and concepts drawn from different 
disciplines and treated independently of the academic 
canons of these disciplines? If this is a possible alternative 
however, then the following questions arise: Under which 
criteria should this selection be made and how should the 
term “educational effect” be defined? 
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In order to answer these questions, and in order to also 
answer the general question about the educational purpose 
and mechanisms of teaching, we have to disconnect the 
concept of education from the concept of teaching and put 
the former concept at a deeper level than the latter: In order 
to determine kinds of teaching that are educative, we have 
first to answer the question, what is education in itself and 
for itself. 
3. Education as Bildung
In the previous chapter we have seen that there is a large 
consensus between three most influential authors in the 
Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of Education – Dewey, Peters and 
Scheffler – that the term “education” indicates a particular 
form of human development that leads to a profound ability 
to participate – actually or virtually – in discourses of public 
reasoning. The great merit especially of Peters’ work is that 
he builds a strong and systematic argument that this form 
of human development regards a disciplined dealing with 
objective, conceptually structured entities that transcend 
the sphere of immediate personal experience. The weakness 
of Peters’ theory is, however, that he wrongly identifies this 
educative confrontation with trans-personal, conceptually 
structured objects of the teaching of disciplinary canonized 
bodies of knowledge as they are represented in the various 
academic subjects that traditionally have been taught at 
schools. 
In order to avoid this fallacy we need to make a strict 
distinction between education and teaching – preserving 
at the same time the notion of education as a form of 
human development which presupposes an individual’s 
encountering a conceptually structured objectivity. This 
distinction and this notion are central to the concept of 
Bildung as this concept has been developed in the framework 
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of German idealism. Unlike the English term “education”, 
Bildung is clearly distinct from the terms “teaching” and 
“pedagogical action”. At the same time, Bildung shares most 
of the central semantic features of education as human 
development towards public reasoning elaborated by Dewey, 
Peters and Scheffler. That is why I shall now briefly sketch out 
the concept of Bildung as it has been developed by Humboldt 
and Hegel. 
Wilhelm von Humboldt defines Bildung as the “most 
general, most intensive and most free” interaction between 
the individual and the world (Humboldt 1980, 235-236). 
According to Humboldt, a successful process of Bildung 
is characterized by a permanent enrichment of the individual 
through her continuous efforts to acquire as much as 
possible of the world (see Ibid, 235). Humboldt even claims 
that not individual things, but the world as the unity and 
the “all-ness” (“Allheit”) of all things is the only subject 
towards which the process of Bildung must be directed 
(Ibid, p. 237.) 
These well-known claims of Humboldt have two implications, 
which have often been overlooked. First, we shall be 
aware of what exactly Humboldt understands by “world”. 
According to him world is the “indefinable centre” towards 
which all particular languages and cultures are directed 
(see Humboldt 1905, pp.27-33). The world cannot ever be 
completely grasped by any particular language game. Rather, 
human beings can only approach the world by bringing 
as many alternative perspectives to it as possible, and by 
translating different vocabularies that articulate the reality 
in different ways. In other words, here “world” is a name for 
universality that cannot be objectified. Hence, to refer to 
the world does not simply mean to deal with any kind of 
objects that are just given outside of the subject, but to grasp 
universal meanings by transcending any particular and 
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contextual horizons of reality perception and interpretation. 
In the paradigmatical case of Humboldt’s theory it means 
to transcend the limitations of any particular language by 
comparative linguistics and by intercultural translations (see 
Humboldt 1905, 27-33). It is precisely the world-relatedness 
of Bildung that grounds its difference from the concept of 
learning, which focuses on the individual’s interactions with 
her particular environments only – and not with the world 
as such.
Second, the world-reference as an indispensable part of 
the semantic structure of Bildung marks the difference 
between that concept and certain “person-centered” terms 
regarding the constituting and growing of subjectivity, 
such as “identity”, or “identity-development”. Again, Bildung 
does not simply mean a constitution and development of 
a self, or of a personality, but rather it displays this constitution 
and development as inherently interwoven with the opening 
of a world-horizon of meanings by and for the self. The 
inherent link between self-development and encountering 
the world, thought as a universal, trans-cultural and trans-
contextual entity, is what shapes the uniqueness of Bildung.
However, Humboldt’s short remarks on the relation 
between I and world, between Self-Development and World-
Encountering do need further clarification. What does it 
precisely mean to get in touch with ideal, “wordly” contents 
that claim universal validity? In which sense are these 
contents not immediately given objects? In which sense does 
the interaction with such ideal contents lead to a process of 
Bildung? 
We can rather find possible answers to these questions in 
Hegel’s powerful Philosophy of Spirit, than in Humboldt’s 
fragmentary theory of Bildung. 
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According to Hegel, Bildung in the narrow sense denotes 
a particular phase in the development of the Spirit. This is 
the phase where the subjective spirit does not interact any 
more with fragmented things, or single persons, but with 
the immediate generality of a system of beliefs and norms 
of a particular community. These beliefs and norms occur 
now as ideal and yet external entities (see Hegel 1821/2009, 
p. 163). Here the process of Bildung consists of overcoming 
the perception of these beliefs and norms as unquestionable 
truths that ground external rules for individual’s behaviour. 
At that stage the subjective spirit recognizes these collective 
beliefs and norms as expressions of the objective spirit in 
its development, thus negating the immediateness and the 
externality of those beliefs and norms (see Hegel 1807/ 1980, 
p. 264-266). That is to say that the subject now understands 
collective, ethical beliefs and norms as objective concepts. 
The subject’s interaction with them is her being-for-herself 
that is the precondition for her being-in-herself, being as a 
subject who has a concept of herself as a subject, that is, as 
somebody, who is capable of understanding, of interpreting, 
of justifying or of criticizing collective beliefs and norms 
– shortly to grasp the conceptual structure of these beliefs 
and norms (see Hegel 1807/1980, p. 266; Hegel 1821/ 2009, 
p. 162-163). 
The crucial question here is: What does it mean to deal 
with concepts, and to conceptualize external and internal 
entities? Roughly speaking it does mean first to group these 
entities on the ground of identical features, and second, to 
discriminate between general features that build up different 
concepts. This grouping and discriminating means to assert 
inferences between entities, inferences which are true, that 
is, which have objective validity that comes into being in 
correct judgments. And judgments are correct, only if they 
can be justified by arguments that are acceptable for every 
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reasonable being. That is to say that true judgments display 
inferences between conceptual contents that constitute a 
universal logical space which transcends every particular 
environment, every particular social and cultural context. 
That is why we could use this universal logical space as a 
synonym to the classic term “world”.
To sum up: For Hegel being an educated person means to 
participate in the universal logical space of the world that 
consists of concepts and of inferences between concepts, 
that is, of arguments. This participation does not require 
an internalization of the canons of the existing academic 
disciplines. By the way, this internalization is obviously not 
possible, for there is nobody who could overlook the entire 
logical space, the entire world. Rather, to inhabit this space 
means basically to transform one’ own beliefs to conceptual 
contents, and to assess the validity of these beliefs by 
articulating them in argumentative discourses. This implies 
the ability of playing the social game of giving and asking for 
reasons (see Brandom 1994, p. 496-497). 
4. Education as Bildung, and Teaching
I have argued so far that in order to determine which kinds 
of pedagogical action are educative and which are not, we 
need first to draw a clear distinction between the terms 
“education” and “teaching”. We can achieve this distinction 
at best by spelling out “education” in Hegelian terms, that 
is, by re-constructing “education” as “Bildung.” A process 
of Bildung is to be understood basically as the development 
of one’s ability of conceptual (self-) articulation by one’s 
participation in practices of public reasoning, in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons. 
The first obvious prerequisite to become a fluent player of that 
game is to gain access to it, to be included in it. Although this 
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seems to be quite a trivial claim, that access is often enough 
denied to children and young people all around the world. 
This is for example the case, when schooling takes the form 
of indoctrination. In that case the students are obviously 
not encouraged to ask for reasons for assertions that the 
textbooks make, and for doctrines which the students 
have to internalize. Nor are they encouraged to examine 
the validity and the justifications of those assertions and 
doctrines. 
Furthermore, we should be aware that playing the game 
of giving and asking for reasons is basically an activity of 
conceptual articulation of one’s own beliefs and notions. 
Before their conceptual articulation these beliefs and 
notions exist merely as intuitions that mirror the social 
experience of the individual as well as her desires and 
fears. So the first and foremost prerequisite of the student’s 
process of Bildung is the emphatic acknowledgment of her 
pre-conceptual beliefs and notions, and of her desires and 
fears that stand behind them. These beliefs and notions 
should be brought to expression in the classroom and this 
expression should be seen as the departing point of teaching 
and learning. 
A further form of intersubjective recognition apart from 
empathy is needed for the process of Bildung, namely the 
form of respect. This form is needed for the cognitive “jump” 
from a merely narrative expression of one’s own beliefs 
and opinions to their conceptual articulation. For respect 
means – to speak with Peters again – to regard a person 
as a “distinctive centre of consciousness” (Peters 1966, p. 
59), as someone who has his own “assertive point of view” 
(Ibid, p. 210), and who is capable of valuation, choice and 
judgment (Ibid, p. 210). To be capable of judgment implies to 
reflect upon one’s own beliefs and notions, to evaluate them 
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critically, to provide them with reasons. Thus, to respect 
someone means to recognize her as having the potential of 
reasoning. 
So the moral of the whole story I tried to present in this paper 
is that empathy and cognitive respect for the students – and 
not the reproduction and the transmission of the canons of 
academic disciplines – should be identified as leading norms 
of educative teaching. These norms are not incorporated in 
an anti-intellectual “child-centred” pedagogy, but rather in a 
Socratic teaching and learning. 
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The Metaphor of the Cave
The Cave in Plato’s Republic gives a powerful, even 
uncompromising metaphor of life without education, 
without knowledge. It portrays what I call ‘epistemic 
dependency’, in which the mental horizons are limited, 
cramped and worthless. The contrast with the cave in Plato 
lies in the sunlit uplands of knowledge and philosophy. But 
how are we to conceive this if we are reluctant to embrace 
the Platonic forms? Paul Hirst, in his Liberal Education and 
the Nature of Knowledge gives us one celebrated version of 
how to conceive knowledge. But in this paper I also want to 
explore the idea of the ‘space of reasons’, elaborated by John 
McDowell in his Mind and World. If we situate knowledge in 
the space of reasons it becomes something that is contestable 
and dynamic. Moreover, our knowledge is demonstrated not 
only by understanding but also through judgement. I want to 
suggest that, this is what we wish to encourage our students 
to do: to make judgements and to provide backing for those 
judgements. Thus the student learns that judgements are 
rarely completely ‘futureproof ’ and they are rarely definitive. 
When it comes to assessment we as teachers also have to 
learn to judge ideas and evaluate our students’ judgements. 
This is all part of working and living in the ‘space of reasons’ 
106 Conceptualizing education, and related issues
so that our students become partners as they learn to throw 
off epistemic dependency.
The broad features of Plato’s account are well known but 
one or two details are worth noticing as well. Plato supposes 
that the cave dwellers are so constrained that all they see 
are flickers on a wall opposite, caused by the light of a fire 
behind them throwing shadows through a curtain. Behind 
the curtain is a road on which there are comings and goings 
of people which cannot be directly seen. All the cave dwellers 
can do is observe the flickers and infer from them what are 
the point and purpose of the people, animals and other 
implements. To help them in this task the cave dwellers can 
hear noises from the road behind which they can associate 
with the shady figures in front of them. Plato speculates that 
they may get quite good at recognising these shadows and 
we can even suppose that they may award each other prizes 
for spotting the most interesting combinations of sound and 
image, not to mention prizes for being able to make correct 
predictions (Plato, 1987: 258). He further speculates that if 
someone had managed to escape from the cave and spent 
time above ground (so that they experienced sunlight and 
could see things correctly) on their return they would be 
somewhat less interested in the prizes that the cave dwellers 
so eagerly valued. What is more, the returnee may not be 
very good at discriminating the flickers for he may have let 
all his old skills go rusty. He may well make a complete fool 
of himself and the cave dwellers “would say that his visit to 
the upper world had ruined his sight” (p. 259). With his new 
knowledge the returnee could certainly explain the causes 
of what the cave dwellers took to be reality but he would no 
longer be able to play an interpretative part in their world. 
The Cave is a powerful metaphor because it is utterly 
uncompromising. What the returnee knows is now entirely 
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incommensurate with what he used to know, to the extent 
that what he used to know is now quite valueless. The 
incommensurability between the cave dwellers and those 
who have escaped has nothing to do with social position or 
social recognition. The incommensurability is not positional 
but epistemic. The uncompromising nature of the metaphor 
is driven home when one sees that the cave dwellers cannot 
even use the flickers on the wall as a basis for knowing 
because such knowing is based on error given that they can 
only see the flickers and not their source. The fact that they 
believe otherwise merely serves to emphasise the utterly 
hopeless position which they are in. The only way to shift their 
perspective is to give them entirely different experiences on 
which to build an interpretative and explanatory structure. 
The cave dwellers are in a position of what might be called 
epistemic dependency. We do not, of course, know why they 
are in the cave in the first place and the power of the metaphor 
could be lost once questions like that are pressed. All we need 
to note is that this dependency is structural and intended 
by no-one. This dependency arises in a twofold way. First, 
they do not know and have no way of knowing anything 
about the source of the sights and sounds they experience. 
All the inferences they might make could be wrong and if 
they are not that would only be by chance. Second, they are 
unaware of the sunlit world and are unable to conceive of 
such a world. (Perhaps they accuse those few who come back 
down to the cave of being ‘elitists’.) Interestingly too, no-one 
benefits by this dependency. The only persons who might be 
said to ‘benefit’ are the cave dwellers themselves because, 
it may be supposed, their constraints are not especially 
irksome especially when they have the distractions of the 
flickers on the wall to look at. Their life could be considered 
as one which is comfortable and undemanding. After all, if 
one knows nothing else why would one ever complain? We 
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might even speculate (although Plato does not go this far) that 
an escapee, whilst glad he has escaped and fully cognisant 
of the fact that there is no going back, might nevertheless 
occasionally feel pangs of regret at leaving behind a trouble-
free existence even if he were to concede, if pressed, that he 
had no desire at all to go back to that kind of life. 
We can see straightaway how the metaphor can work for 
education: the journey from the Cave to the sunlit world is 
a journey of enlightenment, from ignorance to knowledge. 
One of the key points is that in the process of that journey 
many things have to be unlearnt. The metaphor has relevance 
for education not because children and students are in 
the exact position of the cave dwellers but because some 
contemporary experiences may mirror the Cave in a way that 
might be found uncomfortable if dwelt upon for too long (for 
example, Plato’s remarks about prizes they award each other 
and how the perceived prestige of such prizes no longer have 
any value for the returnee: the parallel with today would be 
celebrity culture). An important aim of education, then, is to 
liberate children from the perils of epistemic dependency or 
to ensure as far as possible that children can avoid this when 
they are adults. This requires some purposeful endeavour: 
mere socialisation is not enough, and neither is learning 
of an informal kind: after all, the dwellers in the cave are 
thoroughly socialised and they learn (or think they learn) all 
sorts of interesting facts and tips from each other. It would 
therefore be misguided for an educator to suppose that she 
could take just any of the everyday experiences of the child as 
a starting point in the process of learning. Judgement has to 
be exercised as to which experiences are of value; not to do so 
would be to risk trying to build learning on the basis of the 
experience of the flickers in the cave. Experiential learning 
may well provide a good starting point for building up 
understanding: but not every experience that a child brings 
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with them into school may be of value. Some of the lessons 
learnt outside school may have to be unlearnt (for example, 
placing too much value on what celebrities have to say for 
themselves).
The kind of assumptions behind the Cave metaphor have 
been investigated by a range of educational theorists in 
recent times. For example, Elizabeth Rata has spoken of 
working class children being incarcerated in a ‘never ending 
present’ as a result of the failure to equip them with the 
intellectual tools needed to transcend epistemic dependency. 
For Rata, this failure takes a particular form of a celebration 
of localised, social knowledge often undertaken as a way of 
protecting local cultures and ways of life (Rata, 2012: 106). 
The danger is that children and students are not exposed 
to deeper structures of meaning associated with subject 
disciplinary understanding (Rata, 113). It is not that local 
perspectives need to be given up (and here, the analogy 
with the Cave metaphor gives out) but rather they need 
to be supplemented by a cognitive perspective that is both 
explanatory (by drawing on causes the nature of which is 
unavailable to the local gaze) and interpretative (by drawing 
on perspectives that are outside the immediacy of the local). 
The point about introducing a knowledge perspective in this 
way is to acknowledge, as Suellen Shay has suggested that 
“knowledge matters” and that “.....a knowledge claim cannot 
simply be reduced to who is making that claim.” (Shay, 2012: 
7) The notion that we are, each of us, locked into a subjective 
world, exemplifies epistemic dependency because we are 
unable to make a judgement that can be contested in such a 
way that I might reasonably be expected to modify my claim. 
For if there is no standard that I am prepared to acknowledge 
other than one set by myself then my dependency ends up 
self-referring because there is nothing that I can recognise 
that will enable me to break out of that circle of dependency. 
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It makes no difference if this circle is inhabited by one 
individual or a group.
Hirst’s Conception of Knowledge
The question arises as to how we are to conceptualise the 
knowledge and understanding that is needed to escape 
epistemic dependency. We are familiar with Plato’s 
own conception of knowledge which took the form of a 
contemplative ideal in which forms of experience needed to 
be transcended through knowledge of the Forms – abstract 
entities whose relation to experience was problematic 
(Aristotle being one of Plato’s early critics along these 
lines). The conception of knowledge needed for educational 
purposes must (at the very least) reflect the scientific 
revolution of the 17th century in Europe. The seminal essay 
on the relation between knowledge and education by Paul 
Hirst, Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge, written 
in the 1970’s, is still, in my view, very instructive. The essay 
is in four parts. The first part treats the role of knowledge 
drawn from a reading of ancient philosophy which envisages 
the development of mind through knowledge which both 
furnishes a knowing of reality in terms of truth and, through 
this process, also plays a central role in the development of 
the good life. Knowledge therefore plays, on this reading, 
both an epistemological and an ethical role. In the second 
part, Hirst considers certain modern (in fact, mid-twentieth 
century) proponents of the idea that the purpose of education 
is to cultivate certain attributes of mind (effective thinking, 
communication, ethical judgement). He makes quick work 
of showing that such attributes cannot be developed without 
disciplinary (subject) engagement in which is embedded 
what counts as effective thinking, good communication, etc 
(Hirst, 1972: 90-95). In the fourth section, Hirst elaborates 
in more detail what he envisages to be a knowledge-led 
curriculum, of which the details need not concern us since 
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over the passage of time new disciplines and sub-disciplines 
have emerged whilst others have receded. It is the third part 
of the essay that is of most interest.
Hirst begins by disavowing the suggestion in the first part 
of the essay, namely that the relation between knowledge, 
mind and reality has a ‘metaphysical’ basis and initially goes 
on to suggest that the relation between mind and knowledge 
is rather ‘logical’, such that the achievement of knowledge 
‘necessitates’ the development of mind (Hirst, 1972, p. 97). 
This thought, however, is not developed and Hirst then goes 
on to suggest that the focus of knowledge is rather “experience, 
structured under some conceptual scheme” (Hirst, 1972, p. 
97). ‘Experience’ is enumerated in terms of “sense perceptions, 
emotions or different elements of the understanding” which it 
is suggested “are intelligible only by virtue of the conceptual 
apparatus by which they are articulated.” What emerges, 
I suggest, is that forms of knowledge become coextensive 
with forms of experience. For, firstly, experiences can only 
be articulated through conceptual forms – they can only be 
recognised as experiences of such and such character because 
they are presented and articulated through a conceptual 
apparatus. Second, a system of concepts takes the form of 
publicly known and shared criteria for their application – it 
is this that allows experiences to be recognised, evaluated 
and compared. Third, this structuring of experience is not 
confined to traditional academic divisions of knowledge 
since “the forms of knowledge are the basic articulations 
whereby the whole of experience has become intelligible to 
man” (Hirst, 1972, p. 98, emphasis mine). The generation 
of knowledge – that conceptual apparatus through which 
experience becomes intelligible – pervades the whole of 
experience of human kind. The clear implication is that 
experience is constituted through the forms of knowledge: 
“it is by its terms that the life of man in every particular is 
structured and ordered……without its structure all other 
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forms of consciousness, including for example, emotional 
experiences, or mental attitudes and beliefs would seem to 
be unintelligible” (ibid. p. 98). This thought is developed 
further under the fourth characteristic of Hirst’s conception, 
namely that the experiences we undergo must not be thought 
of as primary or foundational but are themselves in part the 
product of meditation, evaluation and validation of those 
publicly specified criteria which identify and articulate 
experiences themselves (97-98).
But for all that Hirst achieved one could argue that Hirst does 
seem to suggest that knowledge is essentially propositional, 
made up of inert theorems and informational sets . I don’t 
think for one moment that Hirst ever actually thought this 
but this criticism could be read into his account and often 
has been (see, e.g. Goodson, 2005). So we need some way of 
developing his ideas so that the dynamic, shifting character 
of knowledge is somehow built into his account. If we can do 
this then there is the promise of a lively, dynamic curriculum 
as well. Somehow, we need to think of knowledge in terms 
of discovery and justification, of argument and counter-
argument. How should we do this ?
The Space of Reasons
In his book, Mind and World, the philosopher John McDowell 
has contrasted what he terms the ‘space of reasons’ with the 
‘realm of natural law’. The realm of natural law is roughly 
the realm of propositional knowledge – for example, the laws 
of physics. The space of reasons relates to that human space 
in which we ask for and give reasons. We have to justify and 
give an account of our beliefs for whereas the realm of law 
is essentially causal and explanatory, the space of reasons 
is justificatory. Of course, if propositions in the realm of 
law become open to doubt then they themselves have to be 
justified in the space of reasons. 
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For MacDowell, it is important that the space of reasons has 
some grip on the world. Not anything can count as a reason 
and to think it can is to suppose our belief systems can operate 
independently of how the world is, ‘spinning in a void’ as 
he calls it. He thinks that we need to think of the world as 
constraining our beliefs – but it does not follow that they 
are outside what is thinkable. So ‘experience’ never comes as 
just raw sense data but as already conceptualised. Therefore 
an (conceptualised) experience does act as a constraint upon 
belief which potentially can answer to world’s being ‘thus 
and so’, even if in practice I treat my beliefs as provisional 
and open to review. Indeed, that I do treat my beliefs as open 
to review is just what one would expect the moment those 
beliefs become part of the space of reasons. 
MacDowell thinks that we can become attuned to living in 
the space of reasons through the development of a second 
nature. This nature is not biological but cognitive and is 
exemplified by the way in which we conceptualise experience 
and justify our beliefs. It is a form of acculturation and in this 
connection he mentions the role of Bildung – the German 
concept of self-formation through learning. So education 
has a role to play which is not only cultural and moral but is 
also epistemological: through learning we conceptualise the 
world – and therefore experience the world differently from 
what we would do if we did not have this ‘second nature’ . But 
how does knowledge relate to the space of reasons ? 
What I suggest is that we can think of knowledge as existing 
in the space of reasons. From an educational point of view, 
what we want is for our students to learn to live in the space of 
reasons. For it is here that experience is articulated in the form 
of beliefs that are tested, contested and justified. ‘Experience’ 
does not simply consist of pre-conceptual ‘givens’; for 
MacDowell, experience comes as already conceptualised. If 
knowledge is treated as if it were solely propositional, along 
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the lines of the realm of law, then from the standpoint of those 
who are learning it can indeed come to seem as something dry 
and inert. But this rests on a misunderstanding of knowledge 
and its relation to experience whereby our knowledge is seen 
somehow as something separate from experience. When 
we take the ideas of Hirst and MacDowell together we can 
see that this separation is misconceived, a misconception 
that treats ‘knowledge’ as characteristic of the realm of law 
outside the space of reasons. 
However, apart from the space of reasons/realm of law 
distinction there is another feature which plays an increasingly 
major role as McDowell’s analysis has developed and which is 
also a crucial feature of the forms of knowledge, once viewed 
through the perspective of the space of reasons. This is the 
role played by judgement, namely the ability to constitute 
a state of affairs as having certain features and to evaluate 
their relative importance. Judgement is usually contextual so 
that the discrimination of a state of affairs (which, it should 
be noted can be mental or non mental or a combination of 
these) is situated within a wider understanding. When we 
refer to the forms of knowledge as underpinning educational 
purposes then the ability to make judgements occupies a 
central place. Learning does not merely consist of the mastery 
of concepts and information: what we are looking for is the 
ability to make judgements. Understood in this way, learning 
becomes an active process that engages and challenges the 
learner in two distinct ways.
The first links judgement and responsibility and it is described 
by McDowell in these terms:
“…......judging can be singled out as the paradigmatic 
mode of actualisation of conceptual capacities, the one 
in terms of which we should understand the very idea of 
conceptual capacities in the relevant sense. And judging, 
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making up our minds what to think, is something for 
which we are in principle responsible - something we 
freely do, as opposed to something that merely happens 
in our lives………and this freedom, exemplified in 
responsible acts of judging, is essentially a matter of 
being answerable to criticism in the light of rationally 
relevant considerations. So the realm of freedom, at least 
the freedom of judging, can be identified with the space 
of reasons.” (McDowell, 2009a: 5-6; see also Backhurst, 
2011: 75)
Roughly speaking there will be at least some of our beliefs for 
which we are not responsible in the sense that they are formed 
through the world’s being ‘thus and so’. But supervening on 
such beliefs are a complex of beliefs – judgements – for which 
we are responsible. Engagement with forms of knowledge is 
therefore a risky endeavour since we are accountable for our 
judgements and being able to account for them is also what 
one has to do if one lives within a space of reasons. The kinds 
of judgements one makes, as far as learning is concerned, 
will range from the theoretical and the interpretative down 
to the severely practical. For example, the deliverance of 
a judgement may be a decision on which form of clinical 
treatment is most appropriate on the one hand, to a 
judgement that assesses the weight of responsibility accruing 
to Germany in terms of the causes of the World War I. The 
learner, in acting and making judgements thereby becomes 
accountable. Viewing the forms of knowledge through the 
perspective of the space of reasons brings this out.
The second feature is the way in which subjective or agent-
centred considerations must be laid aside. When Hirst 
speaks of knowledge that is subject to publicly specified 
criteria we can see that coming to be acquainted with 
such criteria helps us extrude personal considerations in 
reaching a judgment. That one is held personally accountable 
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for making judgements in accordance with impersonal 
criteria takes some time – many years – in learning and if 
the beginnings of this are started in primary schooling it 
certainly takes the whole experience of education at all levels 
before the appropriate habituation is in place. But this also 
implies a willingness to challenge and revise public criteria 
in order to provide backing for controversial judgements. 
A good example of this is presented in a discussion of what 
constitutes good professional practice in teaching where it 
is suggested that the well-being of the teacher herself needs 
to be built into an understanding of practice; this presents a 
challenge to the view that practice can be evaluated in terms 
of technical competence alone (see Higgins, 2011). 
As far as our students are concerned, the implication is that 
they need to be capable of justifying their beliefs and making 
judgements, because what we really want our students to do 
is to get used to defending and criticising judgements. In 
that way they learn that knowledge doesn’t come in neatly 
packaged bundles but is something difficult, not clear cut. 
Making and defending judgements helps students to learn 
how to become responsible for those judgements.
We can think of school as a place where the space of reasons 
prevails: even for young children. Sometimes they may 
come from homes where reason’s aren’t given; they just 
have to learn to obey the arbitrary will of a parent or take 
the consequences. But in a school they learn (assuming the 
school is well-ordered) that there is always a reason for what 
they are being asked to do. Maybe that reason can’t always 
be given straightaway but it can always be given later. This 
children grow up in an environment where reasons count 
– not just on account of who is giving those reasons but on 
account of their justificatory character. It is in this way they 
grow up in an environment where the making of judgements, 
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backed by reasons, is a key feature of their learning. The idea 
of making judgements in schools is important because we 
want children and student to own their beliefs. In a school 
environment the consequences of getting it wrong are 
normally benign (not always so out in the world outside of 
school and college, unfortunately).
The making of Judgements
If we think of learning and ask what do we want students 
to learn, in some ways the answer could be said to be fairly 
straightforward:
1. Basic theorems and information plus skills
2. Understanding of associated context
3. Judgements
Context is always important because understanding context 
tells us the extent to which students understand basic content. 
Judgements are related to context and content. But there are 
no ‘skills in judging’ that can be learnt apart from context. 
This implies that judgements are not easily transferable from 
one knowledge domain to another. But we can learn what it 
means to be responsible for our judgements and how they 
might be justified: we want our students to learn to become 
mature in their judgements.
The sequence of: basic theorems and information, context 
and judgements may seem to be a fairly linear pattern but 
things are not always so simple. In the UK there is much 
talk of threshold concepts. These are the concepts you need 
to know in a particular discipline if your understanding is 
going to ‘take off’. Lack of understanding acts as a bottle 
neck; but once one does understand a particular concept 
then whole new vistas open up. The idea is that each 
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discipline has its threshold concepts. For example, in my 
experience in teaching educational theory nearly all students 
have immense difficulty in seeing the intrinsic link between 
freedom and reason. For philosophers it is the basic Kantian 
insight: the powers of reason enable self-directedness in 
respect of appraising values and determining one’s purposes 
that provide the basic condition for freedom. But no amount 
of examples and case studies is ever enough for students to 
learn this. You just have to wait until the penny drops. Then 
they start to see the whole point of the Enlightenment and 
they start to see why the overused concept of ‘freedom’ is so 
powerful when used properly. It is at that point they can start 
to make judgements about the limits of reason and the limits 
of freedom. And having understood the Kantian insight 
maybe they come to question it.
So whilst a linear progression of learning is not without its 
merits it doesn’t tell the whole story of the difficulty and pain 
in getting to make judgements that are interesting. Each 
discipline contains a series of dynamic concepts that open 
up understanding in such a way that justificatory reasons 
become interesting and deep. And of course, judgements can 
be turned towards context and content in a form of internal 
critique of those concepts that have been newly acquired. 
Assessing Judgements
When we come to assessment we need to be clear in our 
minds what we are assessing. Are we assessing knowledge 
of content and context? Or, are we assessing judgements and 
how well-founded they are? When I listen to colleagues in 
Higher Education in the UK I worry sometimes that their 
assessment strategies only cover content and context. I worry 
that we don’t really know how to assess judgements – or to 
judge judgements. It as if we are reluctant ourselves to let 
students enter the space of reasons in a full-blown way, by 
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our having assessment methods that play safe, that are risk-
free. The first thing we have to do is to educate students into 
the art of making judgements, no matter what subject they 
are taking. We need students to understand that we don’t just 
want to assess their knowledge of content and context: we 
have to educate them to take risks, even if sometimes that 
doesn’t pay off. Because students have to learn – must learn – 
what a BAD judgement is.
As I understand it, an academic judgement falls short of 
being a statement (or assertion) of ‘how things are’. Rather, 
it is an estimate of how things are, typically prefaced by an 
utterance of the kind: ‘I believe that x, y, z...’ where the belief 
contains a degree of uncertainty. But there are many kinds 
of judgement, of which a summary is contained in table 1 
below.
Table 1: Types of Judgement
PRACTICAL DISCURSIVE
EPISTEMIC/TECHNICO NORMATIVE
  A practical judgement issues in a decision or 
recommendation
  A discursive judgement aims at a certain understanding 
– this phenomena should be understood or interpreted 
in this way rather than that way. In traditional academic 
disciplines most judgements tend to be discursive. It 
provides an estimate of ‘how things are’ which falls short 
of a statement (or assertion) as to how things are
  A practical judgement will often include norms to the 
extent that they give point to the judgement. So a doctor 
may make a judgement as to when to stop chemo-therapy 
for a cancer patient but the care of the patient gives the 
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judgement its normative point even though the content 
of the judgement is largely epistemic/technico.
  A discursive judgement may well precede a practical 
judgement (for example in practitioner discipline). But 
in non-practitioner disciplines one usually stops at the 
discursive.
  Discursive/epistemic judgements emerge out of 
disciplinary engagement – e.g. one judges that Hegel 
continued to influence Marx’s thinking throughout his 
life and that there was there was no ‘epistemological 
break’ – possibly leading to the conclusion that Marx is 
best seen as a thinker of the late enlightenment rather 
than a modern social scientist.
  Often discursive judgements are strongly normative in 
character – e.g. the judgement regarding what kind of 
framework should govern the behaviour of children and 
students in schools.
  Practical judgements may be made without appropriate 
discursive investigation (and judgement) – a good 
example could be (in the UK) the changes in teacher 
education in a technico/craft direction, minimising both 
the influence of universities and the consideration of 
wider pedagogical issues.
Given this (too brief) consideration of the nature of a 
judgement, we may come to understand the features of what 
constitutes a poor judgement in our students. First, there 
would be a lack of secure understanding of basic content 
and where understanding of associated context is thin or 
non-existent. In addition, we would expect to see a failure 
to make use of, or to understand, key threshold concepts – 
this is particularly manifest in weak epistemic judgements. 
Further considerations relating to poor judgements include:
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Failure to make explicit the basis of normative grounds of a 
judgement
Practical judgements and recommendations are not attended 
by sufficient reasoning/evidence
Discursive judgements are likely to be weak if there is only 
a perfunctory engagement with epistemic/technico material
Given that judgements are usually shaped by readings of 
context an inadequate contextual understanding is bound to 
issue in poor judgement
Poor judgements usually wilt under a series of counterfactuals. 
By contrast, good judgements can withstand counterfactuals 
whether in the form of argumentation or evidence. 
What is a good Judgement ?
First, we would expect the student herself to understand that 
a judgement falls short of being propositional. It is a best 
estimate of ‘how things are’. But it is worth remarking that 
we would expect this understanding to be conveyed in the 
substance of a particular judgement and that an extensive 
connotation of phrases of estimation (‘to some extent’, may 
possibly be’, ‘could be seen as’, much use of the word ‘might’, 
etc, etc) does not, in itself, amount to good judgement but 
merely conveys the appearance of judging. In addition, we 
could say:
  There is a rigour and internal robustness to good 
judgements so that they are not easy to knock down. 
They have some resilience.
  Good judgements don’t necessarily need an overly-
extensive and detailed support of academic scholarly 
analysis. By the same token, excessive notes/references/
bibliography may serve to disguise a poor judgement.
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  A good judgement says something interesting. So the 
test is not just ‘is it true?’ but also ‘Is it true but trivial?’ 
Judgements that just repeat at great length what we already 
know are of little use, no matter how sound. (I think that 
we, as practitioners of education, are sometimes we are 
prone to this).
  Consequently, good judgements take risks. The judgement 
has something about it that makes it stand out, whether 
in terms of the judgement itself or the reasons or evidence 
used to back it up. 
Conclusion
The space of reasons is the modern philosopher’s answer 
to the Cave. For Plato, the Cave is a bad place to be and he 
favoured an escape to what was essentially a contemplative 
style of knowledge and wisdom. But for us moderns, I think 
the space of reasons is the place where we need to be. For 
us, this space is the alternative to living in the Cave. But 
it would, I think, be wrong to associate the Cave simply 
with the world of the mundane, the everyday, the world of 
practical problems and relations with our friends, family and 
colleagues. The world of the everyday has its dignity as well 
and there is no reason at all why we should think of this in 
terms of the Cave. The space of reasons, then, goes all the way 
from science and philosophy down to practical matters that 
affect us all whoever we are. In that sense, we all of us live 
in the space of reasons – a space where we all learn to make 
responsible judgements and where we expect and welcome 
our own judgements to be scrutinised.
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This paper addresses two fundamental areas of concern 
in the philosophy of higher education: 1) what kinds of 
reflections about universities do contemporary philosophers 
and commentators feel particularly compelled to address? 
and 2) what broader notions of the university should we 
identify as blocking meaningful discussion and, conversely, 
which ideas should be seen as fruitful for exploration? The 
first section of the paper argues that many discussions of the 
university are trapped in what Jeffrey J. Williams calls “ideas 
discourse,” which focuses on the history of ideas about 
the university as opposed to the variegated history of the 
institution itself. As a corrective to this the second section of 
the paper examines various ways in which higher education 
has moved from a public to a private good, focusing not only 
on ideas, but also the historical conditions which gave rise 
to the post-war university and inform the challenges it faces 
today. The paper concludes by arguing that such historically 
inflected or historicizing approaches move us towards a more 
expansive view of the contemporary university, especially in 
the language used to describe its purposes and its functional 
relationship with the state and the private sector.
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Introduction:
Jacques Derrida opens his essay “The Principle of Reason: The 
University in the Eyes of its Pupils,”1 with an odd question: 
“How not to speak, today, of the university?” Derrida phrases 
his question in the negative for two reasons. First, it has 
become a practical impossibility “to dissociate the work we 
do [in universities], within one discipline or several, from 
a reflection on the political and institutional conditions 
of that work.” Quite simply, despite ongoing changes in 
internal organization, the university has achieved a level of 
institutional solidity in political and educational discourses 
to impose a set of reflections not only on those who work in 
a university setting, but on the political community at large. 
How could one avoid coming back to basic questions about 
the nature and purpose of the university, academic freedom, 
or the shifting borders between the university, the private 
sector, and the public today? The second reason for putting 
the question in the negative is to initiate a discussion about 
the university that can steer clear of “bottomless pits” and 
other paths blocked by conceptual unclarity or adherence to 
dogmatic modes of thought. There is a prescriptive intent in 
naming what Derrida takes to be dead ends in the ongoing 
practice of academic self-reflection. 
Derrida is clearly invoking the Kantian tradition of critical 
philosophy in phrasing the question as he does, and later 
in the essay he attaches the university’s mission to Kant’s 
principle of reason, which Derrida interprets as philosophy’s 
right to interrogate the conceptual foundations of all areas of 
knowledge, and Kant’s notion of the sublime, which avoids 
the determinative judgments of instrumental rationality. My 
goal in this paper is to follow Derrida’s animating question, 
1.  Jacques Derrida, Eyes of the University (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004), 129-155.
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not his conclusion, and address two fundamental areas 
of concern: 1) what kinds of reflections about universities 
do contemporary philosophers and commentators feel 
particularly compelled to address? and 2) what broader 
notions of the university should we identify as blocking 
meaningful discussion and, conversely, which ideas should 
be seen as fruitful for exploration? 
I pose the latter question in an emphatically prescriptive 
tone because I believe many commentators on the university, 
especially its most vocal apologists, suffer from a damaging 
form of ahistorical thinking. In the west the university is 
an institution that carries with it a series of influential and 
inspiring touchstones that provide much of our current 
vocabulary—Immanuel Kant’s Conflict of the Faculties 
(1798), Thomas Jefferson’s mission of civic education in his 
Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia 
(1818), John Henry Newman’s treatise on liberal education 
The Idea of a University (1854), and more recently Clark 
Kerr’s vision of the modern research university The Uses of 
the University (1961). These works and many more provide 
powerful concepts that speak to present concerns, but when 
the primary rhetorical move in an argument about the 
university finds its ballast in a past ideal, we are in what 
Jeffrey J. Williams calls “ideas discourse.”2 The features of 
this, which will be elaborated in the first part of the paper, 
include a tendency to resort to a “weak idealism,” to confuse 
the history of ideas about the university for the variegated 
history of the institution itself, and to primarily represent 
the interests of humanists as opposed to politicians, 
administrators, or scientists and educators in professional 
schools. Following Williams, I will argue that ideas discourse 
is not how we should speak of the university today. I will 
2.  Jeffrey J. Williams, “History As a Challenge to the Idea of the 
University” jac 25 (2005): 55-74.
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focus primarily on the American case, but implications for 
the global should be apparent. 
However, returning to the first sense of Derrida’s question, 
how can we avoid speaking of the university today given 
all the challenges and changes facing academics, students, 
administrators, and concerned politicians and citizens? I will 
argue that there are discussions that we cannot avoid, and 
these concern the various ways in which higher education 
has moved from a public to a private good in current debates. 
As I will argue, this is a lamentable shift, but one that must 
be addressed head on if philosophers of education and other 
commentators are going to gain traction in these debates. 
I will focus on the decline of funding for state university 
systems in the United States to demonstrate which types 
of approaches are the most fruitful and consequential 
in thinking about the university today, highlighting the 
historically inflected or historicizing character of such 
approaches. Whilst no one can reasonably expect to have 
the final word on an ever-changing discourse, one can at 
least mark out the conceptual territory in ways that take into 
account the historical specificity of the present moment in 
relation to past ideals.
Ideas Discourse: 
A contemporary classic in ideas discourse is The University 
in Ruins, a powerful and very influential work published 
in 1996, shortly after the tragic death of its author, Bill 
Readings.3 Readings’ core argument is that the modern 
research university is essentially the outgrowth of two 
Enlightenment projects—the self-regulating movement 
of Reason (expressed eloquently in Kant’s Conflict of the 
Faculties) and the development of national culture (expressed 
3.  Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996).
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eloquently in John Henry Newman’s The Idea of a University, 
but also very much present in Wilhelm Von Humboldt’s 
founding vision for the University of Berlin). These united 
in the formation of the republican subject for Humboldt, 
the “gentleman” for Newman, and guaranteed universities 
a unique role in the development and maintenance of the 
modern nation-state. However, Readings claims that this 
model is no longer operative in an age dominated by global 
capitalism, and the stable references to national culture or 
reason have succumbed to “dereferentialization,” exemplified 
most clearly, and to many most disturbingly, in the hollow 
linkage of research and learning to “excellence,” a watchword 
in in the neoliberal global economy. 
For Williams, Readings’ book, and its enduring presence 
in debates about the contemporary university, is a perfect 
example of the shortcomings of ideas discourse. Despite 
being intuitively appealing and useful in thinking through 
the radical changes that inevitably follow from the process 
of globalization, The University in Ruins exhibits three 
symptomatic features of a truncated discourse.
The first is a weak idealism, “weak because informed as 
much by rhetoric and narrative as explicit, logical means.”4 
As Williams notes, ideas discourse tends to adopt rhetorical 
forms like the elegy, the jeremiad, or the declension narrative 
(present for example in the image of a ruin), all of which 
neatly proffer an absent ideal by which current failings can 
be registered (for Readings this ideal comes from a Kant-
Newman-Humboldt triumvirate). This relates to a second 
problem, which is that ideas discourse tends to treat the 
history of the university as a history of ideas about the 
university, not a history of actual institutions. Referring to 
4.  Jeffrey J. Williams, “History As a Challenge to the Idea of the 
University” jac 25 (2005): 56.
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the American context, Williams cites the example that in 
1890 roughly 2% or the US population attended university, 
whereas after 1970 it became a mass institution with well 
over half of the population attending higher educational 
institutions in some form. The complexities introduced by 
this new scale should call for creative interpretation, not 
strict promotion of past ideals. 
The third problem is that ideas discourse tends to primarily 
represent the interests of humanists (philosophers and 
literary scholars in particular). One glaring deficiency in 
Readings’ book is an underdeveloped appreciation of the 
research function of modern universities. This has a second 
order consequence, namely that the interests of legislators, 
parents, students, or other interested parties that Clark 
Kerr described as the “fuzzy edge” of the university5 get 
short shrift, and humanists are often playing catch up when 
the effects emanating from these other groups flow into 
their work conditions and radically alter the structure of 
universities. 
As a corrective to ideas discourse Williams proposes that 
we talk of the shifting “expectations of the university.”6 
What he means by this is that universities have always 
been constituted by competing and sometimes conflicting 
interests, and what is important in contemporary debates is 
to lay out how these interests are aligned with one another. 
He names five expectations which are most often attached 
to contemporary American universities, though many 
correlates will be seen with other national university systems.
5.  Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 14.
6.  Jeffrey J. Williams, “The Post-Welfare State University” American 
Literary History 18 (2006): 190-216.
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The first is the university as refugium or humanistic enclave7, 
which is most identifiable with the liberal arts tradition 
that stretches back to medieval European universities 
and extends through Newman, the Oxbridge model, and 
many of America’s small liberal arts colleges. In general 
this expectation holds that universities should be insulated 
from predetermined ends (especially economic ends) and 
interested in the holistic development of students. However, 
in the United States this was quickly joined by a second 
expectation, which is that universities should be engaged in 
the training of citizens. Williams notes that this represented 
an interest in social goods (citizenship) rather than the 
individual cultivation of character or genius. After the Morrill 
Acts of 1862 and 18908 a third expectation was added, namely 
that universities would be centers of vocational training (“to 
promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial 
classes in the several pursuits and professions in life” in the 
phrasing of the 1862 Morrill Act), which added another layer 
of expectations, in this case economic, to higher education.
As can already be seen, ideas discourse helps explain 
the horizon of expectations for contemporary American 
universities (in the form of key books and statutes that supply 
the language and guiding assumptions of commentators and 
actors), but so does its instantiation in various forms. This 
can be seen clearly in the fourth expectation that Williams 
identifies, which is the university as home to disciplinary 
research. This idea certainly emerges from the German model 
for the research university established in Berlin, which was 
first adopted in the United States by Daniel Coit Gilman at 
7.  Jeffrey J. Williams, “History As a Challenge to the Idea of the 
University” jac 25 (2005): 59.
8.  The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890, named after Vermont Senator 
Justin Morrill, set aside land for the establishment of public universities, 
as well as private universities meant to serve the children of farmers and 
laborers. 
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Johns Hopkins University.9 However, American universities 
did not attain the status of pre-eminent global centers of 
research until after WWII, when research funding became 
a federal concern, and here Vannevar Bush’s Science—The 
Endless Frontier10 is far more important than the early 
German focus on Wissenschaft in Berlin. Equally present in 
this is the rise of scholarly societies, or the academic scholarly 
monograph as a norm for tenure. Thus the expectation 
solidifies as institutional forms and practices fill out an 
idea like disinterested scholarly research, or knowledge 
production within and between the disciplines.
The fifth expectation that Williams names is what he calls 
“corporatization,” which has become a term of slander in 
ideas discourse, but nonetheless names an expectation 
for how universities should operate in today’s climate. As 
R.C. Lowontin, a prominent commentator on the 20th 
century university wrote, “The radically expanded, higher-
educational infrastructure needed after World War II 
could only have been provided through the socialization of 
education costs...to assume the cost, unbearable even to the 
largest individual enterprises, of creating new technologies 
and the trained cadre required for both the implementation 
of technology that already exists and for creating further 
innovation.”11 Think of the confluence of universities and 
private industry in Massachusetts’ Route 128 innovation 
9.  Humboldt’s original vision for the University of Berlin fused two 
aspects: Bildung (culture, self-cultivation) and Wissenschaft (organized 
inquiry). The latter, in the form of knowledge production (i.e. original 
scholarship and not just commentary) through organized disciplinary 
research and scholarly societies, made German universities the envy of 
the world in the 19th century. 
10.  Vannevar Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier (1945). Available at: 
https://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm.
11.  Cited in Jeffrey J. Williams, “History As a Challenge to the Idea of 
the University” jac 25 (2005): 64.
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corridor or California’s Silicon Valley, to say nothing of the 
training of engineers and other highly skilled workers, and 
you will see how higher education is expected to have certain 
functional relationships with today’s corporate climate. 
What is the upshot of viewing universities as a site where 
competing expectations clamor for our allegiance, all 
justifiably drawing from the history and certain important 
features of the institution itself? First, it allows for a more 
expansive discussion than ideas discourse, for example 
taking into account not just ideals of personal and civic 
cultivation, but also the necessary research function of the 
modern university and ties with industry. But secondly it 
allows for a certain development within our thinking itself, 
which has immediate resonance when we turn to one of 
the most contentious topics in higher education—the 
declining support and changing character of public 
universities in the US, UK, and elsewhere. What I mean by 
this is that the tension between expectations, which may 
produce new terms and areas of concern, avoids reducing 
discourse to the inherited stock of ideals or proffering one 
specific absent ideal from which universities can be judged 
as deficient. 
As mentioned above, for Bill Readings the university has 
become “dereferentialized” as a result of the eclipse of the 
nation-state, where contributions to national culture and 
republican citizenship are replaced by “excellence,” or 
training to meet the needs of the global economy. However, 
as Williams reminds us, the reference to the nation (or state) 
has not been removed from our horizon of expectations 
for higher education, it rather serves “a different construal 
of the nation.” Many American expectations about a 
flourishing public university system emerged during the 
“Golden Age of Higher Education,” the post-war influx of 
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students, resources, and talent (e.g. from European émigrés), 
and the nation at that point can best be characterized as 
a welfare state.12 As will be described in more detail below, 
this particular state formation allowed for the university 
to develop in certain ways, for example as an institution 
that would help move people into the middle class and 
diversify the power structure, staff the workforce needs of 
expanded white collar positions, and produce scientific 
innovation.13 However, the reduction in state support, the 
attempt to disentangle the five expectations that are in 
many cases integrally related, shows that “the problem is not 
that the university has lost a ground in the state; rather, it 
is that the state has been reconfigured from a welfare state 
to a neoliberal state that offers few social services.”14 Hence 
defenders of public universities should feel it necessary to 
speak to these broader changes in the state, and what they 
might mean for updating or abandoning expectations that 
are more appropriate to prior state-university-industry 
constellations. It is to this issue that I now turn, again 
focusing on the American context, but global considerations 
should be apparent.
12.  “The features of mass attendance, of federal and foundation funding, 
of technological development, and of faculty provenance directly 
articulate with the welfare state; and, in turn, they define our horizon 
of expectation of the university.” Jeffrey J. Williams, “The Post-Welfare 
State University.” American Literary History, 18 (2006), 194-5.
13.  It also created the conditions for registering different forms of 
social discontent, seen for example in the rise of the New Left and the 
importance of universities in the civil rights movement.
14.  Jeffrey J. Williams, “History As a Challenge to the Idea of the 
University” jac 25 (2005): 71.
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The Decline of the State University System in the United 
States:
Christopher Newfield’s Unmaking the Public University15 
provides a compelling model for what this expanded 
argument would include. At first blush Unmaking the Public 
University may seem guilty of certain sins that Williams 
attributes to ideas discourse: it is written by an English 
professor and focuses heavily on the culture wars, the bulk 
of which concerned humanities departments; like Readings 
it has a broad thesis of historical decline; and finally it is 
focused primarily on the University of California system, 
perhaps complicating insights that can be imputed to 
more global higher education concerns. However, Newfield 
provides a sufficiently nuanced and provocative argument 
to skirt these charges, and what distinguishes his approach 
from ideas discourse is that he gives a compelling account of 
how horizons of expectations are developed for universities, 
how those strain or clash under changed conditions, and 
how these changes reflect political contestation. Moreover 
he focuses on two tectonic changes: the steady reduction of 
state support for public education since the 1970s, and the 
ascendency of economic as opposed to cultural concerns as 
the framing assumption in university organization. 
The subtitle of Unmaking the Public University is “The Forty-
Year Assault on the Middle Class,” a period which in this case 
roughly spans the late 1960s to the late 2000s. For Newfield 
“middle class” is shorthand for “college-educated,” not 
students’ class position prior to or when exiting university. 
The reason for conceiving the middle class as such is to draw 
out the pre-history of California’s current higher education 
15.  Christopher Newfield, Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-
Year Assault on the Middle Class (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008).
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challenges. “I use ‘middle class,’” he writes, “to refer to the 
numerical majority of the population whose contact with 
colleges was interwoven with the mainstream and politically 
powerful ideal that this majority was to have interesting 
work, economic security, and the ability to lead satisfying 
and insightful lives in which personal and collective social 
development advanced side by side.”16
The signal document in this history is the California Master 
Plan (CMP), commissioned in 1959 and drafted in 1960. In 
a sense the CMP summarizes and formalizes a prior history, 
the massive expansion of higher education following WWII. 
In 1945 Vannevar Bush’s Science—The Endless Frontier 
proposed a mechanism through which basic (as opposed 
to applied) scientific research would be outsourced to the 
universities17 and funded through granting agencies that were 
federally financed, but independent in terms of how funds 
were allocated (initially the National Research Foundation, 
now the National Science Foundation and National Institute 
of Health). Bush felt universities were “uniquely qualified” 
to carry out this work because “they are charged with the 
responsibility of conserving the knowledge accumulated 
by the past, imparting that knowledge to students, and 
contributing new knowledge of all kinds.”18 Moreover, Bush 
was a firm believer in what some call a “downstream model” 
of research, where the goal was to build the fund of basic 
knowledge as opposed to pursuing predetermined research 
ends. This required a strong commitment to academic 
freedom and autonomy in setting research agendas. As he 
wrote, in universities “scientists may work in an atmosphere 
16.  Newfield, 3.
17.  This marks a key difference with other countries, e.g. France, where 
most large-scale research is conducted within the state-managed Centres 
Nationales de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).
18.  Vannevar Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier (1945), 19.
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which is relatively free from the adverse pressure of 
convention, prejudice, or commercial necessity. At their 
best they provide the scientific worker with a strong sense 
of solidarity and security, as well as a substantial degree of 
personal intellectual freedom.”
Thus when the CMP was drafted universities were not only 
well funded, but had developed a culture in which some of 
Williams’ horizon of expectations had been internalized 
(especially disciplinary research, and a mixture of vocational 
training and corporatization, staffing the white collar and 
technical jobs of the post-war economy). To this the CMP 
added further organization (separating the system into three 
tiers to efficiently allocate resources for different educational 
functions within the broader UC mission) and most radically 
made higher education tuition free for all California 
residents. Universities were now placed at the center of long 
term social planning, investing in what sociologists would 
come to call “human capital,” understood here as developing 
the differential talents of a population. The vast expansion of 
higher education that necessitated the CMP made sure that 
this included vocational, professional, and scholarly talents. 
It is for this reason that many refer to this era as the “Golden 
Age” of American higher education, as the five expectations 
that Williams names were relatively balanced and co-present 
in higher education policy.
Newfield lays out three major principles that we can extract 
from the CMP and from the general direction of public 
higher education in the post-war period. The first is “a broad 
social egalitarianism,” by which he means an understanding 
that goods like education should not be denied to any group. 
The CMP addressed this first by removing the barrier of 
cost and expanding the system. Later, protesting students 
further developed this egalitarianism by pointing to cultural 
barriers that prevented minorities, women, and other groups 
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from receiving the full benefits of a college or university 
education. This included establishing ethnic studies, women’s 
studies, and other departments to better reflect the interests 
and cultural backgrounds of what was becoming a far more 
diverse set of students and faculty.
The second principle was “a new kind of meritocracy,” which 
refers to the harnessing of talent, distributed widely across 
the population and not just concentrated in elite high schools, 
for those sectors where knowledge creation and application 
was to become most valuable. This type of meritocracy was to 
be lauded “only as long as it did not simply replicate existing 
inequalities.”19 The third principle was that “educational 
needs should dictate budgets...educational development 
should not be determined by the long series of economic 
crises that the state’s leaders had managed to produce.”20 
Related to the first principle, this further solidified a post-war 
understanding that education is a public good with multiple 
benefits to society, and thus is worthy of commensurate long-
term public investment.
These principles conspired to bring into being the broad 
“middle class” of the book’s subtitle and broadly summarized 
the attitudes of its members. Describing the make-up of 
this class, Newfield writes, “The public university was 
the institution where blue- and white-collar workers and 
managers, citizens of every racial background were being 
invited into a unified majority.”21 Crucially, this unification 
brought along with it a far more diverse make-up in the 
emerging power structure, and this disturbed “conservative 
elites.” In turning to the “unmaking” portion of his account, 
Newfield’s basic argument is that the social, political, 
19.  Newfield, 99.
20.  Newfield, 2.
21.  Newfield, 4.
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economic, and educational gains achieved (even if only 
partially) in the rise of the post-war public university—“full 
social inclusion, general development, cultural equality, and 
majoritarian economics”22—were deliberately targeted by 
these elites. However, their method was counter-intuitive, 
as such goods produced by the university, like technological 
discoveries or the wider distribution of skills and knowledge, 
could not be challenged head on. Instead the conservative 
elites, whom Newfield calls “culture warriors,” proceeded to 
undermine the authority of those within the university by 
attacking the foundations upon which partisans of the public 
university staked their claims. 
As the nation underwent a significant economic downturn 
hastened by deindustrialization, and national confidence 
was shaken following the defeat in Vietnam, culture warriors 
were able to reframe the ways in which the university was 
meant to contribute to society, claiming that economic 
efficiency was not compatible with the social goods just 
mentioned at broad public cost. Thus an extended and 
deliberate campaign was launched by think tanks and other 
organizations attacking ethnic studies programs, policies to 
engender better race relations, and other new features of the 
public university system. 
For Newfield the “crisis of the university” discourse initiated 
by culture warriors, which in his view is the “crisis of the 
mass middle class,” has three aspects —cultural, economic, 
and political.23 The cultural crisis concerns “the eclipsing of 
qualitative knowledge about culture and human relations”24 
by productive, quantitative knowledge. “The humanities,” 
Newfield continues, “were often cast as the source of non-
22.  Newfield, 13.
23.  For a helpful table see Newfield, 23.
24.  Newfield, 24.
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knowledge or even a kind of antiknowledge, one that led to 
social division and economic costs.”25 Whether the target 
was post-modern philosophical discourse, multiculturalism, 
or literary criticism, culture warriors made the case that 
academics propagated a form of obscurantism whose use was 
not readily apparent to wide swaths of society, and thus could 
not justify the kind of public investments that we saw in the 
immediate post-war period, as it was not building the basic 
fund of knowledge, developing human capital, nor fostering 
a collective sense of social belonging by contributing to 
the heritage of western civilization. Such criticisms were 
bolstered by calls for greater efficiency in resource allocation, 
which was on the mind of administrators as state funding for 
public universities was steadily cut.
The political crisis concerned the gradual undoing of what 
the university, in conjunction with the civil rights movement, 
had tirelessly attempted to build—namely a “multiracial mass 
democracy.” A key achievement of the resurgent conservative 
elite was delinking multiracial democracy from university 
study by affirming diversity as a good, but also affirming the 
right of universities to retain their decision-making authority 
absent evidence of ongoing racial discrimination. This meant 
that aggressive forms of affirmative action, for example 
attempting to alter the demographic base of professions such 
as law or medicine, were supererogatory when it came to 
universities making a contribution to advancing multiracial 
mass democracy. Moreover, culture warriors were successful 
in appealing to the middle class belief in meritocracy, altering 
its meaning to now argue that meritocracy is incompatible 
with affirmative action.
Finally, the economic crisis refers simply to the “decline 
of American economic preeminence on which its golden-
25.  Newfield, 25.
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age affluence hinged.”26 As the country’s economic 
fortunes declined for the majority of middle and working 
class Americans, “economic and management discourse 
overwhelmed discussion of broader social and cultural 
matters.”27 In universities this overturned the majoritarian 
focus of models like the CMP and led to the competition for 
scarcer resources amongst the various communities within 
the university, with a growing intolerance for non-economic 
rationales. Newfield sums up the confluence of these three 
crises in the following way: “The university-focused culture 
wars blocked genuine solutions to the first two challenges of 
multiracial democratic politics and majoritarian economics 
by undermining the requisite cultural capabilities on 
which these solutions hinged.”28 The cumulative effect is 
something that is immediately apparent in current “crisis of 
the university” discourse: universities are now reproducing 
inequality and conserving the power structure as opposed 
to altering it; the cold market logic of efficiency and cost 
reductions continues to dominate public attention; and the 
failed integration of minorities into the power structure, via 
the public university, has factored into the perilous state of 
race relations in the United States in 2016.29 
My purpose in unpacking Newfield’s argument and the 
historical background that it assumes is to show how 
changes in the state, the economy, the law, and the cultural 
environment in which universities operate are crucial to 
understanding what kinds of theories are likely to meet 
challenges facing universities today. A persistent trope in 
Newfield’s book is that during the “Golden Age of Higher 
26.  Newfield, 24.
27.  Newfield, 24.
28.  Newfield, 26.
29.  Andrew Delbanco, “Our Universities: The Outrageous Reality,” The 
New York Review of Books, July 9, 2015.
144 Conceptualizing education, and related issues
Education” competing expectations—for individual 
fulfillment, civic and economic benefit, growth within the 
disciplines—were co-present and became expressed in 
the attitudes of the emerging “middle class.”  In order to 
drive a wedge between this middle class and the university 
cultural warriors had to chip away at several features of 
post-war society, or the welfare state in relation to which 
the post-war university developed. We can now see that this 
project was wildly successful. Thus Newfield goes into great 
detail exploring changes in management discourse, which 
after 1970 no longer reflected the post-war social compact 
between capital and labor, but now redefined workers as 
individual “knowledge-workers” who existed within flexible 
employment schemes, subject to constant reorganization 
to maximize efficiency. These changes are originating off-
campus, but in finding a home in our discourse clearly mark 
out a way not to speak about the university today.
Conclusion: 
To briefly summarize, what I hope to have achieved in 
synthesizing the arguments of Williams and Newfield is 
to draw attention to the form in which debates about the 
university unfold. Many current treatments of the university 
will claim that it is in “crisis,” and then go on to explain 
which expectation (to borrow Williams’ term) is being 
betrayed. As anthropologist Janet Roitman points out, this 
approach, which she calls a narrative of “failure,” brings with 
it certain conventions.30 The crisis label generates a set of 
questions—e.g. what went wrong?—by imposing a narrative 
context on historical events. Such a narrative of ethical or 
epistemological failure produces an absent ideal from which 
this very judgment of failure can be made, and in the case of 
universities this often comes from ideas discourse.
30.  Janet Roitman, Anti-Crisis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).
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By flagging the limitations of ideas discourse, and unpacking 
the historical conditions under which ideas are generated 
(I focused on those emerging out of the “Golden Age” 
of American higher education), I hope to have marked 
out ways not to speak of the university today. Specifically, 
when lamenting the reduction in state funding for public 
universities, it is unhelpful to judge the current state formation 
in terms of the welfare state, in hopes of short-circuiting the 
intervening history and returning to the kinds of policies, 
and the goods they produced, that Newfield describes in the 
immediate post-war period. The intervening history matters 
tremendously, and it should indicate that those interested 
in current challenges faced by the university should engage 
changes in the nature of the state and the economy, and not 
simply condemn these current policies and insist on one of 
two aspects of ideas discourse.31 
 This may seem like a facile remark, but the subtext of my 
argument is that contemporary renderings of the crisis 
and the questions and responses they generate are not 
sufficiently attentive to transformations at the level of 
the state and the economy, seen for example in the rise 
of New Public Management in the UK, which disciplines 
knowledge production through different schemas of 
valuation. Changes such as these have caused a great deal 
of discomfort and discord within the university for reasons 
that I share and hope to have conveyed, but they also reveal 
something important about the ways in which the public 
good is conceived today, when the power of the state is so 
31.  A very prominent example of this can be seen in Martha Nussbaum’s 
Not For Profit, which condemns economized and instrumental approaches 
to education and calls for a return to “education for democracy,” which 
is grounded in the humanities. This binary—education for profit vs. 
education for democracy—may be intuitively appealing, but does 
not yield a very expansive set questions that could shed light on the 
contemporary crisis of the university. 
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thoroughly reduced and the boundaries of communities are 
harder to locate. 
As should be gleaned from the above discussion, it would 
be misguided for me to try to offer a definitive answer to 
Derrida’s opening question of “how not to speak, today, of 
the university?” However, a few summary comments on 
two positive directions are in order. The first, seen in the 
work of several philosophers of education32 and subtending 
Newfield and Williams’ approach, is a pressing need to 
critically reflect on the importance of the language used 
to describe both our own practice and larger goals and 
aspirations. If we accept Derrida’s claim that there is an 
imperative to speak about the modern university, we should 
also take seriously his call to avoid dogmatic modes of 
expression, especially the same tired invocations of the 
intrinsic dignity of humanistic study. I take this critical 
attentiveness to language to be a guiding thread through 
the seemingly disparate landscape of reflections on the 
university that I have laid out above.
The second general remark concerns the setting of ends 
for what occurs in universities. The precarious condition 
of the humanities in universities could initiate interesting 
questions about the “public” status of universities, the 
relationship between philosophers of education and the 
multiple audiences that they are positioned to reach, and the 
disciplinary imperatives that they feel compelled to uphold. 
However, for such questions to find a solid footing they must 
be far more attentive to issues of political contestation and 
history in order to avoid a weak idealism. 
32.  Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, “The Governmentalization 
of Learning and the Assemblage of a Learning Apparatus,” Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, 58, no. 4 (2008), 391-415.
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The current global trend of “learnification” allows the 
thematising of educational aims in functionalist and 
instrumentalist terms only. This trend makes ultimately 
impossible to grasp the ethical character of the aims and the 
process of education. In order to overcome that deficit we 
should elaborate on a conceptual alternative to the category 
of “learning” as this category has been constructed by the so 
called “learning sciences” during the last decades. 
My claim in this paper is that the Hegelian concept of 
Bildung could serve as such a conceptual alternative. Unlike 
learning, education in the sense of Bildung is a normative 
concept – and this in a twofold sense. First, Bildung provides 
an evaluative perspective on forms and practices of learning 
(and teaching) according to the criteria, to which extent these 
forms and practices address the core self-components of 
the human individual and serve to the rational articulation 
and modification of these self-components. Second, 
Bildung designates a form of human development, which is 
itself ethically founded, for this form is carried out by the 
mediation of individual’s values and ideals by universal, 
trans-individual ethical concepts. In order the individual 
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to become capable of this mediation, a sense for conceptual 
objectivity must be cultivated at her – and this is the main 
function of teaching academic subjects.
1. “Learnification” and its educational Shortcomings
Nowadays we are witnessing a global trend of analyzing 
and describing of educational issues exclusively in the 
terminology of the so called “learning sciences” – a trend for 
which Gerd Biesta recently invented the term “learnification”. 
“Learnification” manifests itself in the spelling out of all 
educational phenomena in the language of learning, where 
“learning” denotes a process “[t]hat is, itself, empty with 
regard to content and direction” (Biesta 2012, p. 38). 
In fact, according to the predominant notion of learning in 
the new “learning science”1, learning is to be understood 
simply as development of skills and change of habits and 
dispositions. Or, as a definition of learning in a standard 
“Introduction of Theories of Learning” reads, “[l]earning is a 
relatively permanent change in behaviour that results from 
experience and cannot be attributed to temporary body 
states such as those induced by illness, fatigue, or drugs” 
(Hergenhann and Olson 2005, p. 8). According to this 
understanding of learning, its concept has nothing to say about 
the content, the quality and the direction of the behavioural 
change in question (besides that it should not be induced by 
illness, fatigue, or drugs), as well as about the experiences or 
the activities which are likely to make it possible. 
1.  In a recent report the OECD proclaims with a great emphasis the 
„birth of a learning science” that produces research at the intersection 
between cognitive neuroscience and learning studies. Without any 
hesitation the authors of that report name their new “learning science” 
also “educational neuroscience” thus neglecting any possible differences 
between the terms “learning” and “education” (see OECD 2007, pp. 13-
18). For a good critique on the OECD-report see Casale at al 2010, pp. 
50-54. 
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So understood, the concept of learning exclusively focuses 
on the mechanisms and the conditions of the process of 
acquiring of knowledge and of development of skills, thus 
neglecting the question of the aims of that process. Hence, 
when we for example ask the question whether the learned 
knowledge and skills serve to the flourishing of the freedom 
and autonomy of the individual, or rather to her functioning 
as an effective working force for the sake of the reproduction 
of the economy and of the increase of its competitiveness; 
whether the learning activities of the individual should serve 
to the development of her personality, selfhood and moral 
character, or rather to her assimilation into an existing 
economic and political order, then we are well beyond the 
scope of the “learning science”. That is why such normative 
questions have been completely dismissed by the recent trend 
of “learnification” of educational policy and of pedagogy. So 
some EU-papers on educational policy that emphasize the 
slogans of “learning society” declare debates over principles 
(and norms) of education as having come to an end, that is, as 
being pointless. Those papers define “education” qua learning 
simply as “training for employment”, to which other “things” 
like “general knowledge”, or “personal development” are 
subsumed (see European Commission 1995, p. 23; p.3f.; see 
also Standish 2006, p. 221). 
Thus, if we are to address the normative-ethical questions 
about the aims of schooling we should be searching for a 
conceptual alternative of “learning”. My suggestion in this 
paper is that the Hegelian concept of Bildung could serve 
as such an alternative. As I will argue in the following 
sections, this concept first opens up a selective and evaluative 
perspective on learning and on teaching activities. Not all 
kinds and forms of informal and formal learning as well as 
of teaching should be called “educative”, but only those of 
them which lead (or at least contribute) to the Bildung of 
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the person. Second, education in the sense of Bildung itself 
should be understood as an ethical enterprise. The process of 
developing an autonomous self, that is, of self-consciousness 
as the fundament of human mind, requires individual’s 
elaborating on moral norms and ethically relevant beliefs and 
values, and this process takes place within an ethical form of 
life: within a form, which G. W. Hegel calls Sittlichkeit. 
2. The Concept of Education and its evaluative Perspective 
on Learning and Teaching
One of the most important and valuable parts of Hegel’s legacy 
is his claim that the development of human mind should 
be understood in first place as development of individual’s 
self-consciousness. According to Hegel, self-consciousness 
is the capacity to understand and treat one’s own relations 
to the things in the world as well as to other persons, and 
to social institutions, as activities of one’s own self, that is, 
as expressions of one’s own freedom. One’s own self-treating 
as a free human being, as a subject, objectivates itself in the 
judgements of the individual, that is, in her understanding of 
the meanings of the things, of other people’ actions and of 
social institutions, ultimately in her linking of these things, 
other people’ actions and institutions to her own self, and in 
her expressing her own self in those things, (inter-) actions 
and institutions. 
Now, one way to define learning is to describe it as process 
of acquiring of new references to entities in the world (see 
Marotzki 1990, p. 41; pp. 52-54). This process does not 
necessarily entail the development of self-consciousness 
in the Hegelian sense of that term. For this development 
presupposes the individual linking those references to one’s 
own self and the individual experiencing his understanding 
of the meanings of these entities as expression of his selfhood, 
ultimately of his freedom. Exactly this is the point of Hegel’s 
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sometimes quite obscure considerations about the necessary 
self-objectivation of self-consciousness into the “objective 
spirit”, that is, into conceptual, intelligible contents.2 
There are for sure many forms of learning, at which the 
individual does not recognize and objectivate herself in the 
learned “stuff”, and at which she even does not link at all 
the learning activities to her own self. So for example my 
students frequently complain that after the implementation 
of the so called “Bologna-Reform” in the German academia 
a couple of years ago, they suffer under a particular disease, 
which they call “bulimia of learning”. By this these students 
of mine mean that they learn large bodies of knowledge for 
the only purpose to pass through the exams which in most 
cases take the form of multiple-choice-tests. After passing 
the exams the learned contents are immediately “thrown 
away” from the students without touching upon their 
selves, without letting any traces in their personalities, and 
without having any impact on their further activities and life 
projects. 
Of course, there is a plenty of more sustainable and 
intelligent forms of learning than the ones that characterize 
2.  The chapter on “Self-Consciousness” in the “Phenomenology of 
Spirit” (see Hegel 2010/ 1807, pp. 134-174), the paragraphs 5 to 7 of the 
“Groundwork of Philosophy of Right” (see Hegel 1986/1821, pp. 49-57), 
as well as the Introduction of the “Philosophy of Right: Lectures from 
1821/22” (see Hegel 2005/ 1822, pp. 39-57) should be seen as being 
probably the most instructive parts of Hegel’s work with regard to his 
conception of self-consciousness. Consider also the following statement 
by Robert Pippin about self-consciousness and freedom: “[f]or Hegel 
freedom consists in being in a certain reflective and deliberative relation 
to oneself (which he describes as being able to give my inclinations and 
incentives a “rational form”), which itself is possible, so it is argued, only 
if one is also already in certain (ultimately institutional, norm-governed) 
relations to others, if one is participant in certain practices” (Pippin 
2008, p. 4). 
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the phenomenon of “learning bulimia”. In many cases 
the knowledge that one acquires by her learning activities 
remains for a long time in the mind of the learner and has 
significant impact on her behaviour and on her skills to 
master everyday situations and issues in her life. This is 
especially true when good teachers or trainers manage to 
establish learning-for-life arrangements, within which the 
learners could recognize the learned stuff as being “useful” 
for their life-goals. However, in many cases even those more 
sustainable forms of learning cannot be seen as in themselves 
inherently linked to the selves of the learners either. So in my 
young years I had to learn some card games and I am still 
able to recognize the cards and even to play card games if I 
am required to do so. But nevertheless playing cards always 
was for me a boring and stupid activity, and for me it was 
never a form of self-expression, or of self-development. 
Consider also the following example which regards acquiring 
of more useful skills than the ones that are involved in playing 
card games: Like many other people that live in the modern 
Western world I used to learn how to complete my annual 
tax-declaration according to complex tax-regulations which 
I had first to comprehend. Since I have had the chance to 
be trained in that “discipline” by good formal and informal 
tax-consultants, I obviously learned successfully to master 
that issue – after all, I never have had any problems with tax-
authorities so far. Yet completing the annual tax-declaration 
on the base of internalised information about the current 
tax-regulations is for me nothing but a useful technique, or 
an instrumental skill. By performing this activity I am not 
articulating neither my needs, nor my ideals or values. In 
other words, this activity has nothing to do with my self-
identity; it does not have any intrinsic value for me. 
However, this example would be a very different one, if it 
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would be not about me, but about a person who has a passion 
for the calculations which the completion of a tax-declaration 
involves. In this case the person in question would treat the 
completing of her tax-declaration not as an instrumental 
activity but as a form of self-realization. By learning to 
perform this activity she would probably not only satisfy her 
passion for “playing with numbers” in accordance with given 
juristic rules. Rather, it is likely that she would articulate this 
passion by this learning and she would also endeavour the 
distinctive needs her passion for completing tax-declarations 
consists of. Furthermore, particular ideals of that person 
would be brought into being by the process of learning to 
master tax-declarations. This could be for instance ideal 
to organize the human life alongside the principles and 
procedures of financial accounting and to pursue one’s own 
self-realization by becoming fluent in the mastering of these 
principles and procedures. 
If all of that happens, the process of learning to perform the 
activity in question turns into a process of education. With 
regard to Hegel we can assert that a process of education 
occurs when one’s own values, needs and ideals become a 
rational form, that is, when they get transformed to rational, 
conceptual contents of one’s own self-consciousness (see 
Hegel 2005/ 1822, p. 180f.). In other words, education is a 
process which is distinguished by two essential features: 
(1) Linking of acquired references to and knowledge 
about matters in the world to the entities that builds up 
the self or the kernel of a person: her values, needs and 
ideals, and (2) Rational differentiation, articulation and 
justification of these self-building values, needs and ideals of 
the person. 
Now, the crucial question here is in what exactly rational 
differentiation, articulation and justification of self-building 
phenomena consists. What does it mean to bring one’s own 
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values, needs and ideals into a rational form? 
3. Education as Ethical Venture
According to Hegel, a process of education takes place, only 
if self-building components like values, needs, ideals are 
going to reach a status of “universality” (“Allgemeinheit”), 
that is, a status of concepts (see Hegel 2005/ 1821, pp. 180f.). 
Since these self-building components are obviously ethical 
entities, for they are conducting norms of individual’s life, 
education is not an ethically neutral activity, as learning is, 
insofar as learning is in itself indifferent to those entities.3 
Rather, education is a process of forming and subsequent 
conceptual trans-forming of the components of the self. 
It is rather a trivial statement that the core, or the “basic” self 
of every individual comes into being initially by a process 
of internalization of the norms and role-expectations of the 
community in which she was born. According to Hegel’s 
terminology, these communal norms and role-patterns 
appears at that early stage of the self-development as elements 
of a “unmediated natural Spirit” (“unmittelbar natürlicher 
Geist”) (Hegel 2005/ 1821, p. 159); a “Spirit” which exists not 
only in the institution of family, but also in the vital customs 
and rites of a people’s community (“Volk”) (Ibid, p. 155). 
Those communal, unmediated, quasi-natural customs and 
rites are, according to Hegel, like “mother milk” for the mind 
3.  This does not preclude that there might be learning about ethical 
issues. So for example pupils and students frequently are supposed to 
learn about the contents and the historical genesis of moral values in 
different ages and in different societies. But insofar as this learning 
happens only from an objectivist, third-person-perspective without 
regarding and transforming the values and the worldviews of the students 
themselves, this learning does not reach the threshold of education, and 
it is not an ethical enterprise in itself, that is, an activity of articulation, 
differentiation and justification of students’ own notions about good and 
just life.
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of the individual (Ibid, p. 157). That is to say that the child first 
internalizes in his behaviour the common norms and rules 
of his social environment instinctively, that is, without yet 
making of them contents of his self-consciousness, without 
reflecting on them. 
This pre-reflexive initiation in a communal form of life 
is a prerequisite for the process of education, but it is not 
already a part of it. For the process of education begins at 
the moment, at which the communal customs and rites get 
into the self-consciousness of the individual, or – to put it in 
Hegel’s terms – at the moment in which they get mediated 
(“vermittelt”) by her self-consciousness. 
One way to describe this relation between “enculturation” 
and self-consciousness is to spell it out in terms of individual 
transcending the initially internalized by her role-
expectations towards her that are derived from the given 
communal customs and rites, that is, in terms of taking 
distance to that dimension of her self that G. H. Mead calls 
“Me” by building up a complementary and yet opposite 
self-dimension that Mead describes as “I” (Mead 1959, p. 
174f.). However, the Hegelian story of self-development is a 
slightly different one, for it is not a story about “Me” being 
transcended by “I”, nor it is story about a “balance” between 
“Me” and “I”. Rather, it is a story about a mediation of “Me” 
by “I” – and also about a simultaneous mediation of “I” by 
“Me”. How this mutual mediation should be understood?
Well, it would be probably easier, if we first try to comprehend 
the mediation of “I” by “Me”. We can imagine the “I” as a kind 
of “pure” subjectivity, or “pure” will to act in certain ways 
that are distinctively “my own” ways to act. However, this 
kind of “pure” subjectivity is nothing but fiction, for every 
will, every act of decision needs some “stuff”, some objects 
through which the will has to work, and which function as 
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the other of the subjectivity. Communal, trans-personal and 
pre-reflexive customs and rites are exactly this “other” of the 
“I” without which the “I” is not possible. 
And in which sense the “Me” is mediated by the “I”? The 
first and most obvious answer to that question is, that the 
components of “Me”, that is, the internalized communal 
customs and habits, become a new, subjective being by the 
medium of self-consciousness; that they now exist within 
a relation to the self-consciousness. That implies that these 
customs and habits become now a meaning for the self-
consciousness; a meaning that is liable to exploration and 
problematization. The first step to explore the meaning of 
collective norms for action is obviously to ask the question of 
“reason why” with regard to these norms. We are normally 
asking that question when we are deliberating on the genesis 
of certain communal norms and on their function for the 
particular community, within which they exist. However, a 
further step is required in order these norms to get mediated 
through the self-consciousness. This is the step at which 
the self explores the significance of them not only for the 
community, but also for herself, hereby interpreting them 
from her individual perspective. At that step I am asking 
myself what do these norms mean for me; whether or not I 
shall agree to them, or to which extent and in which sense I 
shall accept them. A further step in thus sketched mediation 
process is to justify my interpretation of and my attitude 
towards the communal norms and role-patterns which I was 
supposed to internalize in the course of my upbringing and 
socialization. 
At least at that stage of justification the individual necessarily 
gets involved in the practice of public reasoning. For 
justification means to provide one’s own interpretations 
and evaluations of the norms in question with arguments, 
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and that requires one to defend these interpretations and 
evaluations against real and virtual critics, and to take into 
consideration real and possible counter-arguments against 
one’s own arguments. To use a phrase that has been made 
prominent by Robert Brandom, to justify one’s own beliefs 
requires one to play the discursive game of giving and asking 
for reasons (Brandom 1994, pp. 183, 188, 496-497). 
According to Brandom, who is strongly relying on Hegel in his 
account on the development of the ability of conceptual (self-
) articulation, justifying a belief discursively and articulating 
it conceptually is one and the same thing. This follows from 
Brandom’s approach of inferential semantics, according to 
which to grasp a concept means to use it as consequence of 
other concepts and as premise for propositional claims, that 
is, to use it in the game of public reasoning. As Jan Derry 
puts it, “[i]nferentialism demonstrates that the grasping of 
a concept is an activity that involves commitment to the 
inferences implicit in its use in a social practice of giving and 
asking for reasons” (Derry 2013, p. 229). 
To sum up: According to Hegel, the development of the human 
individual, of her consciousness and self-consciousness, is 
thinkable only within a social and ethical form of life, which 
he calls “Sittlichkeit”. There are two different levels of the 
social dimension of “Sitttlichkeit” – first, this is the stage 
of a group of people sharing common beliefs constituted 
by common traditions, and the second stage is the one of 
public deliberations on these beliefs, that is, of cooperative 
conceptualisations of them. 
The process of critical transforming of one’s initially pre-
reflexively internalized beliefs about good and right life into 
concepts, that is, the process of bringing those beliefs into 
a rational form, into a form of assertions that can claim 
universal validity – a transforming that presupposes one’s 
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participation at the social practice of inferential reasoning – 
is precisely what Hegel calls Bildung. 
Now, if we try to link this Hegelian account of education to 
the domain of schooling, we realize that the ethical character 
of education, in the sense of Bildung, is not so much about 
contents of school curricula, but rather about the perspective, 
from which these contents are to be approached. Drawing 
on the paradigmatic ethical theory of Bernard Williams, 
which could be seen as Neo-Hegelian in its essence 4, we can 
assert that having an ethical relation to the world means 
to see it from the standpoint of the question “How one 
should live?” (Williams 2011, pp. 20-24; 146-172). In other 
words, the ethical relation to the world is not a relation of 
a neutral observation of facts; it is not a relation to bodies 
of information from a third-person-standpoint, but it is a 
relation from a generalized first-person-standpoint. It is not 
a relation of accumulating impersonal bodies of information, 
but of searching for orientation by (growing) individuals who 
deliberate with their co-fellows on what are right courses of 
action (and why) in life-situations that require weighing up 
of and choice between different options. 
These deliberations could be linked not only to those parts 
4.  The Hegelian character of Williams’ ethical theory comes into being 
clearly in his emphasis on Hegel’s critics on the Kantian reduction of 
ethics to formal moral obligations. According to Williams, “[H]egel 
admirably criticized the “abstract” Kantian morality and contrasted it 
with the notion of Sittlichkeit, a concretely determined ethical existence 
that was expressed in the local folkways, a form of life that made particular 
sense to the people living in it” (Williams 2011, p. 115). Furthermore, 
Williams agree with Hegel, that one should ask the question how this “[c]
oncretely experienced form of life can be extended, rather considering 
how a universal program is to be applied” (Ibid, p. 116). The question, how 
the individual can extend, modify, examine the concretely experienced 
ethical form of life, in which he has got socialized, is identical with the 
question of how is Bildung possible. 
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of school curricula, which are usually ascribed to the Liberal 
Arts (Philosophy, Literature, History, Religion etc.), but also 
to scientific subjects. Key features of sciences like logical 
correctness and precision as well as a sense for proportions 
can also be seen as ethical values and can be linked to 
ethical intuitions about how one should live. Interpreted as 
competences, these features are crucial for one’s participation 
in ethical deliberations. 
In other words, for schooling to be a Bildung-supportive 
activity it is not necessarily for schooling to be focused on 
moral issues; rather, broader scientific and art contents 
should be presented in a way at schools, in which these 
contents could be brought in touch with the ethical intuitions 
of the students, and in which they could facilitate the 
conceptual articulation of those intuitions. This articulation 
requires an extension of the “local folkways” (Williams 
2011, p. 115), within which student’s ethical intuitions 
initially arise, towards experiences of the entire humankind 
that are accumulated in sciences and arts. So for example, 
school teaching on the issue of justice could be seen only 
than as a Bildung-supportive one, when the intuitions of the 
students about justice and injustice are not only brought into 
expression in the classroom, but when these intuitions are, in 
addition, mediated by theories of justice that claims objective, 
that is, trans-personal and trans-contextual validity.5 This 
mediation is only possible, if an understanding of theoretical 
claims as well as of the mechanisms and standards of their 
inductive and/ or deductive justifications has been cultivated 
5.  This implies that neither a “canon-orientated” teacher who is focused 
exclusively at academic theories of justice, this neglecting the everyday 
intuitions and experiences of the students about and with justice and 
injustice, nor a “child-centered” teacher who is caring only about these 
experiences and intuitions, thus neglecting academic theories of justice, 
are capable of performing a Bildung-supportive teaching on the topic of 
justice. 
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at the students – and this is a task, which obviously all school 
subjects share. 
Now, it is a well-known assertion that formal education 
should bridge between personal experiences and objective, 
trans-personal knowledge that has been systematically 
accumulated over many generations in the various academic 
disciplines. So, for example, Dewey claims in his famous essay 
“The Child and the Curriculum” that education requires 
establishing a link between the personal experience of the 
child and the universal experience of the human race. And the 
later experience is organized, systematized and reflectively 
formulated in academic subjects which have been normally 
taught at schools (see Dewey 1964, p. 344-345). According to 
Dewey these academic disciplines should be “psychologized”, 
that is, they should be de-canonized in re-constructed in 
the way that these disciplines can be made compatible with 
the personal experiences of the students in order to serve as 
extensions, systematizations and universalizations of those 
experiences (see Ibid, p. 351). 
However, the Hegelian understanding of Bildung differs 
significantly from the pragmatist notion of education. 
According to that understanding education via Bildung 
is not simply about extension and universalization of 
personal experiences, but about the universalization of 
ethically relevant experiences, that is, about the conceptual 
articulation and modification of ethical beliefs that are 
embodied in those experiences. Thus, the Archimedean 
point of every process of education is the continuum of 
lived beliefs of the students about how one should conduct 
his life. However, the rational articulation and modification 
of ethical beliefs is only possible, if a sense for objectivity 
of conceptual concepts, of ideas, is growing at the students. 
Paradoxically, the individual-centred process of education, 
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understood as rational articulation and modification of 
normative, evaluative self-constituting entities like values 
and ideals, presupposes individual’s endorsing of a doctrine 
of conceptual realism, which is inherent to the common 
academic disciplines, for these disciplines make sense 
only if their concepts can claim objective, trans-individual 
validity. To speak with R.S. Peters, the process of education 
necessarily entails a moment of turning the eyes outwards 
to what is essentially independent of persons (Peters 1966, 
p. 54). But unlike Peters, the (Neo-) Hegelian philosopher of 
education shall insists that this “turning the eyes outwards” 
to objective meanings is not for the sake of preservation, 
continuation and transmission of a cultural “heritage”, or 
of public traditions (see Ibid, p. 54-56), Rather, it is for the 
sake of the development of a rational self-autonomy of the 
students by the conceptual articulation and modification of 
their ethical beliefs, that is, of their values and ideals through 
their participation in discursive forms of Sittlichkeit. 
Conclusion
The development of the human mind should be understood 
– from a Hegelian perspective – as a process of progressive 
mediation of individual’s needs, values and ideals by 
objective ethical concepts that entail claims (and their 
subsequent justifications) about how one should live. This 
process of growing of rational self-autonomy understood as 
simultaneous developments of the ability of self-articulation 
and of mastering of objective concepts and their inferences, 
including their arguments, is a process of education in the 
sense of Bildung – and not one of learning. Unlike learning, 
Bildung is a normative concept – and this in a twofold sense. 
First, Bildung provides an evaluative perspective on forms 
and practices of learning (and teaching) according to the 
criteria, to which extent these forms and practices address the 
core self-features of the human individual and serve to the 
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rational articulation and modification of these self-features. 
Second, Bildung designates a form of human development, 
which is itself ethically founded, for this form of human 
development is carried out by the mediation of individual’s 
values and ideals by universal, trans-individual ethical 
concepts. In order to be capable to provide this mediation 
a sense for conceptual objectivity must be cultivated at 
the individual – and this is the main function of teaching 
academic subjects. 
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  It is a tale told by an idiot
  Full of sound and fury. Signifying nothing.
   Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 5
Introduction
At the beginning of my academic career, many decades ago, I 
found it futile to describe myself as an epistemologist when at 
conferences of educational researchers and other education 
professionals. No one seemed to understand, and certainly 
no one seemed to care. My strange little secret – that I was 
interested in the “theory of knowledge”, in issues concerning 
the grounds upon which we can claim to know something 
– could only be spoken about in the narrow confines of 
meetings of that small and exclusive breed – philosophers of 
education. 
Nowadays much has changed. Epistemology is discussed (by 
non-philosophers, it is important to note) at a wide range 
of education conferences, and in a variety of education 
journals – judging by the frequency with which the term 
is used, epistemology is a topic that many educational 
researchers, policy people, trainers of teachers and designers 
of curriculum, have come to care about very deeply. What a 
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pity they still seem not to understand! Many of these recent 
discussions certainly are full of sound and fury, but signify 
little or nothing (nothing, that is, of epistemological interest). 
What a pity it is, too, that those philosophers of education 
who do understand something about epistemology, have by 
and large refused to be drawn into these fiery discussions. 
In this paper I plan to describe (and illustrate) the most 
common misunderstandings about epistemology, and to 
discuss the criticisms of mainsteam epistemology raised 
by those academics who believe that it is a tool used for the 
domination of minority groups. I will also point to, but not 
discuss, important epistemological issues in educational 
research and the field of policy. But in case you do not find 
the claim I made above to be credible – that a fairly technical 
branch of philosophy has generated a great deal of interest 
plus a great deal of heat and misunderstanding amongst 
non-philosophers working in the field of education – perhaps 
it is wise to start with a brief example to illustrate what I was 
referring to. 
A preliminary example
About a decade ago the annual conference of the American 
Educational Research Association (AERA) had a number of 
keynote lectures that each focused upon what was purported 
to be the epistemology of a particular ethnic/racial minority 
group; I attended as many of these events as I could manage, 
and found in each case that there was a large and enthusiastic 
audience. Most memorable of these was the lecture on “Native 
American epistemology” given by a prominent female 
researcher of Native American ancestry to a crowded hall 
with about two hundred academics and teachers apparently 
of the same ethnicity as the speaker making up the audience. 
The speaker began by saying that she had been invited to talk 
about Native American epistemology, but did not understand 
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what this meant. Loud applause and cheering from the 
audience! So, the speaker announced, “yesterday I looked 
up ‘epistemology’ in the dictionary.” (Note the discourtesy 
here – ‘yesterday’!) After a dramatic pause, she continued: “I 
still did not understand what it meant!” – a remark that was 
greeted by even louder applause, cheering and whistling! She 
then embarked on a talk, interesting enough, about Native 
American discourse and interaction practices, and how 
these needed to be recognized in Native American schooling 
– certainly an important topic but one that supported her 
claim not to have understood what epistemology is about! 
I found all of this to be deeply disturbing: First and foremost, 
the organizers of the conference evidently thought it was 
beyond doubt that the different ethnic/cultural groups had 
their own epistemologies – a supposition I judged to be 
confronted by great difficulties; but this basic matter was not 
put forward for discussion anywhere at the conference. But 
turning to this specific session, why did the speaker accept the 
invitation to participate if she did not understand the topic? 
Why would hundreds turn up to hear a lecture advertised to 
be on a topic (epistemology) they evidently had such contempt 
for? Despite what the dictionary said about epistemology 
being the theory of the grounds of our knowledge-claims, 
did the lecturer really believe that the term referred to such 
things as social interaction patterns and learning styles? Did 
the lecturer and audience members believe that it was not 
worthwhile to discuss real epistemological issues because 
there was nothing of value in this subject? And finally, why 
did so many people bother to use the word at all, if they 
believed that it did not to refer to anything of importance?
It is time to leave this preliminary example, and to turn to 
a more systematic discussion of the issues. I shall proceed 
by way of a series of points, and also shall introduce several 
vitally important distinctions. 
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Points about epistemology, and some important 
misconceptions
1. As a first step it is necessary to recognize that there is a 
distinction between (a) discovering or establishing that 
there is a new item that needs to be added to one or other 
of the existing publicly accepted bodies of knowledge that 
deal with such things as biology, physics, economics, the 
field of infant health, motor mechanics, history of recent US 
elections, the field of human nutrition, and hundreds more; 
and (b) an individual (perhaps a student, or a young child, 
or an adult learner) personally learning or mastering an 
item that is new to that individual. The first of these, (a), is of 
professional interest to epistemologists, but the second is not 
– rather, it is of great relevance to researchers in the field of 
learning theory, and also to teachers, curriculum developers, 
and educational psychologists; effective instruction must 
take into account that some learners do better if concrete 
examples are presented at the outset, while others can master 
material that is presented in an abstract way, while for yet 
others learning follows from their being involved in some 
real world activity or problem-solving. It is feasible that there 
are important group or socio-cultural differences here; girls 
may have different learning styles from boys, and Native 
Americans might profit from a different style of teaching 
than do members of the White majority population. But 
again, such phenomena are of great educational importance, 
but they are not what the discipline of epistemology concerns 
itself with!
A book-length example of this mistake about the nature of 
epistemology is Women’s Ways of Knowing (Belenky at al., 
1986/1997). The introduction raises the expectation that the 
work will focus on central epistemological issues, for it lists 
“such difficult and profound questions” as: What is truth? 
169Epistemology on the Firing-Line
What is authority? What counts as evidence? How do I know 
what I know? (p.3) However the book does not deliver on this 
promise, but instead discusses the use of intuition, women’s 
valuing of subjectivity and the role that childbirth plays in 
the development of this trait, and the rejection by women 
(by and large) of unduly abstract, logical, impersonal modes 
of thought. The book certainly throws light on “women’s 
ways of knowing”, and is an achievement in the field of 
social psychology; it is noteworthy that the tools used to gain 
evidence for the book all come from this discipline, and this is 
the authors’ professional affiliation. The Stanford philosopher 
of science, Helen Longino, who is also an important figure in 
contemporary feminist philosophy, thought well of this book 
by Belenky et al., but concluded her review of it by stating: 
“But it is not yet epistemology.”1
2. There is nothing particularly mysterious about the nature 
of epistemology; the dictionary account is straightforward: 
Epistemology is that branch of philosophy that deals with 
theory of knowledge; its focus is upon the philosophical and 
logical issues involved in investigating the core questions: 
What features must an item possess to be counted as an 
item of knowledge? What tests or procedures or criteria are 
used within knowledge-producing communities to ground 
or establish the claim that something counts as knowledge, 
and do these withstand critical scrutiny? (Are these tests, 
procedures and criteria reliable?)
3. Clearly, the central epistemological concept is knowledge, 
and over centuries the so-called “justified true belief” 
analysis of it has become standard: In order for some item 
X to be accepted as being knowledge, three criteria must be 
satisfied: (a) the item or “knowledge claim” must be believed; 
1.  See the discussion in Ruitenberg and Phillips, Education, Culture, 
and Epistemological Diversity, 2012, p. 53 
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(b) there must be a justification or warrant for asserting this 
claim, that stands up to critical scrutiny; (c) the item or claim 
must actually be true.2 That these three criteria are sensible 
can be shown quite easily; for example, we would not find 
it credible if you were to claim that you know that X is the 
case but that you didn’t actually believe it; and if you cannot 
offer any evidence or convincing grounds for believing that 
X is true, you might believe it but you cannot validly assert 
that you know it to be true; and finally, even if you have some 
evidence, but it turns out that X is not the case, that it is false, 
then you cannot be said to have known it, for – as I show in 
more detail in a moment, you cannot know something that is 
not the case. (You cannot know that the Earth is flat, because 
it isn’t!)
4. Another absolutely crucial distinction goes along with this 
standard analysis of the concept of knowledge – a distinction 
that many of the non-philosophers who these days write 
about what they regard as epistemology fail to understand, 
yet it is a distinction that is non-mysterious and easy to 
grasp. This is the distinction between belief and knowledge, 
that is, the distinction between items that are believed to be 
(or are accepted as being) knowledge and those that actually 
are knowledge. The central issue here is that we believe many 
things, and think they are true, and we are prepared to act 
upon these beliefs if the appropriate occasion arises – but 
nevertheless we realize that many of our beliefs actually will 
turn out to be false, and are not part of the repository of 
human knowledge. 
This came home to me very forcefully during the year I was 
training to be a biology teacher (in Melbourne, Australia). 
2.  In recent years it has been suggested that this account needs to be 
strengthened by addition of at least one further criterion to deal with 
some complex examples formulated by Gettier.
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On one very memorable day I was about to teach a lesson 
to an eleventh-grade biology class on cell division (the 
processes of meiosis and mitosis via which the chromosomes 
in a cell replicated and divided). The text book being used by 
the class discussed all of this, with human cells as the focus; 
they were stated to have 48 chromosomes. I believed this to 
be true, and accepted it as an item of genuine knowledge, as 
did my supervising teacher, the professors of biology at the 
University of Melbourne, and as did the authors of the text-
book. But that very same morning it had been announced 
that researchers using new techniques and the most advanced 
microscopes had done a recount and had determined that 
the normal human cell contained not 48 but 46 chromosomes, 
a result that had been replicated in other laboratories. So, 
while I had believed that there were 48, I was wrong to 
think that I knew this; I could not have known there were 
48 because there were not 48, there were only 46! One cannot 
know something that is not the case.
This distinction is familiar to all of us in our daily lives; 
here is an example from the recent experience of millions of 
American citizens who stayed up very late to watch the US 
presidential election results: On the night of the presidential 
election, as the votes were being counted, Mitt Romney knew 
that he had won; and because he knew this he prepared a 
victory speech but did not prepare a speech conceding his 
defeat by Barack Obama. But although he believed he had 
won, and acted on this belief, he could not have known this 
– because he had not won! 
5. There are some social scientists – some anthropologists, 
for example – whose research involves them recording the 
beliefs that are held by different cultural groups (and because 
they are believed by members of these groups, these beliefs 
are regarded as things that are known). Collecting and 
studying and analyzing beliefs that are held, however valuable 
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this research may be, is sometimes called epistemology, 
but it is not – it is ethnography or some related empirical 
endeavor. An epistemologist is not professionally interested 
in cataloguing what is believed by various groups, but rather, 
is concerned to discover – and above all to assess – the 
criteria, tests, standards, or procedures by which cultural 
groups distinguish between beliefs that they judge to be 
true (and which, therefore, are categorized as being things 
that are known) and those that they judge to be faulty. (It 
seems that all cultural groups distinguish between – indeed, 
must distinguish between – true beliefs and false beliefs; it is 
difficult to imagine how a group could survive if it was not 
able to distinguish on a fairly regular basis between true and 
false beliefs). 
In the process of making a list of the beliefs of a cultural 
group (the items that members of this group think they 
know), the researcher quite often finds items that this group 
thinks are knowledge but that we do not accept because 
we have evidence and arguments available that indicate 
that these items are not true. (For example, the belief that 
the Earth is flat.) Often the temptation is to treat cases of 
this sort by saying that the item is “true for them but not 
true for us”, or “it is known by them but is not knowledge 
for us” – thus, “it is true for members of cultural group Y 
that the Earth is flat, but it is not true for us.” This is an 
extremely misleading and relativistic way of describing the 
situation; it simply is not the case that the Earth is both flat 
and non-flat/spherical – this is an empirical and conceptual 
impossibility, and both alternatives cannot be true! It is 
much more straightforward, and accurate, to say “Members 
of this cultural group believe the Earth is flat, but they are 
wrong. They hold a false belief – for the Earth actually is 
spherical (and here is the evidence….).” Many contemporary 
scholars do not like formulations like this, on the grounds 
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that they denigrate the cultural group and its beliefs. But this 
is spurious; all groups, including our own, have held in the 
past (and hold now) some – probably very many – beliefs 
that have turned out, or will turn out, not to be true, and 
there is nothing disrespectful for anyone to be reminded of 
this! (It is an interesting exercise to look at an old edition of 
an encyclopedia; it is truly amazing how outdated – just how 
wrong – much of the so-called knowledge that is recorded in 
it actually is!)
6. The criteria, tests or standards that are used within a 
cultural group or knowledge-making community need 
to be assessed because although they might work on some 
occasions to produce genuine knowledge, they might on 
other occasions be unreliable and fail, and so it is important 
to discover their limitations as knowledge-generating 
procedures. (Note that I am speaking here not only of 
“exotic” cultural groups studied by anthropologists, but 
also of knowledge-making communities within advanced 
societies.) The great American philosopher John Dewey put 
the point well when he wrote:
We know that some methods of inquiry are better than 
others in just the same way in which we know that some 
methods of surgery, farming, road-making, navigating, or 
what-not are better than others…. We ascertain how and 
why certain means and agencies have provided warrantably 
assertible conclusions [i.e. knowledge] while others have not 
and cannot do so. (Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 1966, 
p. 104)
Consider this example taken from the context of the 
international educational research community: Two 
techniques/procedures widely used to establish knowledge 
within this community are blind peer review of research 
reports, and the use of randomized controlled experiments. 
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Both of these often help in establishing that a finding is a 
genuine addition to our knowledge, but sometimes these 
techniques fail – and it is of great epistemological interest 
(and it is of great practical importance as well) to discover 
why. (Indeed, the virtues and deficiencies of the experimental 
method is a topic hotly debated at present within the 
educational research community.)
7. It is necessary to say a little more about the point made 
by Dewey – that the methods of justifying or warranting 
or supporting knowledge-claims must stand up to critical 
examination so that we can detect those methods and criteria 
that cannot possibly lead to justified knowledge-claims. This 
seems to have been seriously misunderstood by a number 
of well-cited educational writers in recent years, especially 
by some leaders in the multicultural education community 
and some postmodernist critics of educational research; 
unfortunately (as I will show in a moment) their standards 
of critical assessment are woefully low. 
These authors (Scheurich and Young, Bernal, Collins, Banks, 
and Asante, among many others) believe that educational 
research is a form of domination, for it reflects the interests 
of the dominant white male group, in particular in the North 
American context; thus it overlooks the needs and life-
experiences of cultural minority groups, women, individuals 
of non-heterosexual disposition, and members of the 
economic lower-classes. Even the research designs that are 
used, and the modes of justifying or warranting or testing 
of knowledge-claims, are biased3 in favor of the dominant 
cultural group.
Clearly these critics of the dominant (so-called white male) 
epistemology need to present a two pronged case: First, they 
3.  See the discussion (and supporting citations) of the well-known essay 
by Scheurich and Young, in Ruitenberg and Phillips, 2012, ch.2.
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must show that it is credible to claim that there are full-blown 
epistemologies that are alternatives – not just that there are 
alternatives to some of the techniques, procedures and so 
on within traditional epistemology (for whoever doubted 
this?). Second, they need to establish that the traditional 
epistemological doctrines and approaches (the ones they 
claim are used as tools of domination) are indeed deficient 
and biased in favor of white males. I shall make some brief 
comments about each “prong” of their argument in turn.
First, in contrast to the procedures used by white, male, 
Western researchers, these critics put forward what they 
claim are alternative ways of establishing or warranting 
knowledge claims. Unfortunately it is far from clear what 
is meant by this, given that traditional epistemology asserts 
that experience and/or reason are central (empiricism and 
rationalism) – do the alternative epistemologies have no place 
for either of these, and how would such a thing be possible? 
The “alternative” procedures that are casually mentioned fail 
to stand up to scrutiny – they simply do not seem the kinds 
of procedures that could possibly show whether or not our 
knowledge claims are true (or “tenable”, as Catherine Elgin 
puts it4). For example, Molefi Kete Asante asserts that “the 
quest for truth” in Afrocentric cultures involves language, 
myth, ancestral memory, and dance-music-art; Delores 
Bernal makes a similar point about Chicana (female Hispanic) 
epistemology when she writes that “A unique characteristic 
of a Chicana feminist epistemology is that it also validates 
and addresses experiences that are intertwined with issues of 
immigration, migration, generational status, bilingualism, 
limited English proficiency, and the contradictions of 
Catholicism.”5 How any of the things listed by Asante and 
Bernal could be a part of an epistemology, especially a part 
4.  Catherine Elgin, Considered Judgment, pp. 116-8.
5.  For documentation, see Ruitenberg and Phillips, ch.2.e,
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concerned with the warranting or justification of the truth of 
knowledge claims, is never addressed by these authors (or by 
the numerous others who make similar claims). Particularly 
striking are the references to dance and music, and exposing 
“the contradictions of Catholicism”, as being epistemological 
tools; in the passage quoted earlier from John Dewey, he 
argued that we (we epistemologists) can ascertain “how and 
why certain means and agencies have provided warrantably 
assertible conclusions, while others have not and cannot 
do so”, and dance, music, and exposing the contradictions 
in Catholicism, have not and cannot possibly be means of 
establishing knowledge claims that are tenable or warranted. 
(How could a dance, for example, or an understanding of 
contradictions in Catholicism, establish the truth or falsity 
– the tenability – of Einstein’s theory of relativity, or of the 
theory that a virus is the cause of aids, or of the trickle-down 
theory in economics, or the theory that lack of pure water 
contributes to the spread of cholera?)
Second, the other prong of the argument that needs to be put 
forward by the critics of the dominant epistemology has to 
establish that traditional educational research methods and 
epistemological criteria are biased, and represent an attempt 
by white male researchers to assert domination and to achieve 
their socio-political goals. In her book Black Feminist Thought 
Patricia Hill Collins writes that “elite white men and their 
representatives control structures of knowledge validation”, 
and that as a result Black feminist scholars often encounter an 
epistemology “representing elite white male interests”6; and 
in a well-known paper in Educational Researcher, Scheurich 
and Young claim that “the ways of the dominant group (its 
epistemologies, its ontologies, its axiologies)” become the 
dominant ways of that civilization, thus “the dominant 
group creates or constructs “the world” or “the Real” and 
6.  See Ruitenberg and Phillips, pp. 19-24.
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does so in its own image.”7 They write that “it is in this sense 
that…the dominant research epistemologies are racially 
biased.”8 White researchers, they add, “are unconsciously 
promulgating racism on an epistemological level” when 
they “teach and promote epistemologies like positivism and 
postmodernism….”
The standard of argument that these critics of mainstream 
epistemology put forward in support of their extremely 
strong position is astoundingly poor. What they need to do – 
but fail to do – is to present a detailed analysis of the elements 
that make up positivism, postpositivism, rationalism and 
other positions developed in traditional epistemology, and 
to show how some or all of these elements are supportive of 
white male social and economic and political interests and 
are harmful to the interests of minority or other subjugated 
groups; and indeed, they need to go further and show that 
the reason mainstream epistemology was developed was 
because it supported white male interests. Instead of offering 
such a detailed analysis, the argument that is put forward 
by the critics simply is this: “Traditional epistemology has 
been developed almost exclusively by white males, THUS it 
represents white male interests and is racially biased.” Clearly 
this is an argument that is a non-sequitur. 
But there is more to be said; consider the following:
a. The disciplines of physics, engineering, climatology, 
bacteriology, agricultural science, and many more, were 
developed in large part by white males, but would we 
want to argue that these are racially biased and need 
to be replaced by an alternative physics, engineering, 
climatology, agricultural science, bacteriology, and so 
7.  Ibid., p. 12.
8.  Ibid., p. 13.
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on? Precisely in what ways are physics, bacteriology, and 
the rest “biased”? 
b. Does it even make sense to speak of an “alternative” 
physics or bacteriology and so forth? There can be, 
and are, alternative theories, hypotheses and so forth 
within each of these disciplines, but this is different from 
claiming that there are alternatives to physics and the 
rest.
c. The same point can be made about epistemology – no 
one believes that philosophers are all of one mind; 
disagreement is the essence of philosophical life! But the 
arguments about empiricism, rationalism, Popperian 
falsificationist epistemology, positivism, and many 
other positions are disagreements within the discipline 
of epistemology; and the notion of an alternative 
epistemology does not make sense. (What, for example, 
would be an epistemology that was an alternative to 
empiricism, rationalism and non-foundationalism? These 
three positions seem to cover all the bases…. Would an 
alternative epistemology be one that was based on a 
rejection of the justified true belief analysis of knowledge 
that I sketched earlier? Would a complete rejection of 
that analysis make any sense?)
d. Given that Scheurich and Young recognize (although 
they never discuss this in detail) that traditional 
epistemology contains within it competing positions 
based on incompatible assumptions (such as positivism, 
empiricism, rationalism, postmodernism and so 
forth), it is strange indeed that they assert that the 
dominant group has constructed the world and the 
“Real” “in its own image”. There is not one agreed-upon 
image, and some positions even assert that the “Real” 
cannot be talked about at all! Neither is it clear how 
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rationalism or empiricism, or foundationalism and non-
foundationalism, and so on, with their incompatible 
bases, further the interests of white males but do not 
further the interests of women or members of minority 
groups. (What is there about empiricism, or rationalism, 
that make them anti-feminist or anti-Black?)
Concluding remarks – What is going on here?
I have not had time to discuss several areas of scholarly 
activity that are of great epistemological interest. But they 
are worth putting on the record.
The first is the growing recognition of a theme developed 
in T.S. Kuhn’s classic work The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962) – that knowledge is not usefully 
thought of as being produced by solitary researchers, for 
such a position overlooks the crucial role played by the 
research community (Kuhn would say, the role played by a 
“paradigm”). Even a researcher who appears to be working 
alone is part of an extended intellectual community and 
makes use of communally developed resources (cognitive as 
well as physical). The point is not the rather trite one that 
much research these days is undertaken by groups led by a 
“principal investigator” (although it must be pointed out that 
interesting studies of the workings of such scientific groups 
have been done by sociologists of science); the point is rather 
that the validity of the criteria, the dependability of the 
research procedures, the decisions about what work is of high 
or low quality, the selection of the theoretical framework, 
and other epistemologically relevant matters, are decisions 
made within the community of inquirers. Catherine Elgin 
put it well when she said that knowledge is like a medieval 
tapestry – it is the work of many hands; but crucially, the 
inquirers must be functioning within a “cognitive system” 
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that is “viable” or “maximally tenable” (in other words, it has 
withstood critical scrutiny).9
The second area worthy of mention is educational research 
– which, as an enterprise that aims to establish new 
knowledge, raises issues of great importance. For example, 
the explanation of human voluntary actions must take a 
form that is different from the form by which physical events 
in the natural world are accounted for. The first involves the 
discovering of reasons, motives, beliefs, and the like; the 
second involves discovery of lawlike generalizations. Does 
this limit the applicability of scientific research methods? 
Do educational researchers need more training in the use of 
interpretive or ethnographic methods and less in statistical 
manipulation of experimental data? In what sense are (or are 
not) these interpretive or ethnographical methods “scientific? 
The final area of interest I can mention here is the policy 
area (broadly conceived) where courses of action, programs 
of instruction, interventions, and the like, are formulated 
and discussed. Empirical evidence of effectiveness of various 
alternative interventions seems clearly to be relevant, and 
this evidence must be epistemologically sound; but deciding 
upon what action to take is not determined by the so-called 
evidence alone but also must include premises incorporating 
values – and there are many issues here. Indeed, is it 
reasonable to assume that values should play a role in the 
design and execution of educational research itself, or would 
this undermine the objectivity of the research (another 
difficult epistemological issue).
But since most of my attention in this paper has focused 
upon the discomfort felt by multicultural educators and 
others – the scholars I have identified as critics of the 
dominant epistemology – I need to conclude by returning to 
9.  Catherine Elgin, Considered Judgment (1996), pp. 116-118
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them. I have argued that, by and large, they misunderstand 
the nature of epistemology as a discipline, and confuse 
it with other empirical endeavors; and their criticisms of 
epistemology are extremely poorly developed and are wide 
of the mark. Nevertheless, I must admit to feeling a great 
deal of sympathy for their underlying concerns; in my view 
these educational scholars have made the mistake of trying 
to express these concerns in the language of epistemology 
when they themselves are not trained in epistemology nor 
are the basic concerns essentially epistemological! (This is 
not to say that contemporary discipline of epistemology is 
perfect; to paraphrase an expression used by my Stanford 
colleague Helen Longino, epistemologists cannot develop 
alternative epistemologies, but they can do – and need to do 
– their epistemological work with more multicultural and 
social sensitivity.) 
The concerns harbored by the critics seem to me to be 
political, and to involve matters of social justice. Thus, issues 
of concern to minority groups of all persuasions, are not 
epistemological issues but are things such as the following: 
The socio-cultural achievements of minority groups and the 
contributions they have made to society are not adequately 
represented in the school curriculum; research on minority 
issues (health, for example, or workplace discrimination) 
have not been of high priority for receiving funding, and 
the national research agenda has been shaped by individuals 
with other priorities; group differences in learning and 
interaction styles (“ways of knowing”) have not, perhaps, 
received the attention they deserve; and so on.
This leaves unexplained why the term “epistemology” seems 
to have such high allure that colleagues from all over the 
broad domain of educational scholarship are driven to 
use it (or misuse it) when raising their legitimate but non-
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epistemological concerns. My excuse for not addressing 
this conundrum is that, after all, explaining why a word has 
enormous fascination is not a task for an epistemologist!
Section III
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The concept of intelligence, as studied in the discipline of 
psychology, has been understood in terms of competencies, 
or aptitude for competencies. In this article, the philosophical 
underpinnings of such conceptions of intelligence are 
examined. Further, the relationship between intelligence, 
and two other characteristics of the human beings- agency 
and consciousness is examined. If one were to conceive of 
intelligence as an achievement attributable to the individual, 
it is arguable that intelligence and agency are closely related 
characteristics of human beings. Further, it is seen that there 
is a prima facie case for the proposition that phenomenal 
consciousness is necessary for intelligence as we currently 
understand, to exist. This article is only exploratory, and 
these aspects will have to be studied further in detail. 
Understanding the nature of the human mind and intelligence 
should be of prime concern to the uniquely human endeavor 
of education, for their development is among its central 
aims.
1. Introduction
The concept of human intelligence has been and is still of 
interest to scholars of many fields- psychology, sociology, 
computer science and philosophy, among others. To students 
of education, it is of central concern, for it influences 
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and affects our understanding of the human mind, the 
development of which is an important aim of education. 
At a more fundamental level, as far as we know, it is 
only human beings who we educate. Hence, a deep 
understanding of the intelligent nature of human beings is 
necessary, upon which we can build our understanding of 
education 
What is intelligence? In daily as well as scholarly usage, one 
suspects we use it to mean different things- when I state that 
‘Humans are intelligent beings, while computers are not’, and 
‘Ram is more intelligent than Shyam’, am I using the word in 
the same sense? A conceptual analysis of intelligence should 
help us understand not only the term better, but also the 
assumptions and premises that underpin our understanding 
of the term.
In this paper, I seek to build a theoretical understanding 
of the concept of intelligence, from psychological and 
philosophical perspectives. The purpose is primarily 
exploratory - to compare and understand the essence of 
the concept as conceived in these disciplines, and explore if 
examining the philosophical underpinning of the concept 
can point us towards some aspects of intelligence that have 
not been accorded much significance in its psychological 
conception. More specifically, I would like to examine the 
relationship between three the following three concepts: 
intelligence, agency, and consciousness.
2. The Concept of Intelligence
2.1 Intelligence: A Psychological View
The concept of intelligence has been the topic of debate of 
scholars for a long time, giving rise to various understandings. 
Some, in despair it would seem, have even concluded that 
intelligence is what intelligence tests test. (Sternberg, R J. 
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2000). However, we now have a more nuanced psychological 
understanding of the concept.
Sternberg (2000) summarizes how the concept is understood 
differently across different cultures. For example, while 
western societies emphasized on speed of mental processing 
and depth of processing, other cultures tend to include 
different competencies, like the Chinese who include non-
verbal reasoning ability, verbal reasoning ability and rote 
memory, and some African communities that tend to include 
those skills that help facilitate and maintain harmonious 
intergroup and intragroup relationships (Sternberg, R. 
J. 2000). Sternberg and Grigorenko (2004) opine that 
intelligence considered outside its cultural context would 
only be a myth, and propound a ‘Theory of Successful 
Intelligence’, which says that “the conceptualization of 
intelligence is individually determined but always occurs 
within a socio- cultural context” and that “intelligence 
involves not only modifying oneself to suit the environment 
(adaptation), but also modifying the environment to suit 
oneself (shaping) and sometimes finding a new environment 
that is a better match to one’s skills, values or desires” 
(Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004). What they seem to be saying 
is that in accordance with’ the cultural and social setting in 
which an individual is, the parameters or the competencies 
that are needed to survive and flourish may differ, and hence 
what one may see as constituting intelligence. However, it is 
possible that these competencies that are seen as constituting 
intelligence may all be manifestation of a different, deeper 
faculty. 
Such a deeper faculty is what Charles Edward Spearman, in 
1904, conceptualized as the measure of general intelligence, 
‘g’. It may be defined as “the common element present in a 
diverse set of intellectual measures that are positively related 
to each other” (Brody N. 2000). Intelligence tests (or IQ 
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tests as they are known), measure the ‘g’ of an individual 
in comparison to others of the same age who take the test. 
Such a conception was based on observation that people who 
excel in one type of intellectual task excel in other types of 
intellectual tasks as well. (Brody N. 2000)
One notices that these conceptions of intelligence define it 
in terms of competencies that individuals display. Even if 
these competencies are manifestation of a deeper faculty of 
general intelligence, practically, it is observed and measured 
only in terms of these competencies. Hand (2007) points out 
problems with such a conception. Taking exception to the 
premise that a person found to be competent in one type of 
task will be competent in other kinds of tasks as well, he notes 
that such a conception would beg the question, ‘competent at 
what?’ Further, Hand opines that the relative ease or difficulty 
with which one acquires a competence would also indicate 
how intelligent (or not) an individual is, not just whether one 
possess the competence or not. Hence, Hand propounds that 
“the quality of mind picked out by the term ‘intelligence’ is a 
species of aptitude. Aptitudes stand in an important logical 
relation to competences but are nevertheless sharply distinct 
from them. Grasping this relation and this distinction is the 
key to understanding the logic of everyday discourse about 
intelligence. [To] have an aptitude, on the other hand, is not 
necessarily to be capable of giving good or correct performances. 
A person may have an aptitude for something without yet 
being able to do it well. Ascriptions of aptitudes are not claims 
about the possession of competences, but claims about the ease 
with which competences are acquired” (Hand M. 2007). Thus, 
such a conception would render IQ tests meaningless, for 
they only measure the current level of competency and not 
one’s ease of acquiring it (i.e. one’s aptitude). Next, Hand also 
argues that the faculty of the mind that intelligence picks out 
is the aptitude for theorizing. By theories, he refers to “mean 
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the wide variety of cognitive constructions by which human 
beings plan, govern and justify their actions and organize, 
narrate and explain their experiences” (Hand M. 2007). The 
kind of competencies that we usually describe as intelligent, 
usually intellectual, require a higher amount of theorizing 
than competencies in physical activities like sports, and 
hence the aptitude for the former would better indicate one’s 
intelligence than the aptitude for the latter.
Hand makes one other point about such a conception 
of intelligence- that it renders irrelevant the question of 
whether it is a product of nature or nurture. He argues that 
“Intelligence might be innate or fixed, but it is not innate or 
fixed by definition”. This brings us to a deeper philosophical 
question on the nature of human intelligence- if what brings 
about the development of aptitude (or even competency) is 
irrelevant to its definition, then, there could hypothetically 
be, machines that could possess intelligence. A machine, 
sufficiently advances in hardware and software, could 
possess the aptitude to theorize (or acquire intellectual 
competencies). Hence, it would seem there is no qualitative 
difference between human and computer ‘intelligence’. 
2.2 Intelligence and Agency
The above idea, that there is no qualitative difference between 
human and computer intelligence is counter intuitive and 
in opposition to our daily experience. To begin with, every 
action of a computer, as we now know it, is explained and 
determined by its hardware and software. Even if based on 
the machine’s interaction with the outside world, it were 
acquire the competence to theorize in relatively shorter time 
than humans (hence possessing an aptitude), every action 
of a computer would be fully determined by its hardware, 
software (‘nature’) and the history of interactions it has had 
(‘nurture’). Theoretically, knowing the exact details of these 
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three elements, one would be able to determine and predict 
its action in any given situation. In short, a computer does 
not possess agency. 
In our everyday life, one feels that our most actions are 
results of our conscious will, and that we are agents and 
not just the structure (biology and factors any other factor 
external to our mind, including the history of our social 
interactions) playing out. We have the conscious experience 
of being agent, causing actions. This faculty for action is what 
is referred to as agency (Fuchs S. 2007). Human actors are 
different, because there is nothing inevitable about most of 
our actions, i.e. an action is not the only way it could have 
been. Humans are conscious of the world, themselves and 
other actors. As Fuchs (2007) says, “actions are contingent, 
behavior is necessary”. Another way of putting it would be to 
say that there are no absolute causes for any of our actions, 
but only reasons that can partly explain them.
One can argue that it is in this sense of possessing agency 
that human beings are intelligent in a way digital computers 
are not. In other words, when I say that ‘Human beings are 
intelligent beings, and computers are not’, I say that human 
beings act as agents and have an experience of conscious will, 
while every action of a computer is fully caused by factors 
external to the computer itself. This raises the further question 
of whether agency would be possible without other facets of 
the human mind, like consciousness. By consciousness I refer 
to the property of the human mind by which it is ‘something 
it is like’ to have any experience (Lormand E. 1998) (to 
differentiate this from other usages of consciousness, this 
is sometimes referred to as ‘phenomenal consciousness’. I 
shall use the stand-alone term to refer to this. When I earlier 
referred to ‘conscious will’, I was referring to one’s subjective, 
phenomenal experience of willing something). Other facets 
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of our mind, like pleasure, emotions, desires etc. are all 
types of conscious experience. If one were not conscious, one 
would not have an experience of conscious will, and hence an 
experience of agency. Would one be able to possess agency, 
without having a phenomenal experience of it? Another way 
of asking the question is, without consciousness, would all 
our actions be determined and caused by our nature and 
nurture? 
Intelligence, as I understand, is that attribute of an individual 
(or entity) for which only the individual is responsible. In 
some ways, intelligence is an achievement that is attributable 
only to the individual. One cannot be held responsible for 
one’s biology or the social environment that one is exposed 
to, for as has been already noted, these are outside an 
individual’s control. It is one’s agency as it manifests in the 
structural setting of the individual that is only attributable to 
the individual. It is in the light of this understanding that I feel 
that intelligence and agency are closely related, and similar 
concepts. At this point, it is worth noting that all conscious 
human actions are agentic, even if they serve to reproduce 
the structures the individual is operating within. Hence, it 
may be meaningless to talk of one action being more agentic 
than another, or an individual not possessing agency. What 
such statements probably mean is that one’s agency serves 
to reproduce the structure, it is an agentic act nevertheless. 
That all human actions, including those habits reproducing 
structural characteristics, are agentic has been noted by 
sociologists as well, for example, Emirbayer & Mische (1998), 
who say that “... we claim that even habitual action is agentic, 
since it involves attention and effort, such activity is largely 
unreflective and taken for granted… We have settled upon the 
unfamiliar term iteration to describe such activity precisely 
because the dimension of agency to which it refers is the most 
difficult to conceive of in properly agentic terms”
192 Conceptualizing education, and related issues
In light of such an understanding of agency, one wonders if it 
would at all be meaningful to talk of X being more intelligent 
than Y, or on evaluating the intelligence of a person in terms 
of his/her success in a purposeful action. All human beings, 
on account of being agents, are intelligent. Some may use 
their intelligence to develop certain competencies and/or 
aptitudes, and hence be termed ‘smart’ or ‘competent’, but if 
they do not, they would still be intelligent in a manner that is 
qualitatively different from the faculties of non-agents. 
2.3 Consciousness and Intelligence
Phenomenal consciousness is an element that characterizes 
every moment of our waking life, and such an integral part 
of our every experience that it is often easy to ignore it. All 
human beings are conscious and intelligent. Does the latter 
presuppose the former? If it were indeed the case, this would 
be another feature that qualitatively differentiates human 
intelligence from that of a machine, unless one is able to 
produce artificial consciousness as well.
At the outset, I would like to differentiate between decisions 
and judgments. A decision is a conclusion arrived at 
following a set of discrete rules and criteria. Decision 
Sciences involves the study of tools like linear programming, 
wherein given a set of inputs and criteria, one can arrive at 
a unique output, and only that output. On the other hand, a 
judgment, while taking into consideration certain rules and 
criteria, but are not bound by them. Conclusions arrived at 
by human beings are often judgments. One might have a set 
of criteria that guide our thought process, but they do not 
bind one. One might, if one so chooses, flout one or many 
of these rules to arrive at a different judgment. A judgment 
is the result of an agent, while a decision is the output of 
an algorithm. As human beings, we arrive at judgments 
based on reflection and introspection- experiences that 
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presuppose phenomenal consciousness. However, while it is 
seen that human judgments, and hence human intelligence 
are dependent on our capacity for conscious experience, this 
still does not show that the latter is necessary for the former. 
Hence, I would like to present two short arguments that, if 
not proving conclusively, point us in the direction of such a 
relation between the two.
The first is what I call ‘The Knowledge Argument’. I would 
like to begin from the premise that any intelligent action is 
not possible without knowledge. In other words, the capacity 
for knowledge is a necessary condition for intelligence. While 
the jury is still out on what constitutes knowledge, a popular 
understanding being the tripartite analysis of knowledge as 
justified true belief, one can agree that knowledge is necessarily 
constituted by a belief. But, what is a belief? BonJour (2010) 
talks of two kinds of beliefs that could constitute knowledge, 
“occurrent belief, which is what happens when the person has 
the proposition explicitly in mind and accepts or assents to 
it; and dispositional belief, where the person does not have 
the proposition explicitly in mind, but is disposed to accept 
or assent to it, that is, would accept or assent to it if the issue 
were raised” (BonJour L. 2010). Further, he adds that with 
regard to dispositional beliefs, “it should be specified instead 
as the dispositional state in which (a) one has previously 
explicitly considered and consciously accepted or assented to 
the proposition in question, and (b) as a direct result of this 
prior acceptance or assent, would accept or assent to it again 
if the question were explicitly raised” (BonJour L, 2010). In 
occurent beliefs, it is clear that any belief is ontologically a 
conscious state of the mind. In the case of a dispositional 
belief, while one may not consciously hold the proposition in 
one’s mind, one should have held it consciously in the past. 
Hence, to hold a belief is to have a phenomenal experience 
of believing in a proposition, not merely being disposed to 
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assenting to the proposition when asked. It would hence seem 
that if knowledge were constituted by beliefs, knowledge, as 
we currently understand it would not be possible without 
phenomenal consciousness. If knowledge were necessary 
for intelligence, it would in turn imply that consciousness is 
necessary for intelligence as well.
The second argument derives from neurobiological research 
on the role of emotions and feelings in our ability to reason. 
Damasio A R (1995) in his book ‘Descartes’ Error’, argues 
against the popular notion that reasoning, in its purest 
form ought to be unaffected by emotions and feelings. In his 
study of individuals whose specific section of the brain had 
been damaged, Damasio found that the damage had two-
pronged impact- first, it left the patients with flat emotions 
and feelings, and second, it had a debilitating affect on the 
ability of the patients to reason, make judgments and plan 
for the future. Talking about one of the patients, Damasio 
(1995) recounts, “also had a strong suspicion that the defect 
in emotion and feeling was not an innocent bystander next 
to the defect in social behavior. Troubled emotions probably 
contributed to the problem. I began to think that the cold-
bloodedness of Elliot’s reasoning prevented him from assigning 
different values to different options, and made his decision-
making landscape hopelessly flat”. It may seem like the ability 
for emotions and reason are only correlated, both resulting 
from a more fundamental cause, implying that emotions by 
themselves are not necessary for an individual to be able to 
reason. However, Damasio (1995) further argues, “Emotion 
and feeling, along with the covert physiological machinery 
underlying them, assist us with the daunting task of predicting 
an uncertain future and planning our actions accordingly”. 
In other words, Damasio considers emotions and feelings 
necessary for the human ability to reason.
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Here again, if one were to assume that the ability to reason 
and make judgments were a necessary manifestation of 
intelligence, it would seem that emotions and feelings are 
necessary for intelligence. When Damasio talks of feelings, 
he refers to the phenomenal experience that accompanies 
emotions. Hence, it would seem that if one were to accept 
Damasio’s argument, phenomenal consciousness is a 
necessary condition for intelligence. 
Both the above arguments for the necessity of consciousness 
for intelligence are not meant to be conclusive. Rather, they 
only seek to highlight an important aspect that has not been 
accorded much importance in the psychological conception 
of intelligence. 
Conclusion
It is seen that psychology has sought to understand the 
concept of intelligence either in terms of competencies, or 
aptitude for competencies. The genealogy of either of these 
two, in terms of structure and agency has not been accorded 
much significance. However, in light of an understanding 
that it is our agency that is a key aspect of the qualitative 
difference between the intelligence of human beings and 
computers, a further closer examination of the relationship 
between intelligence and agency would be required. This 
would be especially relevant if one were to conceptualize 
intelligence as an achievement wholly attributable to the 
individual, not unlike moral responsibility. Further, the 
psychological discourse on intelligence that is based on 
competencies and/or aptitude does not consider that key 
characteristic of the human mind, consciousness. It is seen 
that both the disciplines of epistemology and neurobiology 
both provide us with prima facie reasons to believe that 
if our conception of intelligence considers the ability to 
possess knowledge, and to make reasoned judgments to be 
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its necessary manifestations, one will also have to concede 
that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for 
intelligence to exists in an entity. Hence, along with agency, 
the conscious nature of the human mind would have to be 
further examined closely to understand the nature of the 
entity that we seek to develop in this unique endeavor called 
education.
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Introduction
This paper will examine the view that an increase in 
e-learning will result in a corrosion of attention across 
education. Popular ambivalence and scepticism around the 
distribution of e-learning could offer an important corrective 
to the clamour for the new. But such ambivalence should not 
be uncritical of its own prejudices and occlusions. Indeed 
critical voices will only have traction if they avoid polemics. 
Consequently, I will argue for a mediation between techno-
pessimists and techno-optimists by drawing on philosophers 
who speak ambivalently about the place of technology in 
society and education, particularly that of Bernard Stiegler.
The Real vs. the Virtual
In one sense, the virtual university has existed far longer than 
the Internet. The Open University in the UK was established 
in 1965 and has served a wide group of learners ever since. 
The development of distance learning, as it is commonly 
called, has not replaced the bricks and mortar institution, 
sitting alongside ‘traditional’ campus-based institutions. 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) among the most 
recent iterations of online learning, are extensions of the 
principles of ‘night school’ pioneered by institutions like 
199Education, attention and technology
the Open University. Similarly, it is unlikely that MOOCs 
will supplant the existence of universities. Indeed within 
this variegated market, some universities make explicit 
reference to their ‘traditional’ structures as essential to their 
educational mission:
We seek to enhance a real not a virtual community where 
staff and students are engaged; where offices are turned 
into studies; and the library and other learning spaces 
turned into hubs of active learning. We are not a university 
where academic staff turn up only to deliver lectures 
or to perform timetabled duties; or where educational 
technology substitutes for actual and authentic personal 
engagement.1 
In a world where more and more higher education 
institutions are seeking opportunities to offer courses to a 
global market of ‘online learners’ this commitment to the 
physical habitat of education might seem somewhat obsolete 
or anachronistic. Yet many educators speak for the uncanny 
quality of physical presence; that being physically face to face 
with students has a singular, irreducible pedagogical power. 
This raises a question: is the interest in online education 
really pedagogical? I would argue that the impetus to 
develop online education is founded, first and foremost, on 
economic rather than pedagogic concerns, so my general 
orientation towards online education is critical. There are, 
no doubt, some intrinsic benefits to online education, to 
do with gaining confidence, overcoming social or practical 
restrictions, and the massive scalability of online learning. 
But where the resources of time and money are unrestricted, 
isn’t the educational encounter best in person? The notion 
that time and money could be unrestricted is clearly utopian, 
and only disengaged speculations about some distant future 
world could seriously entertain such a scenario. And so 
perhaps we ought to accept that the prime interest of the 
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online education industry is, and needs to be, the efficiencies 
that can be harnessed through the reconfiguring, if not 
full overcoming, of space and time. The concerns about 
online education expressed here do not justify a wholesale 
rejection of online life. So despite this critical orientation, I 
want to explore some of the ways in which technologies and 
virtual worlds occupy a grey area in educational theory and 
practice. An ambiguity arises when we see that technologies 
are neither simply the neutral means to ends determined by 
human beings, nor, in opposition to this, artificial intrusions 
upon a pure state of nature.
Online Education and E-learning
Online education is a complex and multi-faceted 
phenomenon and can hardly be defined in straightforward 
terms. We might first wonder whether online education is 
equivalent to online learning or e-learning, terms which 
Wikipedia presents as synonymous.2 This is an important 
question for philosophers of education (and educationalists 
generally) because education as a substantive and multi-
faceted phenomenon can be distinguished from learning 
in important ways, as Gert Biesta has shown in his critical 
analysis of the “learnification of education.”3 For Biesta the 
shift in our language from education to learning is related 
to the fact that we have lost sight of questions of educational 
purpose and values:4 
…the point of education is never that children or students 
learn, but that they learn something, that they learn this 
for particular purposes, and that they learn this from 
someone. The problem with the language of learning and 
with the wider ‘learnification’ of educational discourse is 
that it makes it far more difficult, if not impossible, to ask 
the crucial educational questions about content, purpose 
and relationships.5
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The present celebration of learning then, in which authority 
is distributed and knowledge is constructed, is in danger of 
losing the sight of the ontology of education: the priority of the 
thing being learnt. Discussions of e-learning might similarly 
focus attention on the medium of learning than the object of 
learning itself. Nevertheless, e-learning does have some of the 
characteristics that Biesta identifies with the shift towards the 
language of learning. E-learning is more consumer-driven 
in the sense that it tries more than ever before to adapt to 
the needs and context of learners. This can be observed in 
the spatio-temporal flexibility of online education: it can 
take place synchronously (in ‘real time’) or asynchronously 
(whenever suits the learner, i.e., self-paced), though the 
asynchronous component is more characteristic of learning 
online where learners engage in email, blogs, forums, wikis, 
audio, video etc. This flexibility can facilitate independence 
of mind and self-directed attitudes towards education 
but more negatively, plays into the ‘student-as-consumer’ 
attitude. Theorists like Sian Bayne and Norm Friesen have 
recognised that Biesta’s critique of learnification could have 
particular relevance for technology-enhanced learning.6 
Still, it could be argued that much of the asynchronous 
nature of e-learning can be observed in informal learning 
with or without the ‘e’, for example, the practice of reading, 
although linear, is characteristically asynchronous, self-
paced and flexible. Many of our conventional learning 
practices can’t be distinguished from e-learning in 
categorical terms. Rather like the philosophers of technology 
seeking a categorical definition of ‘modern technology’ 
(to meaningfully distinguish the modern IPad from early 
forms of wax tablet) our efforts towards categorisation of 
e-learning are frustrated. But this does not mean that there 
are no meaningful distinctions to be made here. Tendencies 
become pronounced, and practices entrenched. The drift to 
e-learning is, then, cumulative and evolutionary despite the 
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great pace of change that some philosophers of technology 
attest to.7 E-learning also tends to reinforce individualism, 
often replacing classroom experiences with structured 
activities that can be tutor led but are typically self-directed, 
emphasising learning as a process about (and only about) the 
learner who acquires knowledge, understanding, or skills. 
Despite his critical analysis of the shift to a culture of learning, 
Biesta also acknowledges that these features of learning (and 
by implication e-learning) have some emancipatory potential. 
The shift reflects deeper historical currents that see a less 
centralised and less authoritarian view of education in which 
the student is understood as co-constructor of their own 
understanding of the world. However, Biesta argues that the 
language of ‘learning’ does not just reflect a more democratic 
or inclusive form of pedagogy in which the learner is placed 
centre-stage. On the contrary, the learnification culture is 
corrosive of democratic and inclusive ways of being because 
it reduces democratic processes to the aggregation of 
individual desires.8 To service aggregated desires does not 
bring into question the ground and context of those desires. 
Moreover, the learning culture does not foster reflection 
upon the purposes of education, but rather takes for granted 
that purposes basically equate to what individuals want them 
to be: in other words they are regarded as preferences. Of 
course this is thoroughly individualistic but Biesta is hinting 
here at a more fundamental problem: that education properly 
understood, points to a shared cultural enterprise which 
is lost in the culture of learnification. This point is really 
calling for a radical reorientation of our hollowed out culture 
of learning since it reintroduces ontology into education: 
that education has an orientation to something real and that 
individual desires must, in some sense, be in dialogue with 
that reality: both informing it and being informed by it. 
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An important question emerges from this: does education 
online reinforce and extend this transformation of education 
into learning? Or does it limit and reorganise our relationship 
to the purposes of education? Are we at liberty to define our 
own purposes as consumers? One answer implied in the 
foregoing discussion would be to say that online education 
contributes to a culture of individualised and consumerist 
learning that suppresses the examination of the purposes 
of education: online learning reinforces the impression that 
students are able to select a good product determined in 
advance. I believe there is some credibility to this analysis, 
but would not want to leave it there since it does not treat 
the nature of technology and being online in sufficiently 
ambivalent terms and might lead us to a sentimental and 
unrealistic rejection of our technological being. In other 
words, there needs to be a way in which online education can 
express and shape reflection on the purposes of education 
in a substantive and meaningful way, without polarising the 
virtual and the physical.
I now turn to the philosopher Bernard Stiegler who 
understands digital technology and modern media as 
pharmacological: both poison and cure. Stiegler rejects the 
assumption that the human could exist prior to the technical, 
arguing that the evolution of human reflective awareness 
was concurrent with what he calls ‘technics’. Indeed for 
Stiegler there is no human being without technics.9 Despite 
this, he is very critical of the impact of modern technology 
and media on education and the youth in particular.10 Yet 
Stiegler’s analysis is interestingly ambivalent, coming out 
of a reading of critical theories of technology (especially 
Heidegger), but radically departing from them by his view 
that technics is coeval with hominization. I will develop an 
account of his thinking on memory and attention that will 
bring us to examine some of the ideas of particular relevance 
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to education. The connection here is that writing, being 
both supportive and corrosive of memory, is also formative 
of attention. Moreover, as Jan Masschelein has argued,11 
literate culture goes hand in hand with the development of 
education, and the technologies that support pedagogy. In 
other words, the emergence of literate culture had a decisive 
influence on the formation and development of the modern 
concept of education and pedagogy and so it is crucial to 
explore the ways in which memory is tied to technologies 
writing as attention-forming activities.
Tertiary memory in education
Memory is the foundation of culture. The ancient Greeks 
mythologised this insight with the story of the goddess 
Mnemosyne, daughter of Gaia and Uranus, and mother, 
through union with Zeus, of the nine muses. Through 
Mnemosyne (memory), poetry, and the arts more generally, 
are made present. Without memory, then, culture could not 
exist. As Hannah Arendt put it, cultural understanding is 
gathered, shared, and transmitted through education.12 For 
Stiegler, the shared mnemonic heritage that is culture is passed 
on through a process of what he calls “exteriorisation.”13 
Exteriorisations rely upon forms of prosthesis which might 
take prehistoric forms such as flint tools and wax tablets, or 
can appear in the more modern guises of books, magazines 
or forms of digital media and databases. Such prostheses are 
forms of tertiary memory, since they are distinct from the 
primary and secondary forms, namely, genetic inheritance 
and individual awareness.
In tertiary memory, then, experience can be liberated from 
genetic determinism (primary memory) or individual loss 
(secondary memory) enabling humanity to pass on cultural 
inheritance. In prehistoric times cultural transmission would 
have been slow and fitful. Particularly from the 18th and 
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19th centuries this transmission is driven and appropriated 
by a more industrious and methodical spirit. Stiegler shows 
how the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, with 
the perception of science as fundamentally progressive, 
inspired a new sense of the significance of history and the 
passage of time.14 The realisation of culture through memory 
is only possible through the development of technology as 
the material supports of tertiary memory. The ‘technics’ 
(aka technologies) that support tertiary memory constitute 
an awareness of time that entails the possibility of retention 
(looking backwards) and protension (looking forwards). In 
other words, the stitching together of temporality (of past 
and future) and the emergence of technics are one and the 
same event. Here Stiegler is drawing together his interest 
in the phenomenology of temporality that preoccupied so 
much of Heidegger’s thought, with a view that technics form 
that awareness of temporality: in other words, technology is 
a key aspect of hominization, an idea that Heidegger would 
certainly reject. Indeed for Stiegler, the history of philosophy 
(not just Heidegger) has suppressed the recognition of role of 
technics in the process hominization. 
The pharmakology of technology
History, as the story of culture, is generally defined by its 
constitution through one particular technology: writing. 
Where written accounts exist we have entered ‘history’. But 
this birth of history is marked by ambiguity, an undecidable 
that Derrida calls the pharmakon of writing.15 For Derrida 
the dual (and undecidable) nature of the pharmakon 
undercuts the binary logic that structures Western thought: 
it is not a matter of deciding whether writing reveals or 
conceals because it does both simultaneously. But doesn’t 
this binary logic structure contemporary discussions about 
whether technology is an educational force good or a bad 
influence on the youth? We might want to avoid talking about 
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‘technology’ in a general and abstracted sense, a sense that is 
sometimes called ‘essentialist’, by arguing that each technical 
device has some educational potential and some dangers. For 
Derrida, though, this response would point to complexity 
but not ‘undecidability’ – an intrinsic and irreducible quality 
of ambiguity. Furthermore, I would argue that it is quite 
clear that technologies have something undecidable about 
them: technology is both what puts power in our hands 
while simultaneously threatening to erode that power by 
making us blind to the scope and significance of our own 
actions. As Günther Anders, speaking of atomic energy put 
it, “As engineers, at least as engineers of nuclear weapons, 
we have become omnipotent—an expression that is little 
more than a metaphor. But as intellectual beings we do not 
measure up to this omnipotence of ours…by way of our 
technology…we can no longer conceive what we can produce 
and do.”16 
Technology both makes us smarter and more stupid; engaged 
and disengaged, more potent and more powerless. Online 
environments feel much the same: they simultaneously 
present the world and hide it. Drawing on Heidegger’s 
critique of technology, Albert Borgmann makes the point 
that the characteristic feature of technology – which he says 
is its ability to make things available to us in unprecedented 
ways – is marked by an erosion of the significance of things. 
In other words, the more things are made available to us, 
the less significance things have for us. The more film and 
music becomes ‘on demand’, for example, the less committed 
my listening and viewing becomes. We see with MOOC’s 
for example, the extraordinarily enthusiastic take up does 
not translate in quite as extraordinary completion rates.17 
Borgmann defines technological availability as what is 
rendered “instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe, and easy.”18 
There are problems with this definition: for example, the 
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digital divide between those who do and do not have access 
to digital technologies raises questions about ubiquity; the 
use of technology in abuse or issues of online privacy make 
‘safety’ a questionable feature of availability. Despite these 
problems the definition does provide some insight into the 
way in which the world is made more available through 
digital devices. This definition of technical availability 
might well be applied to online environments and extended 
to online learning specifically (at least where they work 
well). But does this availability carry with it an uncanny 
disengagement with the substance of learning, as Borgmann 
might suggest? This is a question that we need to at least be 
able to ask. Do we not often mistake the content or process 
of education for education itself? In a similar sense, doesn’t 
online education presuppose an educational model as little 
more than the transmission of knowledge, Freire’s banking 
model? Is online learning not fundamentally reductive? Isn’t 
education irreducibly founded on the contact and relation 
between teacher and student a relation that cannot fully 
exist in an online world? It might be tempting to argue 
this, but I want to resist the temptation to reintroduce the 
binary that assumes online means somehow existentially 
disconnected, in contrast to a norm that sees real education 
as entailing an unmediated presence of the other. It seems to 
rest upon the norm of a pre-technical human that has never 
existed. Nevertheless, I wish to take seriously the issue that 
Borgmann raises by acknowledging that there is both an 
uncanny disengagement in online environments, but equally 
a new profound possibility.
It would be convenient to reject technology as King Thamus 
rejected the offer of writing in order to remain in a natural 
state of immediacy with nature where our faculties can be 
employed in a fully human way.19 Even if we wanted to make 
such a rejection, we could not do so if technology is part of 
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who we are. As Stiegler argues, the history of technogenesis 
is the history of anthropogenesis. From this point of view, 
the problem of how to ‘humanise’ online education might 
seem predicated on a false assumption, namely that online is 
basically inhuman; unreal; absent; disconnected; disengaged. 
But the recognition that technology is central to human 
identity does not mean we uncritically embrace all that 
we call technology as the affirmation of human creativity. 
Technology – as the invention of writing or the splitting of 
the atom – is the pharmakon. 
Critical consciousness
In his recent work, Stiegler has shifted his emphasis from 
technics to the related question of attention.20 There is a 
clear connection to memory here since for Stielger the ways 
in which memories are retained through exteriorisation 
have an impact upon the kind of attention that characterises 
human being. In other words, the development of attention 
(which might itself be the essential component of our being-
in-the-world) is related to the development of technologies. 
The rise of new media technologies and the changing ways 
in which learners engage in multiple streams of attention 
(for example, listening, reading, and texting simultaneously) 
belong together. The question then is how is attention being 
shaped by the new media technologies? Is attention being 
augmented to evolve into new forms, or is attention a fixed 
faculty that must find strategies to cope with the changing 
environment? In some respects Stiegler’s analysis is a rather 
hackneyed, neo-Frankfurtian attack on the dangers of a 
manipulative culture industry determined to commodify, 
colonise, and corrode the attention of the youth. New media 
technologies are increasingly effective at manipulating 
attention and so the emergence of the new science of 
attention economics is both inevitable and alarming.21 With 
the proliferation of each form of new media – newspapers, 
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pulp paperbacks, movies, television, the Internet and social 
media – emerges new worries about the creation of the 
next generation of ‘I-don’t-give-a-damners.’ In this vein, 
Stiegler draws on Katherine Hayles’ view that our media-
rich environment is eroding our capacity for deep attention, 
especially in the youth. Deep attention is here being replaced 
by what Hayles calls hyper attention: “Hyper attention is 
characterized by switching focus rapidly among different 
tasks, preferring multiple information streams, seeking 
a high level of stimulation, and having a low tolerance for 
boredom.”22 Departing from Hayles’ more even-handed 
interpretation of the shift from deep to hyper attention, 
Stiegler worries that this shift corresponds with a wider 
infantilisation of culture since critical maturity becomes 
increasingly difficult in an age of hyper attention.23 Stiegler 
argues that the very distinction between adults and the 
youth is becoming unhelpfully confused whereby the critical 
maturity of adulthood is stunted or even entirely arrested. 
Stiegler is also keen to acknowledge the insights from brain 
imaging which establish the shifting scene of the brain by 
exploring synaptogenesis.24 This is alarming Stiegler since 
not only are we weakening our attentional capacity, but, 
though substantial neurological change, we are also in 
danger of irretrievably losing our intellectual maturity. 
Pointing to the contradictions at the centre of Stiegler’s 
project here, Richard Iveson says, “Proclaiming himself 
thus a prophet of and from potentially the last generation of 
mature adults, Stiegler seeks to hastily recall us to rational 
critique before the new media has its way and irretrievably 
restructures the connections which constitute intelligence 
so as to render such constitution impossible.”25 For Stiegler 
the effect of new media is, in a nutshell, the destruction 
of that hard-won product of Kant’s Aufklarung, critical 
consciousness. 
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What is somewhat ironic in Stiegler’s account of the erosion 
of our critical consciousness is that it acknowledges the 
pharmacological nature of technological development, but 
then appears to rely on a conventional, even banal, critique 
of modern technology and new media as the manipulation 
and erosion of attention and critical consciousness. This is 
important and illustrates some deeply held assumptions 
about attention itself, for example, that attention exists before 
culture engages it. 
Common among psychologists is the view that attention is 
akin to a spotlight that the subject can point towards objects. 
This view of attention suggests that the spotlight itself does 
not alter what it points towards but only illuminates it - it 
is simply a faculty or tool. There are many problems with 
this view of attention as a neutral tool. For one, it disregards 
the historical constitution of attention, as if attention exists 
as an Archimedean point and that when we attend, we 
can see the world afresh, seeming to invite a form of naïve 
realism.26 It also tends to ignore how attention is related to 
and affected by its object. If we consider with Stiegler that 
attention is affected by its object,27 then the ways in which 
different media form and shape attention become significant. 
The question of online learning can then be seen in terms of 
the ways in which technologies form attention rather than 
supposing that attention is a fixed and natural faculty that 
is either enhanced or diminished by our ever-developing 
technological milieu. We do not, then, need to begin our 
debate with questions like ‘how do we stop the Internet from 
destroying our attention span?’ Susan Greenfield, professor 
of pharmacology at Oxford University has recently raised 
concerns (not dissimilar to Stiegler) about the dangers of 
the growth in online living for our changing intellectual 
and attentional capacities. She says: “Whilst of course it 
[Internet use] doesn’t threaten the existence of the planet 
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like climate change, I think the quality of our existence 
is threatened – and the kind of people we might be in the 
future.”28 Greenfield here is expressing a fairly conventional 
concern about the erosion of deep attention that Hayles 
says is needed for complex problem solving and sustained 
understanding. In the educational world in particular, deep 
attention is regarded as normative while hyper attention, 
useful though it may be in certain commercial contexts from 
air traffic control to currency trading, is connected to the 
loss of some essential aspect of human identity. But Hayles 
suggests that the two forms of attention can be brought 
together: “media stimulation, if structured appropriately, 
may actually contribute to a synergistic combination of hyper 
and deep attention, a finding with suggestive implications 
for pedagogy.”29 Stiegler on the other hand, is less optimistic 
about such a synergy. As we move from what Stiegler 
characterises as the ‘republic of letters’ to an age of ‘numeric 
programming’ (a contrast that evokes the binary logic that 
cannot abide the undecidability of the pharmakon), we must, 
I think, be extremely alert to the dangers that Hayles, Stielger 
and others draw attention to. We can be sympathetic to 
Stiegler’s concerns about the threat to critical consciousness 
without seeing life online as heralding the destruction of 
the literate world. There is, furthermore, a strongly political 
dimension to Stiegler’s concerns. Indeed the formation of 
attention is never isolated but only takes place in dialogue 
with the social, a process that Stiegler calls individuation. 
This individuation can be seen in the formation of attention, 
but also in the formation of desire. However, Stiegler is 
concerned that modern media not only replace deep attention 
with hyper attention, but desire, which should shape and 
be shaped in dialogue with the community (at least in the 
sense of a deliberative democratic process), is decomposed 
to constituent and individualised drives.30 Those drives 
become the individual preferences of the consumer that in 
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some conceptions or democracy, are a given commitment 
to be mediated by a politics of representation. Such drives 
are ‘given’: they are personal and inviolable. These consumer 
drives are to be met by a producer, in this case, the modern 
private education institution. We can see here a connection 
with Biesta’s analysis of the consumerist attitude to learning 
in which the individual preferences are also inviolable, 
representing the start and end of the examination of purposes 
in education.
Overcoming Time and Space
When online vast educational resources are available to 
the student in a de-distanced availability. I have already 
suggested that Borgmann would understand this availability 
as an erosion of significance. But can we clarify the nature 
of what is lost? If e-learning overcomes spatio-temporal 
situatedness, does it also undo some essential qualitative 
dimension of spatio-temporality? Perhaps philosophy of 
religion can help us here. Mircea Eliade was one of the first 
philosophers of religion to develop a strongly comparative 
religious understanding that took seriously correspondences 
between traditions and religions without reduction or 
parochialism. Eliade distinguished between sacred and 
profane with particular reference to the nature of time and 
space.31 For Eliade, the significance of human life can be 
found through the structuring and delineating of space and 
time. Eliade speaks of the manifestation of the sacred as a 
hierophany an event in which space and time are consecrated 
by a transcendent interruption in the mundane.32 The 
capacity for hierophany (of a God who is Wholly Other) 
exists where space and time are consecrated through the 
paradigmatic rituals of religious traditions. Rituals allow 
for the world to be formed, from chaos to cosmos, as they 
bind us to certain times and places which are ordered and 
sanctified. From the Sabbath to the Mass, specific rituals 
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allow for a vertical interruption of the profane. In Eliade’s 
view, myths and rituals provide structure and orientation to 
the world that would inhibit and disrupt the total availability 
of life online. Such inhibition and disruption of the normal 
patterns are where significance itself comes from since 
these interruptions are characterised by their ‘otherness’: 
they cannot be circumscribed within the projections of the 
subject. For example, attending the cathedral at evensong, 
oriented to the alter hearing the choristers that, theoretically, 
could be streamed direct to your mobile phone, opens a space 
for contingency: a place of encounter and otherness that is 
difficult, if not impossible to achieve online. But contingency 
does not happen by chance. It must be structured by the ritual 
encounter. In contrast to this affirmation of contingency, 
life online tends to be circumscribed by the determinations 
of the controlling subject (or the programme that runs on 
the device). This could have relevance to online education 
since it argues for the irreducible significance of the physical 
encounter. This encounter is significant because the subject 
must relinquish control. Eliade’s ideas have been helpfully 
reworked by Jonathan Z Smith. 
Smith takes up but also departs from Eliade where he says 
“Ritual is, first and foremost, a mode of paying attention. It is 
a process of marking interest… It is this characteristic, as well, 
that explains the role of place as a fundamental component of 
ritual: place directs attention.”33 In brief, Smith’s innovation 
of Eliade is the priority he gives to attention as the key 
component of presence and significance. Attention is the 
core dimension of ritual, an attention that for Eliade entailed 
the specificity of sanctified time and space. For Eliade the 
singular times and places are ‘given’ (whether from God, or 
tradition) and so are not easily translated into the virtual. 
For Smith, on the other hand, space is sanctified by virtue of 
the act of attention and could therefore take place only in the 
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mind and conceivably online. This is conceivable because the 
real goal of the disruptive encounter with the other must be 
the attention to the other. The significance of being disrupted 
is to see again with attention so that the subjective projections 
are put to one side. 
Nevertheless, one might find the account of the formation 
of attention through technology in Stiegler’s analysis to be 
incompatible with this view of attention opening the subject 
up to contingency. I do not think these conceptions of 
attention need to be opposed since technologies themselves 
have a contingent dimension: they are not only what they are 
intended to be.
Conclusion
The path we have taken has sketched out some of the relations 
between technology, time, attention and life online. Smith’s 
development of Eliade has given us a way of redirecting our 
attention from the physical to the attentional, thus avoiding 
a crude opposition between the physical and virtual. For 
Stiegler attention and temporality are fundamentally related 
since the formation of attention is coeval with tertiary 
retentions available to us through technological innovations 
and it is those tertiary retentions that constitute our 
experience of temporality. Thus authentic temporality and 
life online are not, in principle, mutually exclusive, though 
Stiegler does explore the risks to our critical attention of 
modern digital media. Elsewhere Stiegler has been keen to 
show the ‘virtual’ to be simply a new form of an ongoing 
process of hominisation:
Rather than talking about ‘virtual space’ one would have 
to refer to a new, digital, retentional system: a system 
which affects institutions of space and time, and which 
is no more and no less virtual than any other form of 
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tertiary retention equally involving space and time, 
calendarity and cardinality.34 
In principle then, online life is not fundamentally different 
from other forms of tertiary retention.
We also considered Biesta’s concerns about the culture of 
learnification and asked whether online education would 
reinforce and extend the pervasive and corrosive language 
of learning. I argued that online education does reinforce 
some aspects of learnification, but suggested that it does 
not need to. That is why I paired a discussion of Biesta with 
an ambivalent reading of technology and modern media. It 
is within the disruptive draft of this ambivalence, that the 
questions of significance and purpose are more likely to have 
traction and could, therefore, resist learnification.
The times and places of face-to-face education can work to 
structure time and space in ways that are disruptive. Those 
who want to be educated should not assume that education 
can come to them, anytime, anyplace, anywhere. Like 
good parenting, the role of structuring space and time, of 
drawing lines and limits to when and where good education 
takes place, is an important part of the job of educational 
institutions. It is the role of the institution to offer the 
structure and support that is not infinitely flexible or able to 
meet the whimsical preferences of the student-as-consumer. 
This is pharmacological insofar as it both structures and 
inhibits us. The disruptive nature of specific times and 
places can enable attention that is significant. But, along with 
Smith and Stiegler, I suggest that it is not the specificity of 
the place or time that is the point. It is the power to disrupt: 
to bring about a fresh attention. And if Biesta is right that 
modern educational theory neglects reflection on the 
purposes of education, then this disruptive moment and the 
subsequent attention it provokes, might offer a challenge to 
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the view of education as conforming to the subjective will 
of the student as consumer. We miss the significance of this 
disruptive moment since the technological age encourages a 
focus on ends rather than means, of destinations rather than 
journeys.
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Theorising, Practising and Practising theorizing
This paper recurrently refers to a distinction between 
theorising and practising both implicitly and explicitly; so 
the worry that an artificial dichotomy between theory and 
practice is being created or that the distinction between 
them is exaggerated, looms large throughout the paper. 
Practices are necessarily influenced and even founded upon 
theories that are rendered invisible in the blinding light of 
visible behaviours and actions that practices manifest as. 
Employing theory and practice, theorising and practising, 
theorists and practitioners, as analytical categories and 
considering them distinct allows for a richer analysis of 
the intricacies of teaching-learning situations.
Reflective practice is valuable because reflection allows for 
clarification of concepts and principles associated with 
practice, lends rich meaning to practices. An act of reflection 
often leads to a reconsideration of theories and practices, 
in the form of acceptance, rejection of a new possibility or 
reaffirmation or modification of beliefs and its associated 
practices. Practitioners reflect in the throes of action 
(practical reasoning) and in quiet moments removed from 
the arena of practice (theoretical reasoning). Both forms 
of reasoning have normative aspects - practical reasoning 
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aims to regulate action, whereas theoretical reasoning aims 
to regulate beliefs. Practical reasoning ought to help judge 
specific situations, apply principles and theories to action 
and is usually driven by pre-formed beliefs and theories. 
Theoretical reasoning ought to allow an examination and 
either rejection, modification, realignment, reaffirmation or 
a richer understanding of our attitude towards a belief and 
hence associated practices.1
Educational practitioners engage in different kinds of 
activities - teaching, developing curriculum and formulating 
policies. These practices are theory-laden, so a learner who 
aspires to be a practitioner in education, ought to theorize, 
examine her beliefs and anticipate and examine practices 
that the beliefs could influence. An important objective 
of Philosophy of Education (PoE) is to learn theoretical 
reasoning and critically examine educational theories that 
inform practice. Learning to philosophize helps one become 
aware of one’s theoretical suppositions and thus informs 
and enriches practice. While theorising, practitioners then 
ought to maintain an attitude that allows for an examination 
of their beliefs. I argue that an attitude of scepticism and 
experiencing a sceptical moment is a necessary condition 
for learning theoretical reasoning in a way that it informs 
educational practice. This ought to inform teaching and 
learning philosophy of education.
This paper first establishes specific purposes of learning to 
philosophize and its value for practitioners of education. 
1. “It would thus be more accurate to characterize the issue of both 
theoretical and practical reason as attitudes; the difference is that 
theoretical reasoning leads to modifications of our beliefs, whereas 
practical reasoning leads to modifications of our intentions (Harman 
1986, Bratman 1987)” (Wallace Wallace, R. Jay, “Practical Reason”, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/
practical-reason/>2
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Subsequently, dissatisfaction with our beliefs is identified 
as the source of the impulse to examine and possible revise 
or reaffirm our beliefs. Using Kant’s definition of practice, 
learning is identified as a practice and in the process three 
normative aspects of learning are identified – the end of 
learning, the procedure of learning and a necessary attitude 
towards learning. Subsequently I argue that these normative 
demands lead to the conclusion that experiencing a sceptical 
moment, defined as suspension of judgement, is a necessary 
condition for learning philosophy of education. 
This allows for a richer understanding of what ought not to 
be (and hence what ought to be) a learner’s attitude when 
learning philosophy of education, which in turn informs 
pedagogy of philosophy of education.
Philosophy (of education)
Practitioners of education engage with theory at various levels. 
Since practices are theory-laden a first order engagement with 
theory occurs in educational practice. Practices are concrete 
instances of theories, in that they contain theories. For 
example, a mathematics teacher teaching teach arithmetic 
through concrete instances of the use of arithmetic operators 
in real life (distributing 10 marbles among 5 children, buying 
5 kilograms of rice that costs Rs.50/- per kg) presumes the 
theory that it is possible or easy for children to construct 
abstractions like numbers and arithmetic operators through 
concrete instances when they are required to employ them. 
A second order engagement with theory is when one is 
constructing theory (or receiving an already constructed 
theory) and employing judgement on when and how to 
employ it in practice. Theories either function as content 
of education (mathematics, history or any other discipline) 
or inform the practice of education (theories of learning 
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coming from developmental psychology that inform the 
practice of teaching, prescriptive theories of education like 
Gandhi or Tagore or Dewey’s theories of education). This 
level of engagement involves using theories and employing 
judgement on whether to use them and if so how to use 
them in particular situations. This act of judgement has it’s 
source in practical situations when a practitioner has to deal 
with specific problems. For example, when a child is not as 
responsive as others to a pedagogical approach, the teacher 
would have to consider her psychological state, the source of 
this psychological state, her social context and then ascertain 
how she could elicit a response from the child, and determine 
an alternative teaching method.
Philosophising involves reflection and critical examination 
of both theories and of practices and includes the judgement 
if and how a theory ought to be implemented in practice. In 
that sense Philosophy of Education is a “higher order activity 
that is parasitic on theory and practice” (Moore, 1982, p. 3). 
This includes uncovering basic assumptions of theories, 
examining them for justification, assessing coherence and 
logical consistency in propositions that form a theory, 
critiquing concepts and establishing their limits, reasoning 
and establishing relationships between claims and arriving 
at sound theories that can inform practice. 
When we do philosophize about education, we sometimes 
critically examine foundations of different disciplines, the 
methods, standards and requirements employed by the 
disciplines (we do Philosophy of Sociology, Philosophy of 
Science, Philosophy of History etc.). Philosophy of Education 
deals with the examination of requirements, standards and 
tools of reflection and the appropriateness and validity 
of methods, tools and criteria for assessment of claims in 
educational theories and practice.
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Philosophy of education for a practitioner
Philosophizing in this sense, happens outside the immediate 
realm of practice. This theorizing demands a particular 
kind of reflection from a practitioner. Practitioners enter 
the realm of philosophy of education with an obligation 
to respond to a wide range of possible expectations from 
practice – pedagogical strategies that ensure learning, 
educational outcomes of students, management of the 
educational environment and engaging with demands from 
other stakeholders. Practitioner-learners perceive the need 
of theorizing for the sake of its implications on practice, as 
means to understand, inform and enrich practice. At a very 
basic level, this engagement with theory involves a pressing 
demand to be convinced of a theory, such that they influence 
practices and give a practitioner the confidence of doing 
things right.
This attitude differs from that of a theorist (a professional 
philosopher of education) who engages with theory for 
the sake of theory where the demand is that theorising be 
rigorous and conclusions be closer to truth.2 Mandates 
on the method in work and motivation for reflection for 
philosophers of education come from the academic discourse 
within the realm of the discipline of philosophy. For example, 
a hint of logical inconsistency or a speculative question 
regarding an accepted theory is enough for a philosopher 
of education to be compelled to re-examine a theory and 
its foundational principles. The Gettier problem and the 
subsequent compulsions to respond and protect or give up 
on the JTB theory of knowledge is a case to the point. The 
2. Truth is intentionally used here and I admit it does convey a particular 
stand. But what is being implied is that Truth serves as the criterion for 
judging differences in conclusions. And also to at the very least exclude 
extreme relativism, because if the possibility of extreme relativism is 
accepted the entire project of reflection or theorising falls apart.
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discourse on education within the discipline of philosophy is 
dictated by concerns different from concerns of practitioners 
of education. 
A practitioner is expected to be a theorist when she is 
learning philosophy of education. If this is so, what might 
impel a practitioner to care for and consider good theorising 
and philosophizing useful? Firstly, uncovering assumptions 
that were hitherto invisible sensitizes practitioners to the 
risk that something could go wrong in practice. Secondly, 
clarity about underlying assumptions in disciplines helps a 
practitioner understand the foundations on which disciplines 
rest on, and comprehend the extent and limits of disciplines 
that form the content of curricula. Thirdly, an understanding 
and continuous awareness of requirements, standards and 
methods of thinking, informs how a practitioner could 
deal with problems that raise normative questions during 
practice. 
Knowing the intricate connections between theory and 
practice, being convinced of the need to philosophize 
because of its value for practice, is a first condition that ought 
to influence the attitude of a practitioner-learner.
Triggers for belief re-examination 
Humans learn and are able to transform themselves 
through learning. If learning to theorize involves examining 
propositions and forming beliefs about them, the mind has 
to do this consciously. A conscious process of judging a belief 
is possible only if the mind can objectify and observe itself. 
Frankfurt describes this unique capacity of the human mind 
as the capability to self-objectify. 
“[When we divide our consciousness in this way,] we 
objectify to ourselves the ingredient items of our ongoing 
mental life… We are unique (probably) in being able 
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simultaneously to be engaged in whatever is going on in our 
conscious minds, to detach ourselves from it, and to observe 
it - as it were - from a distance. We are then in a position to 
form reflexive or higher-order responses to it.” (Frankfurt. 
2006. p. 171.)
He describes the ability of the human mind to observe 
thoughts inhabiting itself, detach itself from its content, 
and observe them as if from a distance. This ability makes 
it possible for us to form a response that is thought-through 
and “developing higher-order attitudes and responses to 
oneself is fundamental to achieving the status of a responsible 
person.” (Frankfurt. 2006. P. 172.)3
But what would make us desire to consider a thought that 
we see in our mind? Our mind is also inhabited by 
thoughts that we consider banal or inconsequential. Why 
do we actively consider some thoughts but ignore and 
discard others? Frankfurt says, “Facing ourselves, in the 
way that internal separation enables us to do, frequently 
leaves us chagrined and distressed by what we see, as 
well as  bewildered and insecure concerning who we are. 
Self-objectification facilitates both an inhibiting uncertainty 
or ambivalence and a nagging general dissatisfaction 
with ourselves.” (emphasis mine) (Frankfurt. 2006. P. 
171.)4
3. The assumption that we are referring not merely to basic skills which 
become embodied in the actions, rather one is referring to explicit 
actions that are reflected upon and then performed – which is a demand 
we have already established for reflective practitioners. One could say 
that having seriously thought through actions eventually could become 
habit and transform into skills.
4. Dissatisfaction implies the existence of some standards, both 
epistemic and moral, that might be unstated and not in the conscious 
mind. My argument in this paper also assumes the existence of some 
standards or the other as a necessary condition for learning.
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In the context of theoretical reasoning (regulation of 
beliefs), this state of “an inhibiting uncertainty and a nagging 
dissatisfaction with ourselves” manifests as doubt in the 
grounds for justification of a belief. This doubt could impel 
us to re-examine beliefs, and then we intentionally initiate 
the process of learning. 
The practice of learning
To term anything a practice, an intention is a necessary 
condition. While having an intention and conscious 
engagement with learning are necessary conditions to term 
learning as a practice, are they sufficient? Kant’s distinction 
between theory and practice is useful to identify some 
other aspects of practices and ascertain if it helps to 
conceive of learning as a practice. Kant defines theory and 
practice as,
“[Conversely,] not every doing is called practice, but only 
that effecting of an end which is thought as the observance of 
certain principles of procedure represented in their generality.” 
(emphasis mine) (Kant, trans. Nisbet, 1970, Page 61)
Kant says practices are different from mere doing, and the 
intention of practices is to “effect an end”. Effecting this end 
involves “observance of certain principles of procedure”, not 
merely following  procedures. It is the desire to “effect an 
end” and an acceptance of “certain principles of procedure” 
that makes something a practice. We need to examine the 
“end of learning” and “principles of the procedure of learning” 
to consider learning a practice.
The end of learning
Kant clarifies further that a practice does not have to be 
grounded in an external end - something else that practice is 
aiming to achieve - but that practices presume an end within 
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themselves – that of doing the practice well, to the best of 
one’s ability. 
“...this concept of duty does not have to be grounded on 
any particular end but rather  introduces another end for 
the human being’s will, namely to work to the best of one’s 
ability;...”(Kant, trans. Nisbet, 1970, p. 61) (emphasis mine)
To explain this he distinguishes between acts of theorising 
that aim to provide explanations of experiences or 
applications in real situations (sciences, engineering - his 
examples) and theories that are purely rational (mathematics, 
objects of philosophy). He points out that if a theory is 
meant to explain experience or be applied in a practice, and 
if experience is contrary to the theory, we need to consider 
the possibility that we have not theorized sufficiently. This 
places a demand on the theoriser that (s)he ought to think 
some more. 
We are considering philosophy of education as a higher-
order activity that examines educational theory and 
practice, and these objects of philosophy have a clear direct 
bearing on educational practice. In this sense, we are 
placing philosophy of education in the category of theories 
that Kant places science and engineering in. The ones that 
provide explanations for experiences, inform practice and 
can be applied to practice. We are considering learners who 
are would-be practitioners (practitioner-learner) who are 
learning philosophy for the sake of  practice. The learner’s 
duty then is to theorize as well as possible such that it informs 
her practice. 
Learning then is a duty concept and there is an end to 
learning that is within learning itself, which implies that for 
a practitioner-learner, learning to philosophize ought to be 
an end in itself. What might be the “end” of the practice of 
learning philosophy of education? 
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Israel Scheffler, in “Philosophical models of teaching” says - 
“The knower must indeed satisfy a further condition beyond 
the mere receiving and storing of a bit of information. ... it 
generally involves the capacity for a principled assessment of 
reasons bearing on justification of the belief in question. The 
knower, in short, must typically earn the right to confidence 
in his belief by acquiring the capacity to make a reasonable 
case for the belief in question.”(Peters. ed., 1967) (emphasis 
mine)
Scheffler further states that “Nor is it sufficient for this case 
to have been explicitly taught. What is generally expected of 
the knower is that his autonomy be evidence in the ability to 
construct and evaluate fresh and alternative arguments, the 
power to innovate, rather than just the capacity to reproduce 
stale arguments earlier stored.” (Peters. ed., 1967) (emphasis 
mine) 
Scheffler defines the end of learning as ‘earn[ing] the right 
to confidence in his belief ’ that comes from acquiring the 
capacity to make a ‘principled assessment of reasons bearing 
on justification of the belief in question’. The learner, he 
says, has to demonstrate her autonomy by constructing and 
evaluating fresh and alternative arguments. 
The practice of learning is then founded on the learner 
experiencing “uncertainty and ambivalence” leading to 
“dissatisfaction” with one’s justification for beliefs, desiring 
to “earn the right to confidence in his belief ” for which the 
learner has to make “a principled assessment of reasons 
bearing on justification of the belief in question”. Earning the 
right to confidence implies being confident of a belief and 
that has to be acquired by the learner, so it is essentially an 
autonomous act. 
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Principle of procedure of learning
Dissatisfaction with the grounds for justification for a 
belief marks the beginning of learning and earning right to 
confidence in a belief marks the end, what does the learner 
do in between? Kant says we observe “principles of procedure 
represented in their generality”.
Kant does not refer to the “observance of certain principles 
of procedure” as mere observance of a predetermined 
procedure. If learning philosophy demands that we theorize 
with the intention to examine our beliefs and learning 
demands that we earn justification for beliefs, then the 
practice of learning can not be just mechanically following 
prescribed (even self-prescribed) procedures. The procedure 
itself can not be static in the sense that one is convinced about 
in the beginning and then follows it without any deviation. 
If a practice (learning to philosophize in our case) is an 
end in itself, it implies that we do not do it as an “empty 
ideal” (Kant, translated by Nisbet, 1970) to achieve. The 
learner is responsible for having determined whether she 
has philosophized and philosophized well enough. Kant 
says that theorising also involves experiencing the effect 
it has on our will – whether it is thought to be completed 
or as approaching completion. We ought to be constantly 
conscious of the practice of learning, not only in the sense 
that we are aware of what we are doing, but also conscious 
of whether we have achieved its end or not. This demands a 
“principled assessment of reasons bearing on justification of 
the belief in question” (Peters. ed., 1967) continuously through 
the process of practice. This assessment is a principle of the 
procedure of learning that one ought to guided by. 
Since the objective is to earn confidence in a belief and 
its justification, the process necessarily involves doing a 
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“principled assessment” of reasons that form justification. 
This places two more demands on the process of learning 
- being conscious of the method of arriving at justification 
(methodological self-consciousness) and confidence in the 
adequacy of the method. The self-conscious methodology 
and confidence in adequacy of the method are conditions for 
the learner to succeed in reflection. Reflection (examining 
grounds for beliefs) and Reflective success (having 
philosophized enough) ought to be the learner’s focus rather 
than mere agreement (or disagreement) with a belief. A 
judgement that one has acquired confidence in a belief and 
has philosophized enough marks the finishing line for the 
process of learning. This judgement, resulting in reflective 
success, also entails judging how the belief might manifest in 
practice. It is not adequacy of justification alone but also it’s 
practicality in real experience that determines the success of 
reflection. 
Moral dimensions of learning to philosophize
What might encourage a practitioner-learner to engage in 
the practice of learning as a duty, when it only promises 
something as evanescent as reflective success and confidence 
which might eventually be useful to her practice and also 
demands that the practitioner herself owns the responsibility 
of assessing the procedure of practice? This seems possible 
only if a moral imperative compels this attitude for the learner. 
The need to do things right serves as a moral imperative that 
directs her attitude to learning. 
“I ought to be a good practitioner who does my practice right. 
So I have to learn what I ought to do eventually in my role as 
a practitioner. If I have to do the right things as a practitioner, 
then, I ought to have theorised well in arriving at the beliefs 
that ‘my’ practice is founded upon. If that is the case, then 
I have to theorise myself (autonomously) and rigorously 
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enough that I have adequate grounds for justification of 
the belief. My practice has to maintain integrity with the 
theorising which is the source of my confidence in beliefs.”
The practice of learning acquires another necessary 
condition, that of moral integrity. Moral integrity in turn 
demands courage to challenge oneself and allow for the 
possibility that one might be wrong. The practice of learning 
places demands of moral integrity and courage to reflect on 
beliefs on the practitioner-learner.
Sceptical moment - a necessary condition for learning
These considerations mark the necessary normative aspects 
of learning – dissatisfaction with justification of our beliefs, 
the end of learning as gaining the right to confidence in 
justification, the procedure of learning being self-reflexive 
(judging whether one has gained confidence in justification 
for a belief), self-reflection being more important than 
agreement or disagreement, a need to maintain integrity 
between theorising and practising, and the courage to 
question oneself. 
These necessary conditions together form an attitude that can 
be best described as “scepticism” directed towards oneself. “I 
don’t know.” and not “It is not possible to know.”. 
This description of the state of the learner presumes that 
she does not have confidence in a belief or its justification, 
which implies that she ought to be in a state of suspended 
judgement with regard to a belief. 
Epistemic qualities of the sceptical moment 
Jonathan Barnes in his introduction to “Sextus Empiricus 
– Outlines of scepticism” describes a type of scepticism 
that he terms ‘local scepticism’. Local in the sense that this 
is scepticism in relation to the particular topic or subject 
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under consideration and a suspension of the judgement on 
a particular belief or set of beliefs. He describes a sceptical 
moment as follows - “suspension of judgement is a standstill 
of the intellect, owing to which we neither posit nor reject 
anything.”(I.10) (Barnes, 2000, Page xxiv). He describes the 
state as one of absence of an opinion. Rather than suspension 
of belief, he shifts our attention to suspension of judgement 
on the belief. If the point of focus is judgement rather than 
belief, some questions about the relationship between beliefs 
and judgements arise. 
Do we believe only those things that we have judged to be 
true? To explain this Barnes distinguishes between 
acceptance and belief. We judge something and then accept 
it, but we may still not believe it. If I logically argue that 
there is no reason to believe you will be alive tomorrow, you 
might accept it but continue to believe that you will be alive 
tomorrow. (Barnes, 2000, Page xxv)
If we believe something, then does it follow that we have 
judged it? This is not necessarily true either. We have beliefs 
that we have never considered, we just happen to believe 
them. For example, most of us believe we will be alive 
tomorrow morning. That means we can suspend judgement 
and still continue to believe. This separation of beliefs from 
judgement helps us understand the sceptical moment better. 
(Barnes, 2000, Page xxv)
One, it is not complete suspension of belief, rather it is 
a suspension of judgement of the belief in question; and 
judgement brings focus on the justification rather than the 
belief itself. Two, this suspension of judgement necessitates 
a process of reflection that includes examination of our 
justification and various alternative beliefs and their 
justifications – with reflective success as the intended end.
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A teaching-learning situation then has to achieve the following 
– the learner is made aware of a belief, she consciously 
considers and assembles arguments for and against the belief 
in question, she weighs different justifications against each 
other, and this pushes her to see that the reasons for and 
against are equipollent. The pedagogical objective is to cause 
this equipollence that leads to uncertainty and ambivalence 
and hence dissatisfaction with grounds for the belief and a 
suspension of judgement. And then the pedagogue has to 
provide tools and methods of reflection which the learner 
uses to achieve reflective success.
This sceptical state is necessary if she has to feel the need for 
the tools and methods of philosophy because common-sense 
does not provide a resolution of the sceptical state.
Since adequacy of the grounds for justification is a necessary 
condition for reflective success, the sceptical moment also 
brings the method of arriving at grounds for justification 
into question. Does the learner then have to completely 
suspend judgement on the philosophical method too? That 
would lead to an impasse. 
But this is not necessary. Since we are discussing particular 
learning situations when the learner suspends judgement of 
a particular belief, this moment brings existing grounds for 
the learner’s belief into question. This enables her to question 
the adequacy of the grounds and consider alternative 
justifications. Assessing them for adequacy implies some 
requirements and standards that the justification has to 
fulfil and examining to see if alternative justification meet 
those requirements and standards or not. This is a rather 
modest version of scepticism expected from a practitioner-
learner.
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Moral force of the sceptical moment
Impelled by the sceptical moment, the practitioner-learner 
ought to engage in theoretical reasoning to resolve the 
suspension of judgement. The source of this moment is an 
erosion of confidence in beliefs and the need for integrity 
between her role as a practitioner and practices that the belief 
in question might influence. Subsequent theorising ought 
to affect the belief such that her lived life is informed and 
her actions influenced by this change. This makes a series of 
demands on learner attitude towards the act of learning that 
demand serious consideration.
There ought to be a moral force to the theoretical reasoning – 
one ought to have to get it right. Epistemic doubt or intellectual 
discomfort does not entail moral commitment towards 
theoretical reasoning. What might provide moral force to the 
practice of learning?
Mikhail Bakhtin provides deep insight into the moral nature 
of theoretical reasoning. Bakhtin says that an individual’s 
relation to the world is essential for the world if (s)he engages 
in participative (unindifferent) thinking. An individual’s 
thinking is unindifferent, if her thinking is “act-performing 
thinking”. “Act performing thinking” is that which one 
considers oneself answerable for and hence it has a moral 
force. If we consider ourselves answerable for the deed we 
perform, our will is emotionally directed - it matters to us 
that the act be morally right -  since we are conscious that 
it would have an effect on the world. He calls this attitude 
towards the act of thinking emotional-volitional. (Bakhtin 
ed. 1993. p. 44-45)
In our case of the practitioner-learner, the act of learning is 
essential for the world because the educational practitioner 
is expected to eventually function in the world, hence her 
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thinking ought to be unindifferent if she considers herself 
morally answerable for the practices she engages in. If this 
obligation occupies her during the practice of learning, 
she would have what Bakhtin terms an emotional-volitional 
tone because her action (learning at that moment) entails 
revision of a belief in a way that is inescapable, irremediable 
and irrevocable. (Bakhtin ed. 1993. p. 44-45) At least the 
learner would want it to be so. 
He describes the emotional-volitional tone as a “certain 
ought-to-be attitude of consciousness, an attitude that 
is morally valid and answerably active. We use the term 
‘emotional-volitional tone’ to designate precisely the moment 
constituted by my self-activity in a lived-experience – the 
experiencing of an experience as mine: I think – perform 
a deed by thinking.” (Page 36-37; Bakhtin; Towards a 
philosophy of the act)
If our learner has suspended judgement she would want 
to resolve this suspension by deciding what she ought to 
believe. Since the belief in question entails practices that 
she is answerable for, it is a morality informed attitude and 
an active consciousness that has to find a resolution to the 
situation. “What ought I believe? It is important because I 
want it to influence what I ought to do.”.
Suspending judgement in justification for a belief brings 
part of our Self into question. This is a moral problem 
because we also realize that we are answerable for the act 
of accepting a justification through this practice of learning. 
I am answerable to my actions, and by deciding to act in a 
certain way, I am undertaking an obligation to act in that 
manner. This obligation is irrevocable since it stems from 
my own self, not imposed from without. The need to be 
answerable propels me to ‘earn the right to justification’ in 
the principle arrived at from theorising.
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It is evident how practical situations could carry a moral 
force. Would that be possible in antiseptic environments where 
theoretical reason is conducted and the engagement is with 
abstractions and universalities?
Bakhtin says that any universally valid value becomes 
actually valid only in an individual context. If learning is 
considered an answerable act by the learner, her emotional-
volitional tone translates generalities realized through 
theoretical cognition into her particular context. The 
emotional-volitional tone, he says, seeks to express the truth 
of the given moment and that relates it to the universal 
theory. The individual’s understanding of a universal 
theory is not a prototype of the universal theory. It is not 
“contentual constancy” that describes how an individual 
receives universal theories, rather it is a unique, unrepeatable, 
particular instance of the universal theory that forms itself in 
the mind of the actor. “The word that would characterize this 
more accurately is faithfulness [being-true-to]” (Bakhtin ed. 
1993. p. 38) rather than accurate representation or accepting 
a prototype of the universal truth. 
What about the environment in which theoretical reasoning 
is done - in quiet moments of contemplation or artificially 
created spaces like classrooms. Such theorising has only 
a sense-validity that “are themselves afloat in a peculiarly 
airless space, and are not rooted in anything, neither in 
something unitary nor in something unique.” (Bakhtin ed. 
1993. p. 21). The metaphor of an airless space insinuates that 
I don’t have to live there, I hold my breath and deal with it, 
until after which I can continue to live the way I already do. 
Doubt in this antiseptic space is hypothetical not real. 
According to Bakhtin, only answerability attached to the act 
of reasoning surmounts this gap between individual living 
ridden with particularities and the world of theoretical 
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reasoning. He says, “The answerable act or deed alone 
surmounts anything hypothetical, for the answerable act 
is, after all, the actualization of a decision – inescapably, 
irremediably and irrevocably.” (Bakhtin ed. 1993. p. 38).
The learner has to realize that while the environment in 
which theoretical reasoning is being performed is artificial, 
the implications of her actions have moral import, because 
they influence actions of hers that she is answerable 
for. 
How does one exercise answerability?
Bakhtin separates the formal (how one convinces oneself 
of the need to act in a particular way) from the substantive 
aspects (the theory that is accepted) of actions in thought. 
He says “...And what compelled me to sign at the moment of 
undersigning was not the content of the given performed act 
of deed. This content could not in isolation have prompted 
me to perform the act or deed - to undersign-acknowledge 
it, but only in correlation with my decision to undertake 
an obligation - by performing the act of undersigning-
acknowledging.” (Bakhtin ed. 1993. p. 38).
It is not the irrefutable logic that reasoning offers, but it is 
the practitioner-learner’s acknowledging and undersigning 
both the process of learning (reflection) and end of learning 
(reflective success) that impels her to practice learning. The 
need for undersigning in turn would exist only if there is 
doubt and an emotional-volitional stance towards doubt. 
Doubt then is a necessary condition for learning. 
Why would a learner think that universal generalities 
arrived at through theoretical reasoning would resolve doubts 
regarding her Self? 
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Bakhtin says in a moment of doubt with regard to an act we 
have to perform, theoretical cognition becomes necessary 
because “It is precisely doubt that forms the basis of our life 
as effective deed-performing, and it does so without coming 
into contradiction with theoretical cognition. This value of 
doubt does not contradict in any way the unitary and the 
unique truth [pravda]: it is precisely this unitary and unique 
truth of the world that demands doubt.”(Bakhtin ed. 1993. p. 
36-37).
Our perception that a unitary, unique set of beliefs forms 
the truth of the world (pravda) is the source of doubt. At 
the same time, the Self has a unique history of experiences 
(historicity and uniqueness) and a particular combination 
of beliefs and principles integrated to form the Self (unitary 
plane). Our Self operates on this unitary plane. The doubt 
in our justification stems from our perception that there are 
universal truths. Hence engaging in theoretical cognition 
is the only way to resolve this doubt and this provides the 
moral force to theorising and makes it a moral endeavour. 
Conclusion
The basic issue then seems to be that practitioners who 
engage in actions and philosophizing ought to inform these 
actions. Human beings are moral beings in the sense that 
we feel morally responsible for our actions. A practitioner-
learner’s function in the domain of education is through 
actions and she ought to feel answerable for her actions. This 
moral imperative ought to affect the process of learning, 
rather it ought to be the reason why a practitioner-learner 
learns philosophy. Formal learning spaces where theoretical 
reasoning happens are by nature isolated from the world of 
action and this establishes a fundamental split between the 
content and the person’s past, her self and hence her life.
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The end of philosophising is for the learner to “earn the right 
to confidence in her beliefs” through theoretical reasoning. 
The practice of learning ought to bridge this gap between 
theoretical reasoning and the multitude of the individual’s 
experiences, history and beliefs which are not an exact copy 
of the universal principles conceived in theories of learning. 
A moment of scepticism about one’s own grounds for beliefs 
helps bridge this fundamental split by making learning 
both an epistemic and a moral imperative because the 
suspension of judgement of a belief leads to a state of doubt 
not merely about a particular belief. That a contrary belief 
or justifications are part of an integrated self, in turn brings 
the practitioner-learner’s own self into question. The learner 
needs to arrive at a resolution that resolves the erosion of 
confidence in a belief, through examining the grounds for 
various possible beliefs and earn her right to confidence in 
justification for a belief. The sceptical learner then adopts an 
emotional-volitional stance towards theorizing because it 
becomes a moral necessity to re-establish her justifications 
and beliefs from universal principles.  
A sceptical learner can then truly engage in theoretical 
reasoning as a moral obligation, rather than a mere 
intellectual exercise. Signing over the dotted line of a practice 
comes from a need to resolve a belief and fulfil the condition 
of answerability that acts of moral beings demand.
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Introduction
Models of learning have often focused on the cognitive 
aspects of learning.1 The mainstream system of education 
also privileges cognitive and intellectual capacities as 
integral to the act of learning. Thus, there is an emphasis 
on disseminating and acquiring knowledge as the central 
aspect of teaching-learning. Given that the model of 
institutional knowledge is so deeply influenced by science 
and mathematics, it is not surprising that the focus 
on knowledge has led to over emphasis on science and 
mathematics teaching right from our schools. Moreover, 
even other disciplines are taught in ways that these scientific 
disciplines are taught and evaluated. 
1.  See McLaughlin(1976) and Lozano (2005) who treat learning 
essentially as a cognitive activity and look at neuroscience research and 
cognitive theories to illuminate our understanding of how learning 
happens.
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Some might argue that education is not just about 
transmitting knowledge but it is also about imparting skills. 
Again, the question of training skills often reduces to the 
model of scientific learning. Problem solving is a skill that is 
taught in mathematics; laboratory skills are also important 
in physics, chemistry and biology. Although laboratory 
activities are many times placed lower in importance when 
compared to theoretical learning and theoretical knowledge, 
they are nonetheless essential parts of acquiring knowledge. 
This is primarily because these ‘skills’ in the mathematical 
and scientific disciplines are also integrally related to the 
nature of the knowledge in these systems. But education 
is also about acquiring broader skills such as reading and 
writing, thinking and analyzing. These skills are not directly 
co-relatable to elements which constitute what we understand 
as knowledge as such and thus there is always an ambiguity 
about the importance of these skills in mainstream school 
education today. 
The emphasis on knowledge, which reflects a historical 
preoccupation with this idea, is based on certain views on 
the nature of knowledge. Firstly, knowledge is dominantly 
understood as a set of statements about various things. That 
is, knowledge is primarily presented as a finished product that 
is concretized in the texts and which is then communicated 
to the student. Knowledge as a product is in essence different 
from knowledge as a process. Knowledge always involves the 
process of knowing but most often the emphasis on the end 
product of knowledge occludes the importance of paying 
attention to this unique process of knowing that is essential 
to learning.2 
2.  In fact, even the theories of knowledge as in traditional epistemology 
emphasize truth, beliefs and propositional states rather than the explicit 
process of knowing that is involved in knowledge creation. There 
are exceptions such as the reliabilist theories of knowledge. See Audi 
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How does one engage with knowing in the classroom? Can 
one teach knowing in the classroom? The first way to engage 
with knowing is to attend to the experiences of a student. In 
other words, if education is not just about transmission of the 
objects of knowledge but also about the process of knowing, 
then it is necessary to begin with articulating the nature 
of this experience of knowing. The fact that experiences of 
students are often erased or not sufficiently thought about 
in classroom education is not surprising since the dominant 
western philosophical system which is at the basis of much of 
modern education has always had a problematic relationship 
with the category of experience. 
Right from the early Greek philosophical tradition, the 
question of experience, which is intrinsically related to the 
human subject, has been a profound problem in the project 
of grander themes like the search for truth and knowledge in 
western thought.3 Experience was seen to be fundamentally 
subjective, located within individuals, not transparent to 
others, and open to deception and misinterpretation. The 
non-availability of any obvious measure of objectivity in 
relation to experience meant that it was easier to ignore 
it in the acts of gathering, producing or transmitting 
knowledge.4 The objectivity and public-ness of objects of 
knowledge were not available to the processes of knowing. 
(2010/1998) for more on this.
3.  While this statement is surely a gloss on a long history, it is 
nevertheless true that mainstream ‘western’ thought does encode a 
consistent suspicion towards experience, feeling and emotion in the 
domain of knowledge. See Williams (1998) for some historical notes on 
this theme, Rooney (1994) for a feminist critique and Rosen (2002) for an 
analysis of the ordinary experience.
4.  Guru (2013) and Sarukkai (2013a, 2013b) in their influential work The 
Cracked Mirror have problematized the relation between experience and 
theory in detail and the need to substantively engage with the category 
of ‘lived experience’.
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Thus, for example, in the description of scientific knowledge 
the emphasis on knowledge, with particular emphasis on 
mathematical and scientific knowledge, and the overall 
increased scientization of education, meant that the 
experience of knowing had been effectively banished from 
understanding the process of learning.5 This paper attempts 
to recapture this lost ground by referring back to this process 
of knowing, not reducible to the cognitive domain alone. It 
does so by drawing on a paradigm example of learning in 
art and through that attempt to conceptualize an extremely 
important category of learning, namely, the possibility of 
authenticity in learning.
We can begin the discussion by focusing on the experience 
of the process of learning in a student. What does a student 
experience while in the classroom? A classroom has many 
structures that are part of the experience of the student. 
The first is the presence of the teacher in the role of a 
teacher as well as in the role of an adult, the second is the 
content of learning, third is the environment of learning 
such as the environment of the classroom, fourth is the 
human presence of other students, fifth is the ‘mood’ of the 
student at the moment of learning and so on. The experience 
of learning is obviously related to all these elements but 
one or other factors may dominate in a typical learning 
experience. 
Learning has to happen as a combination of all these 
factors and has to happen through particular experiences of 
learning. Experiences of learning can range from the ‘aha’ 
moment of insight when listening to a teacher to extreme 
boredom and fatigue. It can range from extreme seriousness 
5.  One illustrates of this claim in the general absence of the importance 
of emotions in learning theories. For exceptions see Beatty (1969) and 
Ingleton (1995)
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and focus to playfulness and being distracted. But whatever 
it is, the learning of a student is always and completely 
located in this experience. There is no content outside this 
experience of learning, even though we may tend to isolate 
learning in terms of the content that is grasped in a class. 
However, is it worth focusing on the experience of learning?6 
The contention of this paper is that there is a primordial and 
essential experience of learning that accompanies learning 
of different kinds. It is also not psychological but existential. 
And the model for it is not necessarily the common classroom 
experience which is ubiquitous in contemporary education 
but is from the domain of learning art. 
We begin with the claim that there is something special to 
the act of learning, to the experience of learning and we 
locate this within the conceptual domain of ‘authenticity’, 
the implication being that there is indeed an essential 
experience of learning which is captured by the idea of 
‘authentic learning’.7 
Authentic is a difficult term since it has so many connotations, 
some of which are not really desirable.8 But there is also a 
6.  There are many accounts of both theoretical and experimental 
work on the experience of learning. In the context of art education, see 
Silverman (1997) and for an empirical approach to this problem see 
Marton et al (1984).
7.  There have been few attempts to bring the concept of authenticity 
in teaching and learning by Schneider (1994), Nicaise, Gibney, & Craine 
(2000), Herrington & Oliver (2000) and Brown (2002-03) 
8.  Adorno (in The Jargon of Authenticity (1964)) and Bloom (in The 
Closing of the American Mind (1987)) have problematized the concept of 
authenticity. Adorno argues that Heidegger’s jargon of authenticity hides 
the Christian language in an existential ontology where “authority of the 
absolute is overthrown by absolutized authority” (5) which pave way for 
fascism. Bloom critiques the so-called “culture of authenticity” in the 
American youth which has become highly individualistic and relativistic 
in their moral positions. 
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primordial sense of authenticity in human action of various 
kinds, and this sense is primarily existential in nature. When 
we invoke the idea of authenticity here, we are attempting 
to articulate what it means to describe the act of learning. 
When does a student realize – experientially – that she is in 
the midst of the learning experience or has had a learning 
experience? Evaluation is a way to test what a student has 
learnt but it is not about the particular experience that 
accompanies the process of learning. 
We find it useful to begin from the other side of learning, 
namely, teaching. If we ask for a similar description of 
teaching, we could be asking whether there is an experience 
of teaching. And whether there is an authenticity of teaching 
like authenticity of learning. While there are different ideas 
surrounding the concept of authenticity, we want to focus 
on one aspect which is its relation to limits. Authenticity in 
Heideggerian terms arises when we confront our finitude, 
when we confront the limits of our existence. In psychological 
terms, authentic action follows a recognition that action for 
other ends, such as functional or utilitarian ends, do not 
really matter when one is facing the end. We tend to act 
more ‘authentically’ when we are not merely passing ‘time’ 
but confront time itself.9 
Analogously we can consider the argument that as a teacher, 
authentic teaching arises when the teacher comes to the limit 
of teaching. One way to phrase this is to say that the possibility 
of authentic teaching arises when the teacher knows the 
student is neither receptive nor even interested in learning 
but yet the teacher teaches with the same involvement. In 
other words, how do we teach when there is no functionality 
to teaching, when we teach not for getting a student to pass 
9.  Heidegger develops the concept of authenticity as confronting 
limitations in his celebrated work Being and Time (1962)
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the exam, for example? What does a teacher experience when 
she is in those throes of the act of teaching, the experience 
of teaching which in itself is not related to teaching for a job, 
for a salary, to please somebody etc? Can we discover an 
authentic experience of teaching in these moments?
Similarly, when a student is learning – again not for purposes 
such as passing exam or exhibiting their ‘intelligence’ – 
what is the quality of that experience? Is there an authentic 
experience of learning that can capture those moments of 
learning qua learning? While these may seem to be questions 
that are perhaps only of philosophical interest, we want 
to point out that the discourse of art teaching routinely 
invokes the notion of authenticity. So instead of beginning 
with theoretical and philosophical understanding of the 
possibility of authentic learning, we want to begin with a 
fieldwork with dance students and dance teachers in order 
to explore the possibility of developing a framework of 
authentic learning. 
Finally, the shift to authentic learning also allows us to 
bring the ethics of learning explicitly into the classroom. 
Authenticity is fundamentally related to ethics, as we argue 
in this paper, although naive readings of authenticity have 
been used in ethically problematical contexts. Moreover, 
the question of authenticity in art, for example, is intimately 
related to the notion of truth in art. The notion of a higher 
sense of truth seems to be integral to the idea of authenticity. 
This truth is not empirical or factual truth but truths about 
the human condition, because of which ethics becomes 
central to questions of authenticity. 
The ethics of teaching necessarily involves certain experiential 
modes of teaching. Invoking authenticity in the experience 
of teaching may allow us to go beyond the ethics of duties of 
a teacher. Since it is experiential, such an ethical stance will 
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place the burden of ethical action on the teacher and not on 
any theoretical or universal principles.
At this point, we are not going to get into the question of 
whether there is an ethics of teaching and learning. In an 
increasingly commercial world of education, ethical questions 
have been deflected to the providers of education which also 
ends up viewing students as consumers. As consumers, they 
tend to believe that they, first and foremost, have rights as 
consumers. But the larger implication of this work is to finally 
illustrate how the ethics of teaching-learning is an important 
component of these processes, not just in the experiential 
sense but also in its project of acquiring and understanding 
knowledge. 
Method in Art Education
One of the authors (A1) spent six months on a fieldwork 
in art education from April 2014 at Attakkalari Center for 
Movement Arts by observing and interviewing diploma 
students of Movement Arts, while also visiting schools where 
the repertory dancers teach. The one year diploma program 
of Attakkalari is one of its kinds in India as it gives intensive 
training in movement arts and mixed media. Apart from 
Attakkalari, several others artists in theatre, music, dance 
and visual arts were interviewed and engaged on questions 
of learning in arts.
The diploma curriculum of Attakkalari is quite diverse 
as everyday they have a mix of classes that range from 
traditional Indian forms of yoga, kalari payyetu10 and 
bharatanatyam11 to classical western form of ballet as well 
as the contemporary dance techniques. Apart from this, 
they have visiting Masters of other different forms like 
10.  Famous martial art form of Kerala.
11.  Classical dance form of Tamil Nadu.
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thevarattam, koodiyattam, kathak,12 and many others. The 
one year program accepts students from varied backgrounds 
like medicine, engineering, commerce, design, theatre and 
even reality dance shows, who may or may not have a previous 
experience in dance. Thus initially a lot of time is spent in de-
conditioning and training of the body. Because even as non-
dancers, we are habituated into certain everyday modes of 
movement and performance13 (maybe based on our gender/
caste/class/religious/race identities and also our individual 
styles) which needs to be looked at as both advantageous 
and limitation of our movement vocabulary.  So the initial 
preparation becomes imperative for the students to ready 
themselves for the more complex and diverse movements to 
be taught throughout the course. Also if some movements are 
done without enough preparation then they risk the chance 
of getting injured. Injury in movement arts is not merely 
something that one has to avoid but it plays a central role in 
learning of bodily techniques, as it becomes an internal check 
for the body to convey the incorrectness/unpreparedness of 
the movement. 
A1 began his fieldwork primarily by observing all the classes 
to understand how the students are learning the movements 
and what is happening with the steps and sequences that 
they learn. Initially, as expected, the student observes the 
teacher and tries to imitate the movement that she is doing. 
Though the teacher shows the movement multiple times and 
expects the students to do it accurately, it is also constantly 
acknowledged that all bodies are different and the student has 
to find their own way of doing the movement sequence. Mere 
12.  Folk and classical dance forms from Tamil Nadu, Kerala and North 
India respectively.
13.  For more details on everyday performativity of gender and other 
identity roles, see Butler (1990)
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gesticulation14 i.e. just copying the teacher’s movement is not 
enough and thus the students are constantly encouraged to go 
beyond gesticulation and find their own way of embodying 
it.
Now this “finding your own way to inhabit the movement” is 
quite central to the contemporary movement education and 
has multiple layers to it. First is at the level of body structure 
i.e. how the movement of teacher fits into different bodily 
structures of the students. It may have to be altered or changed 
a bit according to particular cases and it never seemed that 
the teachers are insistent on copying the movement exactly 
as they have shown although it is important to maintain 
the accuracy. After getting the initial structure of the step, 
the student then plays with the movement and see what all 
comes out in that engagement. They try to experience the 
movement from both outside and inside i.e. how it may look 
to the audience and also how it feels to them while moving 
in that particular way. It may trigger particular memories 
in the students which can vary from being pleasurable to 
being troubling. It can also trigger different imaginations in 
the students to relate it with stories and fantasies. Also every 
rehearsal of the sequence has the possibility of creating these 
different movementscapes for the students that can then help 
them when they choreograph their own pieces. The evaluation 
of the students is based on their class engagement and the 
movements that they create/perform both individually and 
with the group. 
However, in learning these movement phrases from the 
teachers sometimes the students gets habituated in them 
14.  Gesticulation was a term used by dancer Rukmini Vijayakumar 
who has started the Lshva initiative in Bangalore. In a talk at Suchitra 
Film Society in Bangalore (17 August 2014), she problematized mere 
gesticulation of movement that tend to happen in Bharatanatyam and 
other dance forms.
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through repeated rehearsals i.e. whenever they are asked 
to choreograph something, similar style of movements 
come out. Thus, apart from constant conditioning and 
de-conditioning, another important technique is used 
which is improvisation. During improvisation, students 
are encouraged to experiment with new movements which 
maybe from teachers, peers, or from anywhere they have 
seen in their homes or just walking on the road. The focus 
is not so much on where the movement is coming from, 
thus “creating a movement” in not as much emphasized as 
much as bringing different movements together and making 
them your own. This view of art ties back to the idea of art 
as an “imitation of reality” which as Taylor (1991) mentions 
was the understanding of art in the West till it undergoes 
a change in the 18th century.15 It gets transformed from 
imitation of reality to individual creativity to which we will 
return substantially in the later part of paper.
Continuing on the theme of making these movements 
your own (which may come from diverse sources), I started 
interviewing the teachers and students at Attakkalari. In 
one of my initial interviews itself, I got an interesting insight 
15.  Taylor in his influential work Ethics of Authenticity problematizes 
this new idea of creativity – 
The artist becomes in some way the paradigm case of the human being, 
as agent of original self-definition. Since about 1800, there has been 
a tendency to heroize the artist, to see in his or her life the essence of 
the human condition, and to venerate him or her as a seer, the creator 
of cultural values. But of course, along with this has gone a new 
understanding of art. No longer defined mainly by imitation, by mimesis 
of reality, art is understood now more in terms of creation. If we become 
ourselves by expressing what we’re about, and if what we become is by 
hypothesis original, not based on the pre-existing, then what we express 
is not an imitation of the pre-existing either, but a new creation. We 
think of the imagination as creative. (1991: 62).
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from a German ballet and contemporary dancer M1, and this 
was echoed time and again by most artists who I engaged 
with. She mentioned that when she watches a contemporary 
performance she is not so much interested in the glamour and 
scale of what the production is but something which comes 
across to her as an honest engagement of the dancer with the 
movement. So, if the dancer is merely trying to impress the 
audience with lot of acrobatic moves then it’s not enough. 
Somewhere the performer has to show a deeper commitment 
to the work she is doing. Here she also invoked two other 
concepts close to the idea of honesty which throws further 
light on this engagement; these are authenticity and truth 
understood in an experiential sense. She elaborated saying 
that when a dancer engages with the movement honestly 
and experiences authenticity in doing the movement that 
is when both the performer and the audience experience 
something more than an artistic expression. She further 
added the element of sacrifice of the dancer’s ego during 
such an exploration. She and many others have said this 
in different ways that – initially the dancer uses dance as a 
medium to express herself but gradually she reaches a point 
where she becomes the medium for dance to express itself. 
Sarukkai (2012) echoes something similar in his talk at the 
Tanzfestival symposium -
The ultimate aim of dance is [to] let [the] movement 
come into presence, to come into being. It is not about 
what the movements mean. The struggle of the dancer is 
to let the movements out of the bag, to subsume her ego 
and become the medium for the movements to express 
themselves. Thus, dancers become the medium for 
movements. (Sarukkai 2012)
Recently in a talk by TM Krishna, a well known Carnatic 
vocalist and a scholar, at Ninasam Heggodu, he spoke 
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about ‘Art Experience’ in a similar fashion. He began by 
problematizing the culture around Carnatic music scene 
which is highly Brahminical and patriarchal and has little 
space for women and people from lower castes and other 
religious backgrounds to participate or become prominent.16 
However, he also claimed that there are times when he sings 
and loses himself completely in the music and so does the 
audience. In such moments he experiences authenticity of his 
action and a ‘surrender’ to the form itself. In this surrender 
there is a possibility of transformation of the artist as well 
as the form which leads to authentic learning. However, as 
soon as that moment is gone he is again thinking of how 
much accolades he is receiving from the audience and how 
to subdue the violinist and mridangam artist. But it is those 
glimpses of truth that he experiences which keeps him going 
in his work and that’s what he seeks every time he rehearses 
or performs.
The more I spoke to artists, the more I got to hear about this 
art experience of seeking truth. However, as we know from 
the life and works of Gandhi, seeking truth in experience 
is not limited to the field of art. As a satyagrahi (or a truth 
seeker) you can experience truth in something as common as 
making your own salt. A potter, cobbler, blacksmith, sweeper 
or anyone else can seek truth in their experience of an honest 
practice. Thus, art experience in that sense is not restricted 
to the artists or in other words artistic method (or simply 
art method) can and is put into practice in various fields. By 
conceptualizing art method, it is not the intention to make it 
a binary opposition to scientific method as both of them have 
many similarities. The idea of experimentation, for example, 
is central to both the methods. That’s why we hear the usage 
of laboratories in both contexts whether it is nuclear physics 
16.  Krishna explicates these ideas in detail in his recent book A Southern 
Music: The Karnatik Story (2013)
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lab or a theatre lab. Art method also employs the use of 
“play” and “exploration” along with the centrality of body, 
experience and practice to its processes.
However, there seems to be one strong conceptual distinction 
which informs the practice of artists and that is the 
distinction between truth and facts.17 As I mentioned earlier 
many of the artists spoke about their work in art as search 
for truth but they never quite made a claim towards having 
an objective method to seek truth. Whatever techniques 
they have used to seek truth is quite contextual to their 
experience and is not universalizable for everyone (although 
they are universal; this distinction will be discussed in the 
next section). Even in their own practices, they have found 
different techniques relevant for different contexts. Facts, like 
techniques, form the “content” of their learning, art practice 
and teaching and don’t have a truth value in and themselves. 
Facts are epistemological judgments like whether a mudra 
of bharatnatyam is accurately embodied but they are not 
truth bearers. Dhareshwar (2010) problematizes this notion 
of truth which gets associated with facts and argues – 
It is the association of truth with objectual thinking that 
has made truth an intractable concept. Truth, in the 
Gandhian sense, is neither a property of sentences nor 
of propositions; truth-bearers are neither sentences, nor 
propositions. Literally truth-bearers are persons; more 
accurately, experience is the only truth-bearer. (56)
Thus, for artists it is their search for authenticity in which 
they can experience truth and what guides them in their 
work. So even when they are trying to differentiate their 
practices from other artists, they shy away from a moral 
17.  This distinction between truth and facts is inspired by a discussion 
on a draft article ‘Truth or Fact? Reframing the Gandhi-Tagore Debate’ 
by Dhareshwar(forthcoming)
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criticism of the artist as such as they can’t judge someone 
else’s experience with complete certainty. Their aesthetic 
judgment of someone’s art doesn’t necessarily collapse with 
their moral judgment of the artist. 
Subject, Truth and Ethics
This understanding of locating truth in experience (though 
not articulated every time) is at the heart of the art method 
of teaching-learning. Jaychandran Palazhy, artistic director 
of Attakkalari, constantly reiterates to the dancer-teachers 
to be non-judgmental towards the students and have an 
inclusive perspective for all sorts of students who are in the 
classroom with a spirit of positive encouragement. The moral 
criticism that seems endemic to our mainstream classrooms 
be it in Mathematics where the student is ridiculed if he 
doesn’t know if 2+2 is 4 or in social sciences where he is 
equally humiliated18 if he is politically incorrect, is not as 
ubiquitous in art learning environments (as observed in 
Attakkalari). The normativization process through which 
concepts, facts or techniques have come to gain truth value 
hasn’t pervaded arts as much as other fields of education, 
and seeking truth in experience is still acknowledged.19 
Foucault makes interesting observation about when and 
how this normativization process happens as he looks at 
the relationship between subject and truth in Antiquity, 
18.  For a general analysis of Humiliation, see Guru(2009)
19.  The problem is that lack of a capacity in a skill is a particular lack 
and is not easily generalizable. Thus, if a person does not have the 
skill to cook it does not imply that the person does not know how to 
play football. However, a lack in the capacity of acquiring or learning 
knowledge (as understood in mainstream education practices) is more 
easily generalizable; thus, a person who does not have the capacity to 
learn a mathematical subject is more easily judged to have the lack in 
various other cognitive capacities. The situation has become so extreme 
that today’s competitive examinations for subjects like management still 
test students in their mathematical ability.
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early and late Christianity and Modernity. He argues that in 
Antiquity –
[S]ubject as such doesn’t have the right of access to truth 
and is not capable of having access to the truth. It says that 
truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge 
(connaissance)…for the subject to have right of access to the 
truth he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become 
to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself. 
The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings 
the subject’s being into play…there can be no truth without a 
conversion or transformation of the subject…let us call this 
movement…the movement of erōs (love). Another major form 
through which the subject can and must transform himself 
in order to have access to the truth is a kind of work. This is 
a work of the self on the self… a progressive transformation 
of the self by the self for which one takes responsibility in a 
long labor of ascesis (askēsis). (Foucault 2005:15)
He then argues that this relation between subject and truth 
changes in modernity which he locates in Descartes where 
now truth is directly accessible to the subject through 
knowledge of objects (connaissance) without any need 
of transformation. Thus, not only the access to truth is 
changed but the notion of truth itself has changed. Truth 
is taken out of subject’s experience which develops through 
long engagement with erōs and askēsis and is put into the 
objectual world of concepts and facts. Srinivasan (2013) 
draws on Foucualt and Taylor to argue that even the notion 
of self changes during this time. She states – 
[O]ne witnesses a radical shift in the way ‘formation of 
the self ’ is now conceptualized. A positive conception of 
the self which involves cultivating one’s will to emerge 
as self-determining in freedom replaces the earlier idea 
of formation as the sacrifice of the self which requires 
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a surrender of one’s will to the will of God. What thus 
emerges is a view of the “secular,” autonomous self, 
individual defined in abstraction from any order or 
matrix of practices and actions. (21)
However, a major criticism of this understanding of truth 
and authenticity comes from ethicists as they argue that 
it can be easily appropriated into soft relativism and 
subjectivism & thus morally weak.20 We also know how 
authenticity is a much abused word by the right wing 
linguistic and nationalistic groups who are always in search 
of reviving an “authentic” past.21 Even in the arts, post 18th 
century, movements like aestheticism and formalism have 
regarded “ethical criticism of art as either irrelevant or 
conceptually illegitimate” (Carroll 2000) and have argued 
for unbridled creativity.22 In such conflicting positions 
of art and ethics, how do we then begin to find common 
ground between the two? One way to do this is by looking 
at the idea of moral judgment in arts and other fields. 
As described above, the notion of humiliation is more 
pronounced in learning that has to do with disciplinary 
knowledge as against that in arts education. The fundamental 
ethical issue can thus be located in this difference of moral 
judgments in these different domains of learning. How can 
we conceptualize this form of moral criticism related to 
humiliation? Although not directly related to arts education, 
this problem can be analyzed through the responses of two 
seminal thinkers on ethics, namely, Tagore and Gandhi. 
There is another important relation that they bring out 
20.  See Bloom (1987) for more on this.
21.  See Adorno’s (1964) problematization of authenticity in existential 
thought(esp. Heidegger) which he argues lays ground for fascism, see 
footnote 5.
22.  This move is similar to the one that scientists make in the name of 
curiosity as Sarukkai (2009) argues.
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which is that art is fundamentally linked to non-violence 
in an essential sense and thus is taken into the fold of their 
ethical project. 
Both, Tagore and Gandhi, problematized the normative 
concepts that colonization imposed to occlude the 
experience of truth, assimilated in the lives of common 
people in India through centuries of integration of erōs and 
askēsis.23 Two small examples that Tagore mentions are of 
those villagers who didn’t think twice before giving water 
for his overheated car even when there was a water-scarcity 
in their village and when the people of Mahsud village saved 
a pilot out of plane crash who was actually bombing their 
village (Tagore 2007: IV pp. 722-24).24 So how did virtues 
of generosity and hospitality become so well integrated in 
their lives that they couldn’t act in instrumental reason (a 
feature of modernity as Taylor (1991) argues) for their own 
benefit. Bilgrami (2014/2003) tries to articulate the deep 
integration in Gandhi between truth and non-violence as 
he tries to understand his ethics. He claims that Gandhi 
saw a fundamental difference between moral values and 
moral criticism which to a modern eye are invariably 
linked together. Bilgrami argues that it is because of our 
understanding of ethics i.e. “when one chooses for oneself 
one chooses for everyone,” which leads to the conflation of 
moral values and moral criticism. However, Gandhi saw a 
deep source of violence in this understanding as this means 
that whatever one does, he would try to impose it on others, 
failing which he will judge and criticize them. Gandhi gave 
23.  Erōs and askēsis are used in the Focauldian sense as introduced 
above.
24.  Dhareshwar (forthcoming) while looking at Gandhi and Tagore 
highlights their common understanding of the truth assimilated in the 
lives of common people. 
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a wholesale alternative to this imagination of ethics when 
he suggested that “when one chooses for oneself, one sets 
an example to everyone.” This is a deeply moral position 
but it doesn’t lend itself to become judgmental or critical 
of others by placing oneself on a moral high ground. When 
one sets an example for everyone, it is a universal act but 
not a universalizable one, which means that if someone 
doesn’t follow the example that I am setting I can only be 
disappointed in the other, as well as with me because my 
actions weren’t considered worthy enough of being emulated. 
Gandhi’s Satyagraha was a deep integration of the two as he 
claimed that truth can’t be experienced without being non-
violent in this fundamental way. And thus stating that truth 
lies not in epistemological facts but in moral experience. 
Therefore, truth for Gandhi is located in the experience of 
moral values and not in cognition of propositions describing 
the world (Bilgrami 2014).
Based on this background, let us come to the issue of 
teaching and learning ethical concepts especially when 
they gain moral truth value and become normatively right 
or wrong. We encounter many normative concepts like 
secularism, brahminism, patriarchy, privilege, etc in a liberal 
arts classroom which comes with a moral force that pushes 
the student to conform to a norm of political correctness. 
A student unaware of these norms has to learn it the hard 
way which may include ridicule and humiliation of being 
labeled as sexist, casteist, brahmanical, elitist or mere 
ignorant. However, once the naïve student learns the trick 
of political correctness, he takes up the role of disciplining 
others into this language. In such a context, the concept 
becomes rigid to experimentation as there is a punishment 
associated with not adhering to the norms. Thus, a different 
kind of imitation emerges where unlike in the arts, this 
imitation is to conform to what is already right rather than 
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to make the concept your own through various explorations. 
The learner has to constantly discipline herself according 
to the diktats of the concept which may lead to either 
conformity or a resistance to learn. In the cases when the 
student is actually able to engage with the concept in her 
lived experience and a new interpretation emerges which 
is her own, there still remains a difference between the 
two. Visvanathan (2014) raises this problem in the case of 
secularism where he states that the plural interpretations 
of secularism in the Indian context have become a private 
affair about which the official version of secularism doesn’t 
care and keeps pushing for a standardized interpretation. 
So this raises the important question of whether authentic 
learning is even possible in the context of teaching ethically 
normative concepts.
Based on the above problematization, we need to rethink 
how we wish to bring ethical concerns in the domain 
of education i.e. classroom teaching and learning. If the 
normative force of ethical concepts create a resistance in 
learning among the students and may come across as a 
violent form of pushing some ethical principles down the 
throat of students; then the very purpose of ethics education 
is defeated as the form itself has become unethical, to use 
Gandhi’s understanding of moral violence. However, there 
are many valid concerns in the marginalized groups if we 
begin to question the validity of these normative concepts as 
both Tagore25 and Guru (2011) highlight. So how do we then 
imagine an authentic engagement with ethically problematic 
scenarios?
25.  Dhareshwar(forthcoming) points to this concern in Tagore – 
[I]t is true that when the sources of normativity are threatened, society 
descends into criminality and chaos. That’s why Tagore was right 
to say that European societies cannot be imagined without the state 
(Dhareshwar forthcoming).
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Drawing from the method in art education where authentic 
engagement with the form carries strong weightage, we 
have to create possibilities where ethical concepts can 
be experimented and played around by the students in 
a non-judgmental space of a classroom without rewards 
and punishments of adhering to political correctness. 
In Heideggerian terms our classrooms have to provide 
the necessary clearing for ethics to emerge in an active 
engagement by students rather than perceiving them as 
passive containers to be filled by already established ethical 
norms. The question that arises here is fundamentally about 
pedagogy, as to how do we build the trust and skills that 
the students are able to arrive at their own understanding 
of ethical action. From the fieldwork in art education, and 
Gandhi & Tagore’s experiments with truth and ethics, there 
is a possibility of developing this pedagogy for an authentic 
engagement of ethics in education. 
What about the ethics of teaching in all this? What gives 
us a model for this ethics? The claim in this paper is that 
the way of teaching art embodies certain fundamental 
principles that are central to the ethics of teaching in all 
domains. This happens because of art’s engagement with 
the notion of authenticity – in practice and in learning. By 
drawing on examples of dance teaching, we have shown 
how the idea of truth and authenticity play a crucial role in 
creating a particular ethics of teaching in art practices. This 
ethical mode has important lessons for a general practice of 
teaching in other domains. For example, the difference in 
moral judgement in learning in fields such as mathematics 
and the sciences as against learning in arts can be grounded 
on the notions of authenticity, truth and the capacity to 
make what you learn ‘your own’. How do these notions of 
authenticity and related idea of ‘making it your own’ play 
out in the context of teaching propositional and scientific 
263Authenticity of Teaching-Learning
knowledge? Understanding this challenge might allow us to 
develop a workable ethics of teaching in all subjects without 
the concomitant presence of humiliation and related moral 
criticisms of students.
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267Knowledge as Emotion
Knowledge as Emotion: Non-linguistic  
modes of learning 
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Both academia and industry privilege the notion of a 
detached or disengaged individual as apt to maintaining 
the standards of research and inquiry today. This paper 
in contrast seeks to address the role of emotionality in 
processes of learning. Learning in this context is not geared 
towards learning how or learning what but rather learning 
who. Based on Maslow’s notion of self-actualization, this 
paper traces an alternate epistemology of learning that 
focuses on the question of what it means to be a human 
being in general and a human being in particular.
The attempt to explicate such a form of emotional knowledge 
is pursued by considering learning as that which occurs 
beyond the ambit of formal language practices and in 
the domain of day to day experience. In this regard, the 
experience of visual art is deployed as furnishing a form 
of knowing which is instantaneous and contributes to the 
acknowledgement of otherness. This analysis is followed 
up by exploring the role of presence and silence in various 
forms of learning that are culturally transmitted. The 
last section looks at the role civic learning or community 
learning as well as the world of sports and games play in 
fostering a rich sense of self as articulated by an alternate 
epistemology of learning.
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Introduction
The idea of conceptualizing non-linguistic modes of 
learning appeared as a possibility while pursuing my post-
graduate thesis. Primarily this project was a conceptual 
exploration that analyzed a select literature on notions 
of silence. My hunch was that we did learn a great deal of 
things informally, especially in ways that do not make use 
of language as deployed conventionally in education. At that 
time I was not able to grasp what the form or content of such 
a learning might have been. Nevertheless I did find some 
clues in the work of Merleau-Ponty who seemed to have been 
moving beyond the popular, dormant conceptualizations 
of language. His focus on the gestural, reverberating the 
tradition of thinkers such as Giambattista Vico, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried Herder suggested 
an alternative trajectory available within the intellectual 
universe (Abram 1996, p.76).
My interest in the matter though inspired by the gestural, 
tended to extend beyond it. The search for me was rather 
towards the many possibilities that our bodies engendered 
between the spoken, the gestural and that which lay beyond 
that. The direction I was taking in framing an alternate 
modality to learning and knowledge has been captured 
quite beautifully by the psychologist Abraham Maslow in 
his conceptualization of learning. If one thinks in terms 
of the developing of the kinds of wisdom, the kinds of 
understanding, the kinds of life skills that we would want, 
then he must think in terms of what I would like to call 
intrinsic education-intrinsic learning; that is, learning to be 
a human being in general, and second, learning to be this 
particular human being (Maslow 1968, p.74). 
My idea of an approach geared to this end hopes not to 
construe the learner as a blank repository into which 
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data or information can be transmitted. But rather chooses 
to return to the basics, to those drives that we can claim 
to be inherent both collectively and individually in 
all human beings, to those very undercurrents that seem 
to in the first place, frame a variety of capacities and 
capabilities that we exercise and lay claim to as contemporary 
human beings. Such an exercise is felt necessary not 
because of the existance of a dominant conceptualization 
of students as blank repositories. But rather because of 
certain characterestic tendencies in the practices of 
contemporary schools and colleges in the framing of the 
curriculum and the associated pedagogy. Working within 
severe time constraints and under the coercive influence 
of result driven audit cultures, education and thus learning 
today seem to be veering into a limiting exercise of 
transmitting a set of packaged deliverables in an abstract 
manner.
The urge to break away from this dominant approach in 
conceptualizing about humans in general and human 
learning in particular is motivated by recent transformations 
in the field of psychology. These transformations are 
characterized by a move away from the pathological and 
behavioral as foundational to psychology, towards a more 
positive psychology that emphasizes the self actualization 
of human beings as a vital characteristic of our species. 
The sociologist John F. Glass (1971, p.196) grounds these 
claims when he states “That man’s search for meaning 
by himself and for himself is not very successful can be 
attested to by any psychotherapist.” Drawing once again 
upon Maslow, Glass proceeds to contextualize such a 
knowledge as residing in relations to others and within a 
community. 
Our contemporary age which is characterized by notions 
of innovation, development and progress seem to have to 
270 Conceptualizing education, and related issues
have no place for a knowledge which is based on a notion 
of self-actualization and yet grounded in the dynamics of a 
community. For under the current regime of freedom even 
self-actualization seems to be a category open to a series 
of progressive developments that match our technological 
prowess. The famous mathematician Michael Polanyi in 
his book “Personal Knowledge: Towards a post-critical 
philosophy” traces the origin of such a movement back to 
the pioneering discovery of Copernicus.
What is the true lesson of the Copernican revolution? Why 
did Copernicus exchange his actual terrestrial station for 
an imaginary solar standpoint? The only justification for 
this lay in the greater intellectual satisfaction he derived 
from the celestial panorama as seen from the sun instead 
of the earth. Copernicus gave preference to man’s delight 
in abstract theory, at the price of rejecting the evidence of 
our senses, which present us with the irresistible fact of 
the sun, the moon, and the stars rising daily in the east to 
travel across the sky towards their setting in the west. In a 
literal sense, therefore, the new Copernican system was as 
anthropocentric as the Ptolemaic view, the difference being 
merely that it preferred to satisfy a different human affection 
(Polanyi 1998, p.2). 
What seems to have been lost in this transition between 
two different subject positions is the richness of everyday 
human experience. A sensual experience that is nested in 
between the interface of the human body and the body of 
nature. An experience that has been time and again relegated 
to the so called crudities of our more basic propensities 
of everyday life. Yet without these experiences, let alone 
survival, one is robbed of the basic richness of being a human 
being. Paradigmatic of an exploration in this direction 
would be to posit an equally confounding ‘I feel therefore I 
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am’ in subversion of the infamous Cartesian maxim ‘I think 
therefore I am. 
Crucial to treading on such a path is the necessity to drop our 
categorical gaze of approaching learning as driven by ‘facts’ 
or ‘concepts’ and replacing it by a gaze that acknowledges 
a feeling of relatedness or a plurality of beings. A gaze that 
not only acknowledges the presence and connectedness of 
others but also acknowledges the experience of otherness as 
being destructive of individuality and of generalizing human 
values. An urge to such a revision of our ‘ways of seeing’ 
can be found in the works of Dillard, Toulmin, Keller and 
Whitehead (Ross-Bryant 1990, p.82).
The experience of Art as a case study for alternative modes 
of knowing 
In brief one can construe non linguistic modes of learning 
as being grounded in our emotions. Such a move does not 
necessarily discount the skill or ability of, for example 
drawing in itself, but rather contextualises such a skill 
within the larger economy of our emotional lives. In this 
sense, the ability or skill to draw, sketch or paint suggests 
how processes of learning necessarily involve non-cognitive 
aspects that are often beyond the cognitive task at hand. 
Such a characterisation acknowledges as we shall see the 
tacit and seemingly invisible being of such aspects of 
learning. Approaching learning in such fashion allows for 
us to do justice to a wide spectrum of human activities and 
practices and accentuate myriad modes in which we learn 
about ourselves, the world and our place in it.
An example of such modes of learning can be found in the 
domain of art appreciation, the contours of which we shall 
briefly sketch in an exploration of notions of silence in the 
work of the famous Dutch artist Johannes Vermeer. Painting 
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is here explored as a form of art and a system of representation 
that allows for a recourse from the linguistic by virtue of 
its relative lack of commensurability with the format of 
our collective social life which seems to be grounded in 
natural language. This lack of commensurability invokes in 
the audience a necessity to consider works of art under the 
context in which they are generated. The blank canvas 
therefore should be understood as yielding to layers of 
context that are imposed by the artist. In taking into 
consideration what is characteristic of human beings, 
“Barthes goes further than Wolf to say that not only 
artworks but also viewers are layers of contexts yoked 
together” (Wiseman 2006, p.318). 
In order to address the manner in which this engagement 
occurs between contexts, cultural and other that are 
embodied in humans as well in works of art, Barthes 
proposes two terms, ‘studium’ and its corollary ‘punctum’. 
Conceived by Barthes, these two terms provide us with a 
significant method to approach the process of knowledge 
which underwrites the legibility of works of art (Barthes 
1982). 
In the context of Vermeer’s paintings, Wiseman introduces 
us to two different perspectives that use the concepts of 
‘studium’ and ‘punctum’ to interpret Vermeer’s work. The 
first perspective focuses on the inaccessibility of the cultural 
context of these paintings while the second perspective 
celebrates the particularity of each painting. A characteristic 
of subjects in Vermeer’s paintings is their refusal to yield to 
interpretation. 
“In this they are like the contents of the unconscious mind, 
primitive in being untouched by culture and its systems of 
intelligibility” (Wiseman 2006, p.319).
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The first perspective that Wiseman considers is the relation 
that Professor Wolf draws between the paintings and 
the economic, political and intellectual undercurrents of 
Vermeer’s milieu and the necessity to establish continuity 
between these disparate elements through alternate means. 
Wolf seems to achieve this theoretically by situating both 
writing and painting on a common platform and then 
acknowledging the applicability of illegibility to both these 
categories. He then invokes the idea of the ‘punctum’ as a 
means to present to the audience the contextual, that which 
is in the unconscious and evasive of natural languages. 
Gaskell on the other hand is interested in the particularity 
of Vermeer’s paintings and focuses on the painting: 
Woman Standing at a Virginal. For him the modality of 
understanding complex pictorial abstractions parallels 
the modality of love. He invokes the concept of love to 
highlight the mode through which the visual medium 
instantly impresses upon the heart or spirit of the audience. 
This approach can be characterized as dispensing great 
faith in the direct visual apprehension of the objects in his 
paintings as representations of themselves. Such an approach 
is characteristic in undermining the role of the symbolic 
in works of art. Gaskell suggests that the cultural context 
or ‘studium’ of a work of art is overcome as “the punctum 
operates in the manner of love, and in silence” (Wiseman 
2006, p.319).
Wiseman’s own analysis claims that the challenge is not in 
being able to imagine what lies in the consciousness of the 
subject, for this would only amount to a mere projection 
of the viewer’s imagination. Rather the presentness of the 
subjects in Vermeer’s paintings serve to indicate that they 
have a life and identity that is characteristically different 
from ours. In light of this self-containment of the subjects, 
Wiseman prompts us to “bow before the utter differentness 
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of others from ourselves, a difference that coexists with a 
reality, theirs, that, like ours, knows no reserve” (Wiseman 
2006, p.323). 
In a sense, the ‘life of their own’ that we attribute to the 
subjects is not a metaphoric construction. Rather the credit 
attributed to Vermeer seems to stem from the fact that his 
subjects stand before us like other persons, in whose presence 
one has to bear witness. “Credit to the paintings alone is due 
for teaching their viewers that the silence that attends them 
is a sign of recognition that there are other minds than ours” 
(Wiseman 2006, p.323). 
Following the discussion so far prepares us once again to 
ask the question: what is a non linguistic mode of learning 
in art? As discussed earlier, the lack of commensurability 
between linguistic forms of representation and the form of 
representation of art seems to provide us with a direction 
to proceed in. Such a lack of commensurability is made 
legible here on basis of the presumed self-possession and 
self-containment in the paintings of Vermeer. Wiseman’s 
concludes that the silence in a work of art is that which helps 
an individual acknowledge the plurality of existence in an 
albeit spontaneous manner. 
Gaskell on the other hand is seen dabbling with notions of 
the subject’s historicity. The silence in the paintings results 
from what he conceives as a gamble on Vermeer’s part. A 
gamble that assumed viewers would directly apprehend the 
objects in his paintings, in a mode similar to that of love. 
The relation to the emotion, love that is made here and that 
which we have discussed earlier in relation to the notions of 
‘studium’ and ‘punctum’ seem to indicate the non linguistic 
mode of learning as facilitated by works of art as being 
radically different from notions of syntactic reason, logic or 
any such set of structured linkages that are associated with 
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the cognitive processes that we often associate with forms of 
propositional knowledge. 
On the other hand, Wolf is seen trying to relate the works 
of art to the milieu of the time. He seems to be drawn to 
the process by which the private observations of the artist 
manifest in a work of art which is public. For him the 
art of Vermeer seems to convey a message that pays 
tribute to the life of an interior world. The link that he 
brings to light here is the unique style that characterizes 
Vermeer’s presentation of this internal world of the 
subject. Characteristic of this presentation is the manner in 
which the viewer is offered only a token appearance of the 
subjects interiority as the rest of the interiority is engulfed 
in silence. 
Wolf, Gaskell and Wiseman are thus seen using three 
different perspectives in articulating the notion of silence 
in the experience of the art which for our purposes sketch 
out a brief contour of a non-linguistic mode of learning. 
They all seem to be pointing us towards the contours of an 
entity that can be perceived from a variety of perspectives. 
They posit the related concepts of presence, otherness and 
interiority as some of the qualities that allude to the non 
linguistic elements in the visual medium. A medium that, 
by the virtue of its nature is not directly commensurable 
with natural language. The common link that all three 
share though is the ability of the visual artistic medium 
to presence things in a manner that cannot be rivaled or 
conceived of by the linguistic medium. It is to this ability 
of art to appeal instantantly to the non-cognitive, to that 
which resides in the recesses of language and yet animates 
it dynamically that one discovers the contours of a non 
linguistic mode of learning. 
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Non linguistic modes as a cultural strategy of learning
While the above foray into the world of art has provided us 
us with glimpses of the non linguistic modality as associated 
with notions of otherness, presence and interiority. An 
analysis of the practices of certain American Indian 
communities provides us with a cultural and situated 
understanding of the non linguistic mode as a valid means of 
approaching the domain of personal knowledge. In ‘To Give 
up on Words: Silence in Western Apache Culture’, Keith H. 
Basso uses socio-linguistics and ethno-science to introduce 
us to certian non linguistic aspects of behavior among 
the Western Apache of Cibecue at the Fort Apache Indian 
reservation in east-central Arizona. The study presents 
a number of situations where the American Indians are 
seen to be deliberately refraining from involving in 
conversation. The descriptions of these contextual practices 
are complimented by a discussion on the American Indian 
interpretation and encouragement of such practices (Basso 
1970, p.215). 
‘Meeting strangers’, ‘Courting’, ‘Children, coming home’, 
‘Getting cussed out’, ‘Being with people who are sad’ and 
‘Being with someone for whom they sing’ are six contexts 
that sketch out cultural specific modes of social interaction 
in which “silence is defined as appropriate with respect to a 
specific individual or individuals” (Basso 1970, p.226). 
In the context of ‘Meeting strangers’ we see that the Apache 
are often distrustful of strangers who engage in conversation 
too quickly. Such individuals are believed to hold utilitarian 
motives or considered intoxicated. The ethnographic material 
that Basso presents describes an incident where an Apache 
from one settlement avoids speech from an Apache from 
another settlement for two whole days. They start speaking 
only after a sustained period of careful observation after 
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which one of them acknowledges the conduct of the other as 
acceptable.
‘Courting’ also articulates a similar context of unfamiliarity 
during which young men and women are often observed 
refraining from the use of spoken language in public and 
private settings of early courtship. Girls are often warned by 
mothers and sisters of the perceived slight in virtue among 
girls who spoke freely with boys during courtship. Some of 
these young men too are seen as exhibiting intense shyness, 
self consciousness, unfamiliarity and not knowing what to 
say or do as the some of the reasons for keeping mum. 
‘Children, coming home’ offers yet another interesting 
manifestation of refraining from the use of language in 
dictating familial relations. Here parents avoid speaking with 
those children who have been away from home for long, often 
those returning from boarding school. While the children 
do express their experiences freely, parents listen attentively 
and only begin to converse after a couple of days. As a mode 
of re-orientation this response may be baffling to us, but for 
the Apache parents it represents “the concern that they have 
acquired new ideas and expectations which will alter their 
behavior in unpredictable ways” (Basso 1970, p. 220). 
‘Getting cussed out’ is another context that plays out on a wide 
range of locations from houses, trading posts, ceremonial 
dancing grounds to any place in which an individual can 
get angry and go on a rant. Though often associated with 
drinking parties ‘getting cussed out’ is not limited to such 
situations. The non linguistic engagement maintained in 
such situations takes cognizance that the enraged party is 
crazy or in an irrational state of mind. Such an engagement 
may be characterized as an emotional strategy “to avoid any 
action that will attract attention to oneself” (Basso 1970, 
p.222). 
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In ‘being with people who are sad’, one maintains certain 
decorum while visiting friends or relatives who have 
lost a loved one. Such an engagement is not related to 
the immediate burial period, but verbal disengagement 
manifests over the next couple of weeks until the person is 
believed to have recovered from his/her grief. Such a policy 
first seems to acknowledge the difficulty for these individuals 
to engage in normal conversation. Secondly it acknowledges 
the pointlessness in verbalizing concerns during this period 
of irreplaceable grief and finally it connects grief to anger, 
hostility and possible physical violence, pointing at the 
instability of the self during such times. 
The last scenario is ‘being with someone for whom they sing’ 
which is bound to temporal and physical locations due to 
their status as curing ceremonies. Set in accordance to the 
seasons, these rituals are held either at the ceremonial dancing 
ground or at the home of the sick individual. During these 
ceremonies, only the medicine man is allowed to speak to 
the individual. Verbal communication by others is restricted 
“because Apaches undergoing ceremonial treatment are 
perceived as having been changed by power into something 
different from their normal selves, they are regarded with 
caution and apprehension” (Basso 1970, p.225). 
In close relation to what we have come across earlier as a 
disregard for the categorical gaze that straddles sertian 
formal cognitive processes, these six events describe 
alternative methods that not only identify the ambiguous 
or unpredictable relations between human beings. But also 
proceeds to suggest that the non linguistic modes in which 
these concerns are resolved are not contingent upon the 
situation itself but upon the ambiguous emotional status of 
the individual or individuals in the situation. This is why 
the phenomena of courtship seems to be characteristically 
different from that employed in the vicinity of a stranger. For 
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as Basso recounts, “...an individual’s decision to speak may be 
directly contingent upon the character of his surroundings” 
(Basso 1970, p.215). 
This body of evidence is suggestive of alternative 
conceptualizations of modes of knowing in which individuals 
or groups deploy observation and other tacit processes over 
and above the use of dialogue in mediating processes of 
personal knowing. The famous American child psychiatrist 
Robert Coles introduces Kierkegaard’s observation in The 
Present Age to drive home a point about talkativeness as 
resulting from the fall from grace of the distinction between 
talking and keeping silent, a distinction he feels is crucial 
today. Especially when “the hallmark of our time seems to be 
a lot of psychological chatter, lots of self-consciousness, lots 
of ‘interpretations’” (Coles 1980, p.137). 
The Indian sociologist Veena Das provides us with a similar 
form of learning in the Indian context. In her essay titled the 
Voices of Children she touches upon such learning when she 
describes the forms of relationship between mother and child 
encountered while conducting her fieldwork among urban 
Punjabi families in Delhi. A particular episode she narrates 
of a widowed women Sarla and her son Shanker staying with 
her brothers family is particularly insightful. Das narrates a 
typical dinner scenario where the brother and his children, 
along with Shanker are sitting on the foor to eat food. Both 
the women are working in the kitchen, Sarla serving the hot 
rotis as it is being pulled out of the pan while her sister-in law 
is seen cooking them. As Sarla serves the bread the brothers 
children are seen voicing their rights towards a share of 
the hot bread. Sarla’s son Shanker too would participate in 
this process but would time and again be passed over by his 
mother until he began to whine. At this point Sarla’s brother 
steps in, admonishes her and proceeds to serve Shanker a 
roti out of his own plate. 
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Das analyses this indifference on the part of the mother 
as a communicative strategy in which her status as a 
dependent in her brother’s family is being played out. She 
claims that such a move puts the onus of taking an interest 
in the child upon the other members of the family. Sarla in 
this context is not to be read as a cold indifferent mother 
but rather her passivity should be seen as that which provides 
the other family members with an invitation to care for 
her child. “The social structure of the family was thus 
dramatically displayed to this child at mealtimes every day” 
(Das 1989, p.272). 
Both these contexts of learning in both Apache and Indian 
culture are closely associated with what have earlier 
described as Maslow’s notion of learning to be a human 
being in general and in particular. Learning as captured 
by these two cultural contexts though mediated by the 
immediate do not seem to inhere in the immediate. In this 
sense both Sarla as well as the parents of the American 
Indian children who were returning from school could 
have been direct in the articulation of their concerns. Yet 
we see in these contexts, that the immediate is experienced 
as merely a site of mediation that takes into consideration 
certian other aspects of the process of knowing, such as 
an affective sensitivity that lies beyond a merely cognitive 
treatment of the matter. In such an approach to learning, we 
see that learning is not limited merely to the elements that 
participate in such a mode of learning but rather extends to 
involve various other aspects including aspects such as the 
emotional that are often absent from mainstream cognitive 
descriptions of learning.
Thus in both these cultural treatments of the theme of 
learning we see emerge an alternate epistemology of learning. 
Learning in these contexts seem not to be associated to the 
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mastery of certian symbolic processes and methods that 
formal disciplines hold as sacred but rather point us towards 
those inherent qualities that emerge in human interaction 
with its environment and others. Knowledge of this form 
seem to be associated with our emotions, something that 
does not seem to have much space within the contemporary 
epistemic domain of knowledge and knowing.
Lived Experience and Knowledge
Growing up in a small town and experiencing a localized 
mediation of knowing and being, the move to a bigger city 
for education set into view a conflict of values that highlights 
some aspects of the contemporary approach towards life. 
Among the more powerful feelings that I felt when I made 
this transition as an eighteen year old was a deep sense of 
loss. A feeling of unfamiliarity and a sense of a loss of self. A 
sense of self that had till now been fostered by its associations 
with the people and places that had foregrounded my sense 
of both being a particular human being and one in general. 
Agnes Heller in her definition of the essence of modernity 
provides a way of making sense of this feeling that I had 
experienced. She claims that: 
Modernity has no foundation, since it emerged in and through 
the destruction and deconstruction of all foundations. In 
other words, modernity is founded on freedom (Heller 2000, 
p.1). 
Heller then proceeds to indicate how this foundation of 
freedom is unfit to serve as a foundation. She invokes both 
Heidegger and Hegel in claiming that this ground is rather 
like an abyss because it is a foundation that does not found, 
but rather stimulates a continuous reinvention. Thus the 
newly wrought notions of truth, good and justice serve to to 
displace all existing norms which had in the past set the limit, 
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scope and form of human knowledge and interrogation. As 
abstract as Heller’s definition may sound, and as confounding 
as these new notions of truth good and justice might seem it 
allows us to unpack an interesting trajectory in the paradigm 
of individual development today. 
We can proceed by taking a recourse to the continuous 
reinvention that such a modernity enforces. At the foundation 
of such an inquiry is the individual who in the name of 
freedom is albeit unwittingly directed onto an trajectory of 
educational and vocational progress that expects him/her 
to frame the self and its relations with others a quarantined 
fashion. This stripping away of the emotional being from the 
locality of his/her affective ties in order to accommodate a 
disinterested/detached being is a much valued both academy 
and industry is paradigmatic of the contemporary trajectory 
of an individuals development.
Emotionality arises out of inhibited, interpreted social acts 
in which the subject inserts self-conversations between the 
perception of experience and the organization of action. 
In these conversations, feelings directed to the self mediate 
action and interpretation. Emotionality becomes a social act 
lodged in the social situation (Denzin 1985, p.224). 
Examples that illustrate the various nuances of this phenomena 
abound and I myself am guilty of being party to it. For while 
pursuing my post-graduate degree in philosophy, I used to 
live with a friend who was pursuing his degree in journalism. 
A feature of our educational training that used to come up 
in our discussions often was the perceived lack of rigor in 
the journalism course as compared to the philosophy. As I 
had far more reading to do and assignments to submit, there 
was a certain intellectual distance that I used to articulate 
towards my friends on this basis. Though as the face of the 
matter such an emotional disposition seems trivial, Denzin 
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claims that “it consists of structures of behavior, movements, 
mannerisms, gestures, and feelings that are uniquely the 
person’s”(Denzin 1985, p.227).
We can understand such dispositions as articulating the 
process of knowledge production if we consider it from the 
perspective of Rorty as an endless search for consensus rather 
than an endless search for truth (Moreira and Diversi 2010, 
p.463). In their essay regarding the politics of knowledge 
production, Moreira and Diversi thus stake a claim for what 
they conceive as a visceral knowledge. They claim that this 
knowledge does not reside in the book or brain but rather 
in the lived body. The ability to walk through the slums at 
ease, the ability to interact with soccer fans and sugar cane 
workers are all considered as representative of such a form of 
knowledge. 
Understanding emotionality in this way directs our gaze 
towards the larger stratification that is being played out 
under the pretext of birds of a feather, flocking together. 
Here formal knowledge and the vocational stratification it 
earmarks is but a sign of the even larger scheme of social 
stratification in contemporary society. Doctors fraternizing 
only with other doctors, engineers fraternizing only with 
other engineers is suggestive of such a rendering of our 
being. The gated community of today is thus but a sign of 
such a scheme of being, enforced by a ruthless and rootless 
logic of what it means to be a successful human being. This 
manner of lack of a common foundation is paradigmatic 
of contemporary educational progress. Which as we have 
seen earlier in Polanyi’s description of the achievement of 
Copernicus, is wrought out of a fundamental shift is the 
affective principles that guide human co-existence.
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Education, Experience and Emotion
So far we have discussed the possibility of an alternate 
epistemology of learning. We have seen how the idea of 
knowledge as emotion caters to notions of self actualization 
that the psychologist Maslow held as paradigmatic of 
being human. We also have seen albeit briefly, starting 
with Copernicus and culminating in my own personal 
experiences, the narrow manner in which formal education 
channels the affective structure of the human potential. Now 
let us proceed further by briefly surveying a few examples of 
non formal educational practices and their contribution to 
the knowledge economy. 
We begin this exploration by taking a look at a youth civic 
engagement practice that is active in Gaza and the West Bank 
in Palestine since 2002. The Popular Achievement program 
is a model of civic education or service learning, developed 
by the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University 
of Minnesota. The program is administered by coaches who 
are university students between the age of eighteen to twenty 
four. These students are trained extensively for a period 
of fourteen days to become facilitators of youth groups of 
children between the ages fourteen to seventeen. Run for a 
period of seven months annually, members meet for about 
two to three hours a week. 
In their essay Learning by Doing: The Experience of Popular 
Achievement in Palestine, Suzanne Hammad and Tareq 
Bakri review the achievement of this program over the past 
couple of years. By harnessing team building exercises, group 
discussions and role playing games that reflect on notions 
of the civic, the program fosters the free expression of 
opinion which occurs as trust develops within each youth 
group. “The seven-month learning process of problem 
identification, power mapping, and action planning and 
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doing has been flagged as one of the most important 
outcomes for individuals and groups involved” (Hammad 
and Bakri 2007, p.35). 
The authors credit the program for creating a special space 
that fosters experiences which are free from the domineering 
influences of adults and tradition. They also applaud the 
experiential mode which brings to life concepts which is most 
often encountered in the form of textbook definitions. Of 
interest to us is the manner in which the affective is mapped 
in such practices. As involvement in this form of learning 
begins from the college students who work as facilitators, 
involve adolescents who form the action team and extends 
to the larger community of adults by virtue of the specific 
action goals chosen on the basis of the shared context.
The experience of achieving specific goals such as the setting 
up of a Community library or a Computer or Sports room 
seems to have paved the way for the affective in the sense that 
they helped in getting the larger community together. The 
festivals carried out to celebrate the success of the program, 
in which the adult members of the community participated 
indicates the larger impact of such civic learning projects.” 
This has contributed to the creation of a complex network of 
relationships based on shared experiences, expertise, skills, 
creativity and wisdom” (Hammad and Bakri 2007, p.41). 
Notions of being someone and especially someone in relation 
to the community is a recurring theme in the testimonies of 
the coaches. They seem to suggest that both effect and affect 
are closely intertwined here as the effect of the project was not 
restricted to the goals that had been set by each group. The 
blooming of affective relationships between the facilitator 
and those facilitated, stemming from the non-intrusive, non-
coercive and non-judgmental interaction are all suggestive of 
the alternate epistemology of knowledge that we have been 
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exploring so far. In an interview to the executive editor of 
Change, the Harvard psychiatrist Robert Coles discusses 
the role that the experience of community service plays in 
the ethical and moral development of students as well as 
professors. He frames community service in terms of a moral 
and psychological antidote to competitiveness and greedy 
self assertion which he sees only as articulating one aspect 
of human nature. Though he does not restrict such service 
to any particular age group, he does claim the intersection 
between high school and college to be an important starting 
point as it is here that one can anticipate the development of 
class divisions. 
Coles posits a number of projects that can foster learning 
through service. Working on environmental and ecological 
projects, working with children, the elderly, nursing homes, 
prisons etc. Any domain which requires the energy and 
intelligence of young people who can provide intellectual, 
emotional and moral support seems apt for carrying out 
such service projects. He posits such projects as supporting a 
two way knowledge process as he sees service as a a mutual 
process which involves both helping and being helped. 
Speaking of such forms of learning he claims: “Educationally, 
because I think it is a tremendous way for students to learn 
sociology, anthropology, psychology and social ethics, and, 
in a sense, to learn about others and about themselves in the 
most effective way I know” (Coles 1989, p19). 
Sports and Learning
In the previous section we saw a number of learning 
experiences and the manner in which they contribute to the 
fostering of personal knowledge that is socally and emotionally 
relevant. Another avenue that allows us to enunciate such 
alternate modes of learning is that characterised by the 
world of sports. Modern sports trace their origin back to the 
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advent of the industrialisation of England, a period during 
which the body which was previously treated with scepticism 
undergoes a radical transformation such that it becomes an 
important part of the social as well as educational apparatus 
of the modern state. Sports in this sense comes to represent 
a valuable form of leisure for urban dwellers and also a rich 
field for learning important values. At the forefront of such a 
transformation was the Muscular Christian movement which 
sought to introduce the care of the body as an important 
religious imperative (De Ceuster 2003, p. 57). 
In her essay Women and Sports: Extending Limits to Physical 
Expression, Prakash offers us a feminist reading of sports 
from the Indian context. Such a reading traces the gradual 
manner in which women around the world have after 
decades of struggle made their entry into the world of sports. 
Prakash skillfully uses this context to address many of the 
biological myths associated with the subjugation of women. 
But the principle insight we can draw from her discussion 
is the acknowledgement of the manner in which modern 
sports provide for women, an alternative form of expression, 
leisure and enjoyment. Acknowledging the heritage of folk 
dances in having fulfilled this need in the past, Prakash urges 
that “...we must recognise that dance may not be everyone’s 
choice of communicating or giving expression to emotion” 
(Prakash 1990, p. 29). 
This quality of sports as providing an alternate form to 
expression, leisure and enjoyment can often be found listed 
under the socially and psychologically integrative aspects 
of sports. In their analysis of the leisure sport of Bowling 
as an ‘ephemeral role’ that caters to drives not fulfilled by 
the dominant role responsibility of everyday life, Steele and 
Zurcher list four physchological and six social functions of 
sports. Drawing on a number sources they list: preparation 
for life, catharsis of socially unapproved drives in a 
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socially acceptable manner, relaxation and recreation and 
identity generation, reinforcement and expression as the 
four psychological functions of sport. While afffiliation, 
socialisation, status and prestige needs, occupational needs, 
fulfilling the wishes of others and the seperation from 
dominant roles and significant others are listed as the social 
functions (Steele and Zurcher 1973, p.348). 
The demarcation problem in sport is a serious concern that 
often plagues discussions of sport, it is useful to note that 
one can approach this question either by considering the 
common traits or characterestics of sports practices around 
the globe or by focussing on one case at a time (Wertz 2002, 
p. 100). While the former approach as we have explored 
suggests the knowledge associated with leisure sports to be 
psychologically and socially integrative, a more detailled 
account is necessary to sketch the contours of such a learning. 
The modern lifestyle sport of Windsurfing provides us with 
an opportunity to take a closer look at the experiences of 
learning that are involved. The experience of Windsurfing as 
a sport is characterised by the dynamic relationship between 
body, kit sail and board, water and wind. Learning to 
windsurf in this sense cannot be draw upon other previous 
learning experiences. Knowing to windsurf in this sense 
resides in the interaction of the body with the kit which 
involves various fine adjustments of the body in relation the 
board and the mast. Since the windsurfer does not have have 
a rudder or a handlebar most steering occurs by using the 
heel and the toe which adjust the angle of the board against 
the water (Dant and Wheaton 2007, p. 10). 
Since two people cannot surf aboard one board one can 
discern in such a sport a very intuitive approach to learning. 
So while the result of being able to windsurf does open 
access to the subculture, the process though aided by the 
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hints and suggestions of fellow windsurfers is in not directly 
intuitive as the required skills are not on the same plane as 
the skills of walking and running which we learn without 
really being taught. Dant and Wheaton quote Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of the ‘intentional arc’ to describe the manner 
in which such a form of embodied learning expresses an 
individuals intentions through the motor capacity of the 
body. So while the exhilirating experience of windsurfing 
provides for a unique form of expression, Dant and Wheaton 
claim that “the motivation to engage in the action and the 
pleasure derived from engagement are linked to how the 
boday has learnt to be in the world” (Dant and Wheaton 
2007, p. 11). 
Conclusion
Though such forms of facilitating learning through 
incidental means still do exist and are pursued across the 
world, such experiences are receding into the shadow of 
the rush that is fostered in contemporary cultures. The 
dominating means to an end approach has cast its shadow 
across such alternate experiences of learning such that 
activities are pursued only if there are tangible benefits 
available for the participant. The packaged deliverable that 
formal education caters to is now endemic to other realms 
of the contemporary lifestyle as well. One factor more that 
anything else has contributed to this subtle overshadowing 
is the contemporary phenomenon of the time crunch. 
There exists a vast literature which documents this event, 
including what the Japanese refer to as Karoshi which 
literally means ‘work to death’ (Kanai 2009, p.209). 
This is a phenomenon that one experiences when one visits 
most urban centers. Most people don’t seem to have the time 
or luxury to pursue leisure activities that seemingly reflect a 
sense of self outside the immediate ambit of their vocations. 
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While critics may point out certain individuals as pursuing 
such ends, often they are exceptional individuals. What needs 
to be taken into consideration here is the lack of a universal 
imperative in delivering such learning experiences across 
the spectrum. This paper thus urges us to re-consider the 
dominant manner in which learning is framed and especially 
the treatment it mets out upon the affective or non-cognitive 
aspects that often remain invisible withing the realms of 
formal knowledge. Acknowledgement of such factors can 
assist us in better understanding the process of teaching and 
learning and the gap that exist between the two.
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This paper attempts to discern the most inseparable part and 
practice of school curriculum and that is assessment. The kind 
of assessment being enquired is the one whose purpose is to 
understand learning in a context, largely that of the classroom 
with multiple learners and the kind which serves certain 
pedagogic purposes and not those of judging an individual 
for his or her potential or ability to do something in future 
(famously the entrance examinations etc.). This aspect of 
schooling evokes strong emotions among teachers, learners 
and educationists. Often being associated with moral aspect1 
of educating individuals; assessment in form of examinations 
and tests is considered as most important aspect of teaching 
learning process at least in a formal sense and claimed to 
be closely connected to learning. The following discussion 
attempts to abstract theory of assessment and its alleged 
connection with learning, through various philosophical 
perspectives and reasoning by thinkers and educationists. 
1.  Often teachers opine “Pariksha ke bina Shiksha Adhuri hi nahi, 
nirarthak bhi hai. Bina Pariksha ke shiksharthi aalsi aur durachari 
banega” (without examination education is not only incomplete but 
meaningless too. A learner is deemed to be lazy and even may turn 
towards bad behavior without examinations)
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There are certain defining features of classroom assessment; 
firstly it is closely related to pedagogic process of reasoning 
about what students know and how they develop a 
competence in a subject domain. Secondly it is a purposeful 
practice for various means and ends, which involve 
assistance in learning, measurement of individual 
achievement and to evaluate programs (Pellagrino et.al, 
2001, p.36). further it can be safely assumed that in 
principle assessment has to be imprecise to some degree 
for the assessment results are estimates, based on samples 
of knowledge and performance drawn from much larger 
universe of what a person knows and can do. (ibid. 36) 
And at the macro level the questions of maintaining quality 
and accountability, for public interest as school education 
is after all a societal endeavor involving not only material 
resources but a great deal of tacit expectations of values, 
socio cultural and not to forget a great deal of national 
interests. And to this end what else could answer more 
objectively apart from the report card of a child going 
to school which has all the symbols, letters or numbers 
which stand as an assurance of the fact that schools are 
working to the aforesaid expectations or indeed are not 
doing so. This understanding about assessment practices 
poses no problem if it can be freed from added baggage 
of issues it carries apart from technical aspects of validity 
reliability etc. the issues are societal on one hand and deeply 
epistemic on the other. The most important one is that of 
conception of assessment in practice which has a wide 
range indeed, starting from informal classroom teaching 
learning based done by the teachers on everyday basis for 
their own planning and monitoring of teaching. Secondly 
on a large scale it assumes the form of school leaving 
examination or summative assessments at the end of some 
units of lessons. The latter ones have unavoidable inherent 
disadvantages especially for socio economically, socio 
295Looking into notions of assessment in education
culturally and to physically or mentally disadvantaged. 
Even though disadvantage of certain individuals solely 
as a reading of assessment results can be assumed as an 
avoidable shortcoming, it is still very large scale to be ignored 
completely. 
Then there are other type of small scale assessment 
practices as mentioned earlier, that serve useful purpose 
for the teachers to monitor students’ learning, performance 
in certain skills and to modify her ways accordingly in a 
classroom situation. Even this type of small scale routine 
assessment practices have to be deeply understood for not 
only their pedagogic underpinnings but for their assumed 
nature of learning and nature of knowledge and not to forget 
aims of education. As Willis (1993) reiterates “…learning 
theory that underlies technicist assessment models is based 
on particular assumptions about the activity of learning 
and its product as well as nature of knowledge”. It is more 
often that the underlying assumptions about learning when 
one sets to assess it (learning) by some way is that learning 
is indeed unidirectional in nature with certain inputs or 
stimulus creating certain changes in the mental make up of 
the learner that is plastic and these inputs can be retraced 
or rather judged by the results of the students assessment. 
It is quite surprising to know the simplistic ways in which 
the purposes and the ends of assessment are well agreed 
upon practically. My experience in teaching in a formal 
school tells that this centrality and credence of assessment 
is rarely ever doubted by the teaching community, and it 
won’t be incorrect to claim that all the teaching and learning 
affairs of the school are simply to serve the purposes of 
assessment and performance of the students to the same. 
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Analyzing the needs and possibilities – philosophical 
perspectives
With the changing conceptions of school curriculum, there 
is an implicit need to change the assessment practices. The 
National Curriculum Framework 2005 paved a way to be 
followed by the schools systems in the country with an aim 
to change this centrality of examinations and hence was 
the idea of continuous comprehensive evaluations famously 
called CCE introduced in the schools. And to the dismay 
of the conventional teachers and school administrators the 
idea was more intimidating than relieving for its ambiguity 
of purpose and complexity of practicing it. Nevertheless 
continuous and comprehensive evaluation of students with 
skewed teacher student ratios is a farce and appears to 
be more victimizing2 than the traditional examinations 
at least for the teachers of our country, and not to forget 
the limitations which may turn out to the disadvantage of 
learners. 
With this state of affairs the question that could be asked then 
is what is it to be discerned about assessment for its rooted 
in the pragmatics of teaching and learning which itself may 
be conceptualized variedly? And if assessment is indeed 
indispensable then it is simply a matter of technical aspects 
of administering various types of educational assessments to 
keep a check on the happenings in the classroom. The answer 
to such questions will be discussed further. 
2.  Continuous and Comprehensive evaluation which is conceptualized 
assiduously by the school authorities and policy makers as a threat to 
the education system and hence needs to be kept in constant check by 
imposing record keeping, maintaining rubrics and constantly evaluating 
the learners in the garb of formative assessments which are nothing but 
more exams for the learners and more record keeping for the teacher. 
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Analytical positions on assessment: Andrew Davis and 
Winch and Gingell 
There have certainly been varied philosophical and analytical 
traditions which bring in the discourse of learning and hence 
teaching being an imperative for the same. These traditions 
emerge out of and beyond those of psychology which largely 
deals with aspects of learning and less with teaching. But 
before this there is even a larger, more rigorous attempt of 
discerning the ideas of knowledge, forms of understanding 
and hence what is suitable for school education namely 
curriculum. With this background work of analytical 
traditions in education little has been talked about assessment 
in certain traditions while more has been understood in 
certain others. While the paradigms of understanding 
knowledge, human learning and hence teaching which are 
influenced by the behaviorist traditions emphasize certain 
aspects of human learning3 central to educational enterprise, 
the more recent approaches including the constructivist one 
see these differently. Nevertheless none of the philosophical 
traditions have denied the central role of teaching and 
choosing certain special acts which qualify for the teaching 
practice in a formal setting. And hence perhaps assessment 
has been an indispensable part of the teaching practice 
whatever may be the assumed need it may fulfill and end to 
which it may take. If this idea is to be agreed upon then there 
is little or no scope of any further discussion on assessment 
practices, for whatever said and done, if assessment serves 
some if not all educational purposes then its an end to the 
discussion. But this idea deserves serious contemplation, if 
3.  Educational traditions which give a lot of importance to focused, 
control teaching and learning wrought by well defined behavioral 
objectives, certainly emphasize a need to check and recheck whether the 
objectives have been met or not through various ways, like tests, quizzes 
and verbal repletion of what has been taught.
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only for one reason and that of the present day scenario of 
school education which rather seems more ambiguous than 
clear and seems to be unable to move out of the clichés of 
competencies, school performance and public assessment 
based quality debates. Not to forget the question of how the 
well thought out aims of education be achieved if one takes 
assessment practices more seriously or otherwise. 
Further thinking about assessment also requires more 
arguing about qualification of large scale assessment in 
form of year end examinations, summative assessments or 
board examinations so to say, for these have been a source 
of greater debate because of various downsides and 
upsides and analysis certain shows greater downsides than 
upsides. 
Various such attempts to discuss, qualify and analyze the 
practice, purpose and the philosophy of assessment some 
accounts present a detailed analysis and argument discussing 
both socio political and epistemic aspects of school level 
assessment of learning and examinations. Amongst these 
discussions certain noteworthy analysis is done by Andrew 
Davis 4(1995). He contends that assessment practices in 
school in whichever form are not only invalid but also 
unreliable and further opines that it is not possible to 
measure any kind of learning through whatever is perceived 
as assessment of learning. He systematically analyses the 
perceived needs of assessment and also disapproves of each 
of these needs by systematically arguing against each case. 
The felt need of assessment for differentiation of choosing 
pedagogic interventions for different learner needs is 
discarded because this type of understanding has certain 
diagnostic intentions and has cognitive underpinnings, 
4.  in the paper “Need for philosophical treatment of Assessment”Journal 
of philosophy of education volume 32
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which may very well argued for as well as against, and little 
generality can be attained. To understand the conceptual 
flaw in the learners’ understanding is a kind of a cognitive 
treatment which is not necessary; for it is more necessary for 
a teacher to know the efforts taken by the learner than to 
judge her cognitive skills on the basis of her performance in 
certain kind of test. A diagnostic approach is quite negative 
according to Davis. 
Secondly if it can be supposed that assessments can be a 
way to pin pointedly give feedbacks to students for what 
they need to do or not in order to learn in a better way, then 
the contention can be whether such type of feedbacks can 
actually be understood by the young learners especially if 
they are too young and if they are old enough wouldn’t their 
attitudes towards learning matter more? Because if learning 
be so consciously modifiable by the learners then most 
of the problems or issues of teaching and learning would 
be simplistically solved, but certainly this is not the case. 
Davis further discards the validity and reliability aspect of 
assessment by putting forward that any assessment relates 
to a performance in a context, any attempt to generalize by 
predicting that the performance will be the same in further 
contexts will be unjustified. (Davis, 1995, Winch &Gingell, 
1996). Finally the aspects teaching to assessments pose a 
serious problem to teaching for rich knowledge as the former 
certainly focus on shallow aspects competencies and skill 
based teaching to cater only to the demands of modern 
industrial societies. 
But to argue for the positive side of assessment Winch 
and Gingell (1996) come up with the central argument of 
accountability of teachers and public education system as a 
whole. They insist “assessment is a necessary feature of the 
work of any teacher who takes his job seriously. This is a 
sufficient reason why a teacher should be prepared to assess 
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pupils as a part of taking his professional duties seriously” 
(ibid, 378). Secondly, the reason they have to be accountable 
is that there are public resources and stakes involved in 
public schooling and hence it is necessary to indicate to 
the general public in some manner about the works of the 
school in terms of how much knowledge and skills are being 
developed in the learners. To this argument there are some 
counters which will be explained in the later sections. Some 
epistemic claims that Winch and Gingell seem to make in 
order to qualify assessment practices in education are as 
follows: it has to be agreed that no assessment of learning 
can be ever completely valid of reliable, but this aspect of 
any form of assessment should be catered by making them 
more diverse in nature and certainly whatever that can be 
assessed of learning should be assessed if not everything. 
Moreover if teaching involves mere teaching to the test that 
is to say making the learners perform to their best possible 
in the tests is not objectionable as long as tests are reasonable 
and the teaching is sensible (ibid, p. 386). Thus they seem to 
approve of educational assessment both to the socio political 
ends and to the teaching learning processes and qualify 
the standardized testing in terms of year end examinations 
for the sake of public accountability and evaluation of 
educational programs. 
These two treatments above seem to be polarized in terms 
of their treatment with respect to assessment in practice as 
well as in theory. One discards the possibility of any kind 
of educational assessment completely and the other indeed 
proves it indispensable for the entire formal educational 
agenda. However one can also disagree with Gingell and 
Winch’s position with respect to assessment as serving the 
purpose for public accountability with a simple contention 
that such types of assessment practices can always be 
made easier to administer and to mislead the general 
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public’s understanding about school and about students’ 
performance though not intentionally. 
These analysis about assessment in educational practice 
are indeed important and have a general nature in the 
sense that one need not want to get into the sociological, 
systemic and other qualitative aspects of assessment once 
we agree with the needs and possibility of assessment of 
learning in school education. But one cannot ignore these 
aspects completely when it comes to educating masses in 
a country like ours, with its colonial past still holds on to 
“British Colonial Ideology” and requires individuals to 
possess workable aptitudes for certain vocations than to 
develop rational autonomy of thought and knowledge. With 
changing scenario of globalization there are even greater 
vocational demands which need the individuals to be more 
competent in certain skills viz. communication, technology 
and market values. And with this emphasis on skill 
development and competence will hence lead to Thinking 
of assessment in terms of measurable learning achievement, 
just leads to privileging a certain kind of learning areas, 
and impoverishes the child in the abilities, necessary for 
leading a richer aesthetic, ethical, moral and social life. The 
second problem with measurability is that there too many 
assumptions involved in connecting what the measurable 
are and what the worth learning is. Bill Ayers has put it 
precisely as “it is beyond the scope of standardized testing to 
test intuitive, creativity, imagination, conceptual thinking, 
curiosity, efforts, irony, judgment, commitment, nuance, 
goodwill, ethical refection, and moral values”. Further, what 
they measure and count, are isolated skills, specific facts and 
function and content knowledge. 
How then can there be a consonance of these important 
aspects of human learning in formal education? Or could 
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one hope to work with piecemeal concentrating on one and 
letting go off other? 
Some empirical studies on assessment practices and learning 
attitudes in students 5
Many a times one comes across various strategies employed 
by the learners to perform to the tests as well perceive the 
role of assessments in learning and hence display certain 
attitudes towards learning. One such mentionable work is 
of Marton and Saljo (1976, 1984) (Willis, 1993, p. 386). 
Their research demonstrates the approaches students used 
when learning was directly related to quality of learning 
outcome (ibid, p.386). Two types of approaches or strategies 
of learning were identified which were termed as deep 
approach and surface approaches. While in the former 
approach the learner tried to identify deeper meanings, 
understanding and integrative approach of linking the 
present and prior knowledge, in the latter approach 
the learner is concerned with superficial features of the 
contents with an intention of rote learning (Willis, 1993, 
p.387). These approaches enabled a differential understanding 
and retention of the details of contents. The learners 
employing deeper strategies were better likely to understand 
the intricacies of the subject and were better able to link 
them with the learning outcomes. John Biggs gave a more 
elaborate account of these strategies in his work with tertiary 
and secondary school students and their approaches to 
learning. He basically categorized three approaches and 
combined them to describe two more viz. surface approach, 
deep approach, achievement oriented, surface achieving 
and deep achieving. These approaches were backed by the 
5.  This section is a part of assignment as a part of a course on “Curriculum 
and School” during MA in Education (elementary) from TISS, Mumbai, 
in 2010; unpublished review by Aruna Bajantri of research of Deborah 
Willis on learning and assessment. 
303Looking into notions of assessment in education
motivational aspects towards learning. The deep approach 
enabled the learner to perceive meaning and acquiring higher 
competence through wide readings and interrelating with 
existing knowledge. The surface approach was employed 
with a motive of meeting the institutional requirements 
minimally, thus just enabling limited understanding which 
can be sufficiently reproduced through rote learning. 
Achievement orientation approach is generally sought with 
a motive of ego enhancement through high performance 
and grades, with a greater strategizing and management 
of time and resources. Now this description of approaches 
of learning by the students cannot be complete without 
the explanation about the concepts of learning possessed 
by the learners through their learning experiences. Beaty 
et.al (1990) discusses these concepts as understood by the 
students regarding what learning is all about? Six broad 
categories of concepts are elaborately presented in the 
article, which is as follows:
A. Increasing one’s knowledge: the students view learning 
as a process of accumulation of discrete concepts and 
items of knowledge are to be possessed and there is no 
distinction between knowledge in learning process. 
Learning here refers simply to acquisition of knowledge.
B. Learning as memorizing and reproducing: the motive of 
reproduction of accumulated knowledge here guides the 
idea of learning, thus learning is conceived as a process 
of memorization for the purpose of later application in 
the tests and examination.
C. Learning as applying: the ability of being able to apply 
the accumulated knowledge is referred to as learning 
in this case. Better the application in tests or outcome 
of rote memorization better the learning. Generally 
this view predominates almost all spheres of classroom 
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teaching and learning, as effective teaching is perceived 
in accordance to the performance of the learners in 
tests which further asses ability of reproduction of 
accumulated facts and information and so is the case 
with effective learning.
D. Learning as understanding: here the learning is described 
as gaining understanding and insight from the learning 
material, for the sake of it. But this view limits itself to 
classroom and within the school. It is centered on the 
learner who attempts to extract meanings from the 
contents. 
E. Learning as an interpretive process aimed at 
understanding reality: learning means change in person’s 
way of thinking, and which extends beyond classroom to 
the outside world. The new ways of thinking and change 
in perception is simultaneous phenomenon with that 
of learning, not seen as a later application of learning 
process.
F. Learning as changing as a person: this is an extension of 
learning as an interpretive process as the learner changes 
as person and moves towards self realization. 
It is very interesting that these types of concepts are very 
apparent in daily classroom experience, where one finds 
students regurgitating the text and mathematical algorithms 
verbatim for the sake of good performance in the tests and 
examination. It is peculiar to see that such students hardly seek 
a qualitative feedback on their performance. The quantitative 
grades suffice their own need to self improvisation. Also it is 
not rare to find students struggling to derive true meaning of 
whatever they are taught and their attempt to contextualize 
the concepts is very apparent, many a times in such cases 
the kind of language used to express the need of deeper 
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meaning either helps the students seek the answers or on 
the contrary it curtails their effective learning. The latter 
generally happens when the students are unable to articulate 
their need for deeper understanding of the given concept 
and are also unable to relate it to their context. In such cases 
students succumb to the shallow practices of assessment and 
their poor performance becomes indicative of their lack of 
intellect or that of right attitude, a phenomenon described by 
Nell Keddie in his analysis of classroom knowledge.
These concepts are proved to guide the students’ approach 
to learning, which can be superficial or deep approaches 
described earlier. Willis emphasizes that these concepts 
about learning held by learners lead to process and product of 
learning and that the understanding about students’ learning 
is not possible without discernment of these perceptions. But 
a deeper analysis of these perceptions about the concept of 
learning and regarding the reasons behind their inculcation 
needs to be done. It shouldn’t be incorrect to say that 
somewhere these perceptions develop out of classroom 
teaching and learning experiences, which are greatly driven 
by the objective assessment of learning outcomes of the 
students. Indeed the whole process of teaching and learning 
is centered more around the aspect of assessment than that 
of holistic learning which incorporates interpretive process 
and a change in the way of thinking of the learner; on the 
contrary learning is discerned as the learning outcome 
itself. The felt reasons behind the A and B type of learning 
concept is that the teaching itself involves nothing more 
than the instruction and supply of pieces of information or 
discrete forms of knowledge and learning in this form of 
teaching is considered to have taken place only when these 
pieces of information are reproduced verbatim. The idea of 
behavioral outcomes of learning greatly govern the teaching 
practices and thus the forms of assessment which are easy 
306 Conceptualizing education, and related issues
to undertake and cheap to administer; a technicist approach 
of assessment described by Willis. It is ironical that the true 
need of assessment is hardly understood by any of the players 
in education which further leads to a never ending vicious 
circle of teaching for assessment of learning outcomes that 
build the concept of rote learning assessment oriented 
approach by the learner. The disentanglement of true need of 
assessment from the existing practices is almost impossible. 
Generally the notion of future performance based on today’s 
learning outcomes predominate the classroom culture. It is 
needless to say that the performance in tests and examination 
through any means is the factor deciding vocational aspects 
of the learners’ life. The notion of understanding the 
students’ shortfalls or gaps in learning through assessment 
is a missing factor, instead a poor performance in the tests 
is considered to be an attitudinal deviance on the part of 
the student. The failure of performance quantitatively, is 
attributed to negligence and lack of hard work on the part 
of the student. The increasing socio economic demands and 
ideas of competence as well as competition undoubtedly 
influence the classroom practices. Thus the concepts of 
learning as rote memorization and reproduction of facts and 
information taught in the classroom generally predominate, 
while it is rare to find that student’s posses the D and E type 
of learning concepts. 
Identifiable problems with the assessment approach 
Willis mentions that the theories of holistic learning and 
teaching practices hardly converge with the actual practices 
of assessment. While the learning is theoretically supposed 
to bring in a change in the way thinking and motivation to 
extract deeper meaning of knowledge, the actual assessment 
practices do not seem to check these theories, it to say that 
the validity of assessment with respect to the theories of 
learning can be said to be insufficient. Secondly on one side 
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teaching still is found to be teacher centered but on the other 
side assessment is simply intended to test the learner only. 
Further the inability of the student to perform effectively 
in the assessment is attributed to a behavioral deviance and 
possession of wrong attitude towards learning by the student. 
Lastly it can be said that not only the students posses the 
above mentioned type of concepts of learning but it is also 
the teachers who perceive learning differently and the held 
perceptions guide the strategy of teaching as well. Other 
institutional issues and constraints related to structural 
problems existing in the educational scenario lead to a 
technicist approach of assessment, which indeed gives lesser 
autonomy to the teacher as well as the learner to decide the 
process of teaching and learning in the classroom. In such a 
situation one really finds it difficult to answer the questions 
like assessment for what and how can assessment converge 
with the idea of holistic learning? To conclude in the words 
of Willis there is a great need of revisiting the theories of 
assessment which compliment the curricular reforms and a 
greater need to develop approaches of assessment which not 
only asses the students learning but also open up windows 
for both the teacher and the learner to see the holistic picture 
of learning. 
Some suggestions on assessment 
The discussion till now brought into view major conceptual 
aspects and empirical findings with respect to assessment 
practices in formal education. While it cannot be denied 
that assessment of teaching and learning are necessary in an 
educational endeavor, it is important to discuss certain basic 
principles that should underlie these practices. It is clear 
till now that any attempt to measure learning through any 
kind of assessment does indeed provide a limited answer to 
holistic teaching and learning, and in spite of this it seems an 
unavoidable practice. So it is now important to conceptualize 
308 Conceptualizing education, and related issues
this important aspect with greater emphasis on underlying 
assumptions about learning and over arching aims and 
objectives of education. When it is well agreed that aims of 
education cannot simply be that of supplanting learners with 
knowledge and information from outside, but to make them 
active participants in knowledge creation, then the school 
experience certainly has to be such that it is not linearly 
organized into small facets of teaching to certain well defined 
ends. In such a case the assessment of learning cannot be 
outcome oriented but has to be process oriented. And this not 
only at primary level but as far as possible at all levels. One 
might argue that at secondary and tertiary levels where it 
becomes important aspect of school experience to provide for 
building up of subject knowledge (forms of understanding) 
in a more formal sense, the requirements of discipline cannot 
be simply construed by certain loose interaction in the 
classroom. Then does this mean that teaching and learning 
processes have to be strictly controlled and conceived as a 
laboratory of a scientist who experiments with her objects 
controlling inputs here and there and observing outputs? This 
suggestion seems not only improbable but also unethical in a 
wider sense of endeavor of human education. The classroom 
interactions have to be deeply thought out for the intended 
purposes that have to be met and not for mere judgments of 
individual skill development, that is to say that teaching to 
test has to be an unacceptable norm of classroom interaction, 
but teaching in order to develop certain attitudes of learning 
the forms of understanding has to be a norm. For wanting to 
teach solving mathematical equation is certainly not an end 
in itself, it is important that these equations are perceivable 
by the students as certain mathematical tools in larger realm 
of mathematical knowledge. With such larger picture of 
educational objectives in mind, one cannot certainly ignore 
the smaller identifiable aspects of learning, in the process 
and constant monitoring of these aspects is an undeniable 
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need. Thus in principle assessment can assume a form of 
monitoring as described by John White (1999) “Children’s 
progress in acquiring rich knowledge and understanding can 
be followed by a mixture of day to day monitoring and more 
systematic recording and in class testing. With older students 
an important form of monitoring lies in seeing how far 
they are developing a whole hearted commitment to school 
related activities” (white, 1999, p. 210). But monitoring itself 
can assume forms of hierarchy in educational endeavor, for 
one who is monitored is certainly positioned lower than one 
who is monitoring, and such a hierarchy is nothing different 
from the traditional teacher and the taught hierarchies. 
Teacher student interaction and dialogue- knowing the 
student personally
The purpose of philosophy in education is not only to ask 
questions in educational endeavors but also to identify 
educational ideals. And why should one not perceive ideals 
in something as technical aspect as that of assessment in 
classroom. Teachers assuming the role of mediators and 
facilitators knowledge in perceived ideals of present day 
education, there is a need to identify that teacher student 
interactions and dialogues indeed can be processes which 
replace the older technicist forms of assessment. What can 
be better than knowing a student personally for his or her 
feats of educational achievements in the course of classroom 
interactions and various educational tasks that intend to 
enhance learning and hence knowledge than to merely 
test the reproduction of information being fed passively 
by teachers in traditional ways? For personal acquaintance 
with the learner is a way to understand the attitudes of 
the learner and the nature of child in more progressive 
conceptualization of education. The interaction and dialogue 
intended here is not a day to day dialogue between two 
individuals, but more in the sense of educational, intentional 
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dialogue, where the teacher is certainly at a higher cognitive 
level trying to bring about desired changes in the learner 
through well sought out teaching learning experiences and 
also allowing a scope for integration of various forms of 
understanding than to be confined within the premises of a 
given subject matter. 
Assessment for Meta- learning
As described in earlier sections that the attitudes towards 
and perception about learning in students after certain levels 
do affect learning strategies, whilst these strategies can only 
be affected superficially through tests and examinations, 
it is important to recognize that learners indeed display 
an agency in the process of education, whether negative or 
positive. The most sought after ideal of liberal education 
is that the learners actively participate in knowing and 
creating knowledge. Given certain classroom experiences 
in piecemeal means and end form, can this ideal be simply 
achieved? May be never, process oriented approach towards 
assessment involving greater agency of the learners to decide 
whether what is appropriate skill that should be assessed 
by the teacher; when and how to administer a test after 
completion of a given lesson or unit, places the learner in 
active participation of teaching learning process. For self 
judgment and peer interactions have greater potential to 
lead towards larger social good than nurturing the feeling of 
individual achievement and competition in performance in 
shallow tests and examinations.
Principles of assessment and evaluation through the 
perspectives of aims of education 
In discussion so far the guiding principle of assessment 
and evaluation seems to emerge from various sources like 
the emergence and consonance over aims and objectives 
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of education and hence those of curricular decisions, the 
principles of assessment and evaluation have to map these 
aspects of formal education. If the aim of education is to 
develop independent and critical thinking in the learners, 
one cannot assess the learners merely on reproducible 
information or routine literacy and competency skills. 
Further if the larger goals of curricular planning seek to 
imbibe ideals of social justice, democracy and equality, 
these goals have to be reflected in assessment and evaluation 
schemes. If social living and virtues of rational autonomy 
are to be valued over individual self centered growth, then 
individual centric learning and assessment of the same 
have to be discarded by ideas of social learning and social 
construction of knowledge. Thus the ideals of education 
to percolate down to those practices in close confines of 
classroom is indeed a complex process, not to forget as trivial 
an aspect of educational assessment aimed at identifying 
and modifying teaching and learning. Objectified empiricist 
practices of testing and measuring are indeed necessary 
but certainly not sufficient. What is required is an open 
ended, principled approach that is indeed comprehensive as 
well as continuous process with larger overarching aims of 
education in mind. 
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